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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation reports two meta-analyses on verbal cues to deception. 
Whereas the first synthesis focuses on the validity of linguistic cues to deception, the 
second article focuses on the inter-rater reliability of verbal content cues. In general, 
the validity deals with the question if and to what extent a certain indicator of 
deception distinguishes truthful from deceptive statements. On the other side, the 
inter-rater reliability describes the amount of agreement that can be reached from 
several evaluators when rating specific verbal content cues. 
More specifically, the first meta-analysis investigates the validity of linguistic 
cues to deception that are assessed with computer programs. From 44 studies 
meeting the inclusion criteria, operational definitions for 79 linguistic cues were 
identified and allocated to six broader research questions. As predicted, meta-
analyses showed that relative to truth-tellers, liars experienced greater cognitive 
load, expressed more negative emotions, and distanced themselves more from 
events. On the other side, liars expressed fewer sensory-perceptual words, and 
referred less often to cognitive processes. However, compared to liars, truth-tellers 
slightly used more terms related to uncertainty. Most main effects were moderated 
by several important independent variables such as event type, personal 
involvement, emotional valence, intensity of interaction, motivation, production mode, 
type of computer program and publication status. Although the average effect size 
was small, theoretical predictions were partially supported indicating that (a) liars and 
truth-tellers seem to use different words in a specific context and (b) computer 
programs can be designed to count some of these linguistic differences. However, at 
this point, computer programs are far from being applied in real life deception 
detection contexts. These findings not only further our knowledge about the 
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usefulness of linguistic cues to detect deception with computers in applied settings 
but also elucidate the relationship between language and deception. 
The second meta-analysis examines the inter-rater reliability of a different 
kind of verbal content criteria, the so-called Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA). 
CBCA consists of 19 credibility criteria and constitutes an important component of 
Statement Validity Assessment (SVA). SVA is a forensic assessment procedure 
used in many countries to evaluate whether statements (e.g., of sexual abuse) are 
based on experienced or fabricated events. Furthermore, these criteria have 
frequently been adapted for research on the detection of deception as a “credibility 
assessment tool”. A total of 82 hypothesis tests from 52 English and 22 German 
studies were included and revealed high inter-rater reliabilities for most CBCA 
criteria as measured with several reliability indices. Due to large heterogeneity, 
moderator analyses and meta-regression were conducted on Pearson’s r. Significant 
findings occurred for research paradigm, intensity of rater training, type of rating 
scale used, and the frequency of occurrence of CBCA criteria (base rates) for some 
criteria. Implications for future research and forensic practice are discussed. 
In summary, these meta-analyses suggest that human language is probably 
the most promising source to differentiate liars from truth-tellers. Moreover, these 
results show that several linguistic and verbal content cues fulfilled psychometric 
quality standards like validity and inter-rater reliability to some extent and under 
specific conditions. Taken several limitations into account, implications for research 
and practice are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent German trial, a well-known weather forecaster named Jörg 
Kachelmann was accused by the German prosecution of having severely raped his 
former beloved (Claudia D., also being the accessory prosecution) in coincidence 
with a grievous bodily harm in February 2010 (Spiegel Online, 2010, May). 
Kachelmann denied this serious accusation (Doerris, 2010, March), and a long and 
complex trial known as the “Kachelmann-Prozess” (Kachelmann-trial) started and 
attracted great national and international public interest (e.g., Connolly, 2010, 
September). In general, in the inquisitorial legal system in Germany, expert (and lay) 
judges’ main task is to establish the truth by evaluating and weighting evidence 
presented by prosecutors and defense lawyers and finally to pass a sentence. Alike 
many cases of sexual abuse or rape brought to court, no external or independent 
evidence, such as a videotape, existed (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Undeutsch, 1982; 
Vrij, 2008). As a consequence, often, the only evidence that can be consulted is 
testimonies of the accused, the victim, or other witnesses. Precisely this happened in 
the Kachelmann-trial: In principal, her statement stood against his statement and 
they unsurprisingly did not correspond to each other. 
In view of this adverse starting position, how did the judges come to a 
decision? Within the scope of two main evidence lines of this trial, expert witnesses 
were called upon. First, medical forensic experts were heard to evaluate forensic 
evidence (DNA traces on panties and knife; physical injuries of Claudia D.). From 
their analyses, no conclusive findings were presented. Hence, in a second stage, 
two experienced and reputable German forensic psychologists (Prof. Dr. Luise 
Greuel and Prof. Dr. Günther Köhnken) evaluated the credibility of Claudia D.’s 
testimony. The opportunity of the judge to mandate qualified expert witnesses is 
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widely adopted in many European countries in complex cases where explicit 
evidence does not exist (e.g., Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland; 
Sporer, 1983; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij, 2008). Here, psychological experts 
attempt to assess the credibility of a statement - not the general credibility of the 
person - with a clinical assessment procedure called Statement Validity Assessment 
(SVA, Köhnken, 2004; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). In the Kachelmann-trail, both 
experts concluded (in two different ways) that Claudia D.’s statement was probably 
not based on real experience. One reason for this assumption as cited in the media 
was a less differentiated and undetailed statement of the critical action in comparison 
to the victim’s generally more detailed narrative style (Albrecht-Heider, 2011, May; 
Friedrichsen, 2011, May). However, her accusation could neither be verified nor 
falsified, and eventually the genuine truth (also called “ground truth”) remained 
hidden. Finally, the district court (“Landgericht”) Mannheim acquitted Kachelmann 
(Bock, 2011, May) in terms of the juridical principle “in dubio pro reo” (European 
Court of Human Rights, 2010, June). Recently, in a civil proceeding denounced by 
Jörg Kachelmann, the district court Cologne suited the most widely read German 
newspaper “Bild” for a payment of compensation due to several infringements of 
Kachelmann’s personal rights (Landgericht Köln, 28 O 2/14, 28 O 7/14; Zeit Online 
2015, September). 
This famous German trial is an example of hundreds of related cases of 
(alleged) sexual abuse or rape lacking unambiguous evidence that were and need to 
be negotiated (Arntzen, 1992; Sporer, 1983; Steller, 2013). Out of the courtroom, in 
everyday life, there are also many social situations in which a mere statement stands 
against another statement and no proof of the truth exists. To be more specific, 
DePaulo and her colleagues found that people tell one to two lies on average per 
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day (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). For example, a manager 
comes too late to a business meeting and tells he was stuck in traffic, or a little girl 
asserts her mother that she has not eaten the missing piece of cake. These are 
situations in which the listener of the story faces himself or herself with the following 
question: How can you tell when people are lying? Exactly this question was asked 
to lay persons in a large-scale investigation by several deception research experts in 
75 different countries (Global Deception Research Team, 2010). Interestingly, 
regardless of the type of question asked (open or closed-ended), a worldwide, pan-
cultural stereotype of a liar was uncovered: Most people subjectively assume that 
liars avoid eye contact. Also, liars are considered to be nervous, shift postures, touch 
and scratch themselves, or have a flawed language (e.g., more pauses, stuttering, 
inconsistent) compared to truth-tellers (Global Deception Research Team, 2010). 
These findings unclose the next question: Can these stereotypes indeed help 
in distinguishing deceptive from true stories? Put differently, do these subjective 
assumptions actually correspond to objective indicators (or cues) to deception? A 
first insight comes from two meta-analyses on the general ability to detect deception 
(Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Before presenting the main 
results, a brief definition of meta-analysis is given. A meta-analysis represents a 
quantitative integration or synthesis of empirical studies investigating the same 
research question. Opposite to a mere literature review, meta-analyses quantify 
study outcomes with predetermined methodological and statistical methods, in 
particular by means of effect sizes (APA, 2008; Cooper, Hedges, & Valentine, 2009; 
Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, Sporer & Cohn, 2011). However, both meta-analyses found a 
general average detection accuracy of 54% in more than 24,000 judgments (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). Alarmingly, this finding is only slightly higher (due to the large 
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sample size) than the probability of flipping a coin (50%). In other words, in general, 
people are poor lie detectors. Anyway, further analyses suggested that people’s 
ability to detect true stories (61.34%) is significantly higher than the ability to detect 
lies (47.55%). From these findings it can be hypothesized that a discrepancy 
between subjective lay assumptions and objective indicators of deception may exist 
(see Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). Contrary to this hypothesis are the findings of 
Hartwig and Bond’s (2011) large-scale meta-analyses: They found that people do 
actually not rely on the wrong cues to deception. Rather, the authors attributed the 
generally low detection accuracy to a limited validity of objective behavioral cues to 
deception. Actually, research on objective cues to deception (DePaulo, Lindsay, 
Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007) 
suggested that on average, nonverbal (e.g., gestures, adaptors, eye contact) and 
paraverbal (e.g., speech rate, pauses, voice pitch) cues do not show impressive 
effect sizes. Therefore, these cues to deception may indeed not be useful for 
deciding whether a person is lying or telling the truth. 
If only weak objective cues to deception exist and if people generally make 
judgments on chance level - how can you tell when people are lying or telling the 
truth? This dissertation is an attempt to come closer to an answer to this important 
question. More specifically, it focuses on empirical studies that examine content and 
language differences of deceptive and true statements. Before introducing the 
specific investigations that are presented in this dissertation, important research 
findings will be identified that justify these attempts. 
First, the meta-analysis by DePaulo et al. (2003) suggested that objective 
indicators to deception related to the content of a statement reveal somewhat higher 
effect sizes than nonverbal or paraverbal cues to deception (see also Sporer & 
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Schwandt, 2006, 2007). The only shortcoming of these findings is the small number 
of studies examining verbal content cues that were included in this meta-analysis. 
However, a recent meta-analysis (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015) on 19 specific 
verbal content cues, called Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA, Steller & 
Köhnken, 1989) - as an important part of Statement Validity Assessment - 
synthesized more studies than DePaulo and her colleagues (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
The authors found medium to large effect sizes for almost all CBCA criteria when 
assessed in children’s statements in 18 published empirical studies. In other words, 
these verbal content (CBCA) criteria are on average more frequently present in true 
than in deceptive statements. 
Second, Bond and DePaulo (2006) showed that discrimination accuracy was 
lowest when judges are exposed to videotapes rather than presented with 
audiovisual or audio only stimuli. The authors interpreted this finding with their 
double-standard framework (i.e., people tend to overestimate other people’s lies and 
underestimate their own lies), that a liar’s stereotype is predominantly visual and 
thus mostly activated when seeing a video. From a different perspective, this finding 
could be another hint to the assumed superiority of verbal versus nonverbal and 
paraverbal cues to deception. 
Third, another line of research confirms this assumption. As detection 
accuracy is consistently found to be around chance level, for decades, researchers 
from different areas have trained people in order to increase their detection 
accuracy. Recently, 30 studies implementing an experimental (i.e. training) group 
versus control group design were meta-analyzed (Hauch, Sporer, Michaels, & 
Meissner, 2014). Obviously, training programs with verbal content cues resulted in 
significantly higher training effects than training programs with nonverbal and/or 
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paraverbal cues to deception, or with giving feedback to judges (versus no feedback 
control group). 
 Taken together, these empirical findings from different approaches suggest 
that the content of a statement is probably more diagnostic than behavioral cues in 
differentiating lies from true accounts. Therefore, more detailed and specialized 
analyses of the existing research on these promising verbal cues is warranted and 
focus of this thesis. 
Essentially, this dissertation presents two quantitative syntheses on verbal 
cues (or criteria) to deception. The first meta-analysis deals with an apparently 
curious method to detect deception: Besides the aforementioned approaches of 
investigating people’s behavior or content of the statement (e.g., CBCA) in previous 
meta-analyses, a different method was inspected. More precisely, researchers and 
practitioners have developed computer programs to analyze the verbal content, 
more specifically, linguistic markers (or cues; i.e. words, or word categories) in 
transcribed statements. The intention is clear: A computer program is supposed to 
distinguish lies from true statements based on linguistic differences. Surprisingly, 
already forty years ago, the first study was designed to analyze linguistic markers 
with a computer program (Knapp, Hart, & Dennis, 1974). Since then, a large amount 
of studies from various research disciplines, such as psychology and law, social 
psychology, communication, linguistics, or computer science, were conducted on this 
topic. Additionally, a number of different linguistic cues were investigated (e.g., 
Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & 
Twitchell, 2004). Therefore, a systematic review is clearly warranted. 
Meta-analysis is the first attempt to quantitatively summarize and categorize 
these studies and linguistic cues to deception - assessed by computer programs. 
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This enterprise is conducted with support of basic theoretical frameworks from the 
deception literature within main research questions. The aim of this meta-analysis 
was to test directional hypothesis and to present operational definitions for linguistic 
cues to deception. Furthermore, several important independent variables, such as 
the type of the event, degree of personal investment, emotional valence, or extrinsic 
motivation of the storyteller are analyzed to shed light on the relevance of the context 
of a statement for linguistic differences of liars and truth-tellers. The findings will be 
discussed in regard to their theoretical background, limitations and their usefulness 
in applied settings. 
As the first meta-analysis deals with the validity of linguistic cues to deception, 
the second meta-analysis focuses on the inter-rater reliability of a different set of 
verbal content cues to deception. More specifically, the aforementioned set of 19 
CBCA criteria, credibility criteria, or verbal content criteria, is object of the second 
meta-analysis (Steller & Köhnken, 1989). As noted in the example case 
(Kachelmann-trial), these criteria feature an important component of the credibility 
assessment procedure called Statement Validity Assessment (e.g., Köhnken, 2004; 
Steller, 1989), which is widely applied in psychological expert testimonies in many 
countries. Opposite to linguistic cues assessed by computer programs, human 
judges rate these criteria in statements with regard to their presence (or strength of 
presence). With respect to its validity, true accounts are assumed to contain more 
criteria compared to false accounts due to qualitative differences, and the presence 
of a criterion is an indicator (not evidence) that the statement is based on real 
experience (e.g., Undeutsch, 1967; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). 
A large amount of research on credibility assessment and the detection of 
deception frequently investigate the validity of CBCA criteria as an attempt to 
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distinguish true from false statements (e.g., Vrij, 2008). As mentioned earlier, a 
recent meta-analysis on a subset of published CBCA studies with children (Amado et 
al., 2015) estimated the validity of almost all criteria as present to some extent. 
Preliminary results of a large-scale meta-analysis (Sporer, Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, & 
Masip, 2015, August) also showed that most criteria significantly differ between 
deceptive and true statements, although some important variables (e.g., type of 
experimental paradigm, type of rating scale used, or the age of senders) moderate 
the effect sizes. 
Not less important than its validity is the question of its inter-rater reliability, 
especially for its legal application (e.g., Köhnken, 2004; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). 
Inter-rater reliability represents the amount of agreement that can be reached in 
subjective ratings from several judges. Therefore, the inter-rater reliability constitutes 
a prerequisite of its validity and thus is important to be quantified (Küpper & Sporer, 
1995). Put differently, with two rubber tape measures with varying elastic properties - 
how can you correctly determine your exact height? This is probably an impossible 
endeavor. Back to CBCA, the following research question guides the second meta-
analysis: To what extent do different evaluators agree on their presence (or strength 
of presence) ratings of CBCA criteria? Therefore, in an attempt to synthesize all 
published and unpublished studies written in English and German, this meta-analysis 
is the first quantitative review on several inter-rater reliability indices of individual 
CBCA criteria. The second aim is to quantify the association of inter-rater reliability 
with important independent variables, such as the frequency of occurrence (i.e., 
base rate), the rating scale used, different research paradigms, and the training of 
the raters. The findings will be discussed in light of their implications for future 
research and practice. 
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The purpose of the following meta-analyses in this dissertation is (a) to quantify 
linguistic differences between deceptive and true accounts by integrating empirical 
studies from different research areas, and (b) to assess the amount of inter-rater 
reliability of verbal content cues as a prerequisite of its validity. Taken together, this 
dissertation aims to add scientific knowledge on deception detection research from a 
verbal perspective.
Introduction 
 
16 
References 
Aamodt, M. G. & Custer, H. (2006). Who can best catch a liar? A meta-analysis of 
individual differences in detecting deception. Forensic Examiner, 15, 6-11. 
Albrecht-Heider, C. (2011, May). Plädoyer für den Angeklagten Kachelmann 
[Pleading for the defendant Kachelmann]. Retrieved from http://www.fr-
online.de/panorama/prozess-plaedoyer-fuer-den-angeklagten-
kachelmann,1472782,8426576.html on November 14th 2015. 
Amado, B. G., Arce, R. & Fariña, F. (2015). Undeutsch hypothesis and Criteria-
Based Content Analysis: A meta-analytic review. The European Journal of 
Psychology Applied to Legal Context, 7, 3-12. doi:10.1016/j.ejpal.2014.11.002 
APA Publications and Communications Board Working Group on Journal Article 
Reporting Standards (2008). Reporting standards for research in Psychology. 
Why do we need them? What might they be? American Psychologist, 63, 839-
851. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.63.9.839 
Arntzen, F. (1992). Die Situation der forensischen Aussagepsychologie in der BRD. 
[Current state of psychology of testimony in the Federal Republic of Germany]. 
In A. Trankell (Ed.), Reconstructing the past: The role of psychologists in 
criminal trials (pp. 107-120). Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer. 
Bock, J. (2011, May). Pressemitteilung vom 31.05.2011 - Freispruch für Jörg 
Kachelmann [Press release from 05/31/2011 - Acquittal of Jörg Kachelmann]. 
Retrieved from http://www.landgericht-mannheim.de/pb/,Lde/1167947? 
QUERYSTRING =Kachelmann on November 14th 2015. 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214-234. 
doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2 
Introduction 
 
17 
Connolly, K. (2010, September). German weatherman faces rape trial. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/05/germany-weatherman-rape-trial 
on November 14th 2015. 
Cooper, H., Hedges, L. V., & Valentine, J. C. (2009). (Eds.) The handbook of 
research synthesis and meta-analysis. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). 
Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 979-
995. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.979 
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & 
Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-118. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74 
Doerries, B. (2010, March). Ich bin unschuldig [I am innocent]. Süddeutsche Zeitung. 
Retrieved from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/kachelmann-bleibt-in-
haft-ich-bin-unschuldig-1.12069 on November 14th 2015. 
European Court of Human Rights (2010, June). European Convention on Human 
Rights, Section 1, Article 6 (2). Retrieved from 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf on November 14th 
2015. 
Friedrichsen, G. (2011, May). Gutachter im Kachelmann-Prozess: “Vielleicht hat sie 
das Messer nur gefühlt?” [Expert witnesses in Kachelmann-trial: “Perhaps she 
has just felt the knife?”] Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/ 
gutachter-in-kachelmann-prozess-vielleicht-hat-sie-das-messer-nur-gefuehlt-a-
761541.html on November 14th 2015. 
Introduction 
 
18 
Global Deception Research Team (2006). A world of lies. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 37, 60–74. doi:10.1080/14789940412331337353 
Hartwig, M. & Bond, C. F. (2011). Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-
analysis of human lie judgments. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 643-59. 
doi:10.1037/a0023589. 
Hauch, V., Sporer, S. L., Michael, S. W., & Meissner, C. A. (2014). Does training 
improve the detection of deception? A meta-analysis. Communication 
Research. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0093650214534974 
Knapp, M. L., Hart, R. P., & Dennis H. S. (1974). An exploration of deception as a 
communication construct. Communication Research, 1, 15-29. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.1974.tb00250.x 
Köhnken, G. (2004). Statement Validity Analysis and the "detection of the truth". In 
P. A. Granhag & L. A. Strömwall (Eds.), The detection of deception in forensic 
contexts (pp. 41-63). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Küpper, B., & Sporer, S. L. (1995). Beurteilerübereinstimmung bei Glaubwürdig-
keitsmerkmalen: Eine empirische Studie [Inter-rater reliability of content 
credibility criteria: An empirical study]. In G. Bierbrauer, W. Gottwald, & B. 
Birnbreier-Stahlberger (Eds.), Verfahrensgerechtigkeit (pp. 187-213). Köln, 
Germany: Otto Schmidt. 
Landgericht Köln (2015, September). Urteil 28 O 2/14 [Sentence No. 28 O 2/14]. 
Retrieved from http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/koeln/lg_koeln/ 
j2015/28_O_2_14_Urteil_20150930.html on November 14th 2015. 
Landgericht Köln (2015, September). Urteil 28 O 7/14 [Sentence No. 28 O 7/14]. 
Retrieved from http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/koeln/lg_koeln/ 
j2015/28_O_7_14_Urteil_20150930.html on November 14th 2015. 
Introduction 
 
19 
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2001). Practical meta-analysis. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications. 
Newman, M. L., Pennebaker, J. W., Berry, D. S., & Richards, J. M. (2003). Lying 
words: Predicting deception from linguistic style. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 29, 665-675. doi:10.1177/0146167203029005010 
Spiegel Online (2010, May). Vorwurf der Vergewaltigung. Staatsanwälte klagen 
Moderator Kachelmann an [Accusation of rape. Prosecutors accused 
moderator Kachelmann]. Retrieved from 
http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/vorwurf-der-vergewaltigung-
staatsanwaelte-klagen-moderator-kachelmann-an-a-695568.html on November 
14th 2015. 
Sporer, S. L. (1983, August). Content criteria of credibility: The German approach to 
eyewitness testimony. Paper presented at the 91st Annual Meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, Anaheim, CA.  
Sporer, S. L., & Cohn, L. D. (2011). Meta-analysis. In B. D. Rosenfeld, & S. D. 
Penrod (Eds.), Research methods in forensic psychology (pp. 43-62). New 
York: Wiley. 
Sporer, S. L., Hauch, V., Blandón-Gitlin, I., & Masip, J. (2015, August). Content cues 
to veracity: A meta-analysis of the validity of Criteria-based Content Analysis. 
Paper presented at the European Association of Psychology and Law 
Conference in Nuremberg, Germany. 
Sporer, S. L., & Schwandt, B. (2006). Paraverbal correlates of deception: A meta-
analysis. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 421-446. doi:10.1002/acp.1190 
Introduction 
 
20 
Sporer, S. L., & Schwandt, B. (2007). Moderators of nonverbal indicators of 
deception: A meta-analytic synthesis. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 13, 
1-34. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.13.1.1 
Steller, M. (1989). Recent developments in statement analysis. In J. C. Yuille (Ed.), 
Credibility assessment (pp. 135-154). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Steller, M. (2013). Vier Jahrzehnte forensische Aussagepsychologie: Eine nicht nur 
persönliche Geschichte [Four decades of forensic psychology of testimony: Not 
only a personal story]. Praxis der Rechtspsychologie, 23, 11-32.  
Steller, M., & Köhnken, G. (1989). Criteria-based statement analysis. In D. C. Raskin 
(Ed.), Psychological methods for investigation and evidence (pp. 217-245). New 
York: Springer-Verlag. 
Undeutsch, U. (1967). Beurteilung der Glaubhaftigkeit von Zeugenaussagen. In U. 
Undeutsch (Ed.), Handbuch der Psychologie, Band 11: Forensische 
Psychologie (pp. 26-181). Göttingen, Germany: Hogrefe. 
Undeutsch, U. (1982). Statement reality analysis. In A. Trankell (Ed.), Reconstructing 
the past: The role of psychologists in criminal trials (pp. 27-56). Deventer, 
Netherlands: Kluwer. 
Vrij, A. (2008). Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities. Chichester, 
England: Wiley. 
Zeit Online (2015, September). Springer-Verlag muss Rekordentschädigung zahlen 
[Springer publishers has to pay record compensation]. Retrieved from 
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-09/joerg-kachelmann-
bildzeitung-urteil-schmerzensgeld on November 14th 2015. 
Introduction 
 
21 
Zhou, L., Burgoon, J. K., Nunamaker, J. F., & Twitchell, D. (2004). Automating 
linguistics-based cues for detecting deception in text-based asynchronous computer-
mediated communication. Group Decision and Negotiation, 13, 81-106. 
doi:10.1023/B:GRUP.0000011944.62889.6f 
Meta-analysis of computer-assessed linguistic cues to deception 
 
22 
META-ANALYSIS I: 
Are Computers Effective Lie Detectors? 
A Meta-Analysis of Linguistic Cues to Deception 
Deception is an ubiquitous phenomenon, and people at all times have sought 
to find ways to detect it. Humans have searched for indicators of deception in 
physiological, nonverbal and paraverbal behavior, and the very content of what 
people are saying. Since the beginning of experimental psychology, researchers 
have systematically investigated different types of cues assumed to reveal deception 
(Benussi, 1914; Freud, 1905; Wertheimer & Klein, 1904; see Bunn, 2012; Grubin & 
Madsen, 2005; Sporer, 2008, for historical reviews).Despite these efforts, meta-
analyses indicate that humans are not very good at discriminating between truths 
and lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Reasons may lie in the complexity and difficulty of 
the task, incorrect beliefs about cues and the use of invalid cues, as well as the 
pervasive biases in decision making (Global Detection Research Team, 2006; 
Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, & Marksteiner, 2011; Vrij, 2008b).  
In this meta-analysis, we focus on the use of computers to overcome these 
limitations. However, we unpretentiously believe the present contribution goes far 
beyond this goal. Based on a series of theoretical frameworks rooted in cognitive 
and social psychology, we posed (and tested) specific directional hypotheses 
concerning the potential utility to detect deception with a number of linguistic cues. 
Our findings are relevant not only in terms of the potential practical utility of 
computers to detect deception, but also in terms of basic knowledge about the 
language of deception and the underlying theories predicting specific linguistic 
differences between truths and lies. 
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Human Judgmental Biases 
Humans are biased lie detectors. Biases include a reliance on cognitive 
heuristics (Levine & McCornack, 2001), overestimation of dispositional factors 
(O’Sullivan, 2003), and an exaggerated focus on nonverbal relative to verbal content 
cues (Reinhard et al., 2011; Vrij, 2008b). Other researchers have shown that 
humans are prone to truth or lie biases (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999; Meissner 
& Kassin, 2002; Zuckerman, Koestner, Collela, & Alton, 1984), which are the 
tendency to judge statements as truthful--or as deceptive--regardless of their actual 
veracity. It has also been shown that observers’ veracity judgments are affected by 
factors unrelated to the veracity of particular statements, such as the sender’s facial 
appearance (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2003). Likewise, Bond and DePaulo (2006) 
argue that people hold the stereotype that liars are “tormented, anxious, and 
conscience stricken” (p. 216), and that they may draw on this stereotype when 
judging the veracity of other people. 
As a possible remedy to overcome these deficiencies in human judgments, 
physiological psychologists and brain researchers have utilized "machines" like the 
polygraph, voice stress analyzer, pupillometry, electromyogram, and brain imagery 
(e.g., EEG, fMRI) to detect deception. In the last 40 years, but particularly most 
recently, scientists from various fields have also sought to detect deception by 
analyzing speech content with computers, looking for specific word cues or sentence 
structures to reveal deception.  
A computer system would arguably be less prone to the influence of biases 
and stereotypes than human judges. There would be virtually no top-down 
processing. Additionally, online assessment of various deception cues from ongoing 
interactions or videos can tax the cognitive capacity of human judges and lead to 
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errors. Computers can quickly analyze large amounts of information and provide 
more reliable data. These are the principal reasons for the appeal of the 
automatization of lie detection. However, we must not forget that computers do not 
make choices about definitions of word categories nor about the specific words to be 
contained in broader categories. Most importantly, computers do not make choices 
about the direction of any particular cue as a lie or truth indicator. It is important to 
stress that, for a computer to be able to detect deception, the linguistic 
characteristics to be analyzed must be revealing of deception. Here, in examining 
what linguistic cues identified with computers differ between truths and lies, we also 
contribute to our basic understanding about linguistic markers of deception. 
Can Computers be Useful to Detect Deception? 
In an attempt to identify and quantify linguistic cues to deception, researchers 
had an (unrealistic) dream: Enter peoples’ words into a computer to find out if they 
are telling the truth or not. In an early study, Knapp, Hart, and Dennis (1974) 
assessed several linguistic cues using a program called TEXAN on a CDC 6500 
mainframe computer. The program analyzed word frequencies without taking 
contextual meaning into account. Most of the investigated cues significantly differed 
in the expected direction between truths and lies. 
Many years passed until similar but more modern word frequency count 
approaches were used regularly to deception detection (at least in research 
contexts). The most common program, called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001), was developed to count words in 
psychology-relevant dimensions across multiple text files. LIWC has been used in 
numerous domains like personality, health, or psychological adjustment (see 
Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010, for a review). LIWC analyzes typed or transcribed 
Meta-analysis of computer-assessed linguistic cues to deception 
 
25 
accounts on a word-by-word basis, where each word is compared against a 
dictionary of 2000 pre-selected words allocated to 72 linguistic categories. Although 
LIWC was not specifically designed to assess deception, Newman, Pennebaker, 
Berry, and Richards (2003) used it to calculate the percentages of specific linguistic 
cues in true versus deceptive statements, yielding above-chance accuracy of 
classifications for different types of lies. Subsequently, researchers from a variety of 
fields have also applied LIWC with the same purpose (see Appendix C). 
Other researchers realized that the methods used ought to be more complex. 
As a result, specialized programs and algorithms have been developed which are 
oriented more directly to detecting deception. For example, Agent99Analyzer was 
created to specifically detect (linguistic cues to) deception in texts and videos (Fuller, 
Biros, Burgoon, Adkins, & Twitchell, 2006). One of its sub-tools is a natural language 
processing unit called “GATE” (General Architecture for Text Engineering; 
Cunningham, 2002; Qin, Burgoon, Blair, & Nunamaker, 2005). Other related 
automated text-based tools used were “iSkim” or “CueCal” (Zhou, Booker, & Zhang, 
2002; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004). More specifically, smaller text 
units are analyzed and integrated in the context of the whole text through examining 
different levels of human language (e.g., sub-sentential, sentential and discourse 
processing; see also Zhou et al., 2004). Recently, a growing body of research using 
machine-learning approaches of natural language processing emerged to detect 
linguistic cues to deception (Nunamaker, Burgoon, Twyman, Proudfoot, Schuetzler, 
& Giboney, 2012). 
A highly sophisticated program of this kind called “Coh-Metrix” (Graesser, 
McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004; McNamara & Graesser, 2012), goes beyond 
word frequency analysis. Specifically, in analyzing “cohesion relations”, Coh-Metrix 
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takes into account meaning and context in which words or phrases occur in texts 
(http://cohmetrix.memphis.edu). Although not specifically developed to detect 
deception, Coh-Metrix was recently applied for this purpose (e.g., Bedwell, 
Gallagher, Whitten, & Fiore, 2011). A somewhat different detection deception 
software called Automated Deception Analysis Machine (“ADAM”; Derrick, Meservy, 
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2012) focuses on editing processes while typing messages 
(e.g., backspace, delete, or spacebar) and measures response latencies. The 
program includes an automated interviewer asking questions from an internal script. 
Taken together, various computer programs from different research areas and 
labs originated in the last 15 years that were either applied to detecting deception or 
specifically developed for this purpose. The effectiveness of such programs can be 
better determined with a comprehensive and integrative quantitative analysis of the 
results on various linguistic cues to deception. This is the focus of the current meta-
analysis. 
The Importance of Theory 
Is this dream of automated lie detection realistic? A quick preview of our 
results hints to the fragmented nature of the findings from computer studies. Effect 
sizes in our meta-analysis were coded in a way that positive gus are indicative of 
truth, while negative gus are indicative of deception. For 1,093 effect sizes we 
calculated for 79 linguistic cues, we obtained an approximately normal distribution 
centering on a mean effect size of gu = -0.01 (SD = 0.37), and a Mdn of 0.02. The 
effect sizes ranged from -1.95 to 1.43 and the first and third quartiles were -0.17, and 
0.20, respectively. To get a more accurate picture of the diagnostic usefulness of 
linguistic markers of deception, we calculated the absolute magnitude of all effect 
sizes, assuming that all were in the expected direction as predicted by a-priori 
Meta-analysis of computer-assessed linguistic cues to deception 
 
27 
specified hypotheses (Figure 1). The average absolute effect size was 0.26 (SD = 
0.26) with a Mdn of 0.19 (first quartile = 0.09, third quartile = 0.34). This average 
effect size denotes the maximum possible mean of all cues if the results had actually 
been in the direction predicted. This mean effect size implies that across all studies 
and cues only small effect sizes were obtained. This suggests that without a-priori 
theoretical predictions, computer analyses of linguistic cues to deception are a futile 
exercise. Can larger effect sizes be observed if we classify cues into theoretically 
meaningful categories and consider possible moderators? 
Theoretical Approaches Used to Predict Linguistic Cues to Deception 
We cannot provide an exhaustive review of all approaches taken by different 
research groups. Some authors may prefer to emphasize the role of emotion, 
arousal and motivation, while communication researchers may look at deception as 
strategic behavior. We will address some of these alternative interpretations where 
appropriate. Instead, we focus more on a cognitive and memory-oriented approach, 
supplemented by social psychological considerations and self-presentation, which 
help us to pin down the differences in processes involved in telling true stories vs. 
lies. Hence, we focus on four viewpoints resulting in six research questions: (1) 
Recalling an experience from episodic memory vs. constructing a lie from semantic 
memory. Constructing a lie may be more cognitively taxing (Research Question 1) 
and reduces the certainty with which lies are delivered (Research Question 2). (2) 
Again drawing on the literature on memory, we discuss the role of emotion and affect 
in recall of true experiences vs. reporting lies (Research Question 3). (3) We discuss 
the role of the self as an organizational principle as well as self-presentational 
strategies and the role of immediacy in communication (Research Question 4). (4) 
We draw on the reality monitoring framework to derive predictions about sensory and 
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perceptual cues (Research Question 5) and cognitive operations (Research 
Question 6). 
For each question we noted those linguistic cues that would elucidate 
differences between accounts of truth-tellers and liars, clearly specifying the direction 
of effect for each cue. Some of the theoretical approaches we discuss elaborate 
retrieval and construction processes truth-tellers engage in when reporting an event 
while others focus on lie construction. Furthermore, we developed clear operational 
definitions for each cue in order to provide consistency in the names and definitions 
used in different research areas (see Appendices A and B). Most cues investigated 
could be allocated to one of the six research questions. However, because some 
cues did not clearly fit in any theory or research question, they were relegated to the 
miscellaneous question category. Following are the principal research questions. 
Research Question 1: Do Liars Experience Greater Cognitive Load? 
Telling a lie can be more cognitively demanding than truth-telling, because it 
involves the execution of a number of concurrent tasks requiring a great deal of 
mental resources. In general, both liars and truth-tellers must tell a plausible and 
coherent story that does not contradict their own former statements or facts the 
observer/interviewer may know about. Also, in some cases lying requires 
suppressing thoughts about the truth (Gombos, 2006); this may inadvertently 
preoccupy the speaker’s thinking (Pennebaker & Chew, 1985; see also Lane & 
Wegner's, 1995, model of secrecy). Further, as communication researchers have 
emphasized, storytellers must monitor their own behaviors and observers' reactions 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Truth-tellers may also engage in some of these cognitive 
processes but for liars this task is more difficult because they cannot easily draw on 
episodic memories. Instead, they must rely on the semantic memory system or on 
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rather nonspecific scripts or schemata (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Sporer & Küpper, 
1995). 
When constructing a lie, a convincing scenario has to be communicated. 
However, due to the demands for cognitive resources, a lie may not include the 
complexities and richness of information that characterize reports of real 
experiences. In contrast, telling a story about a true event relies on retrieval of 
experienced events. Although this typically involves reconstruction, and may at times 
even take increased effort, recall of episodic memories and supporting details is 
generally rather automatic. 
Much research on the cognitive load approach has not been grounded on 
well-articulated cognitive models of deception (Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip, & Yoo, 
2014). Yet, a few such models have been proposed to specify cognitive processes 
involved in lie production (for reviews, see Gombos, 2006, and Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, 
& Tcholakian, 2013). Some of these models (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; 
Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei, & Zha, 2005; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & 
Mulay, 2014; Walczyk et al., 2013) have invoked Baddeley’s (2000, 2006) working 
memory model, which involves transferring information from long-term memory to an 
episodic buffer in working memory. While this should facilitate truth-telling, it should 
also make lying more difficult (see, e.g., Walczyk et al., 2005, 2013, 2014).  
Does research support the cognitive load assumptions? Numerous recent 
studies (for review, see Vrij & Granhag, 2012) have provided indirect evidence by 
experimentally increasing a storyteller’s task demands. This has elicited more 
discernable cues to deception than in control, lower cognitive load conditions. Note, 
however, that manipulating "cognitive load" is not equivalent to assessing the 
cognitive mechanisms postulated as a function of such manipulations (Blandón-Gitlin 
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et al., 2014). More direct (and revealing) evidence comes from behavioral studies 
using response latencies and other indices of cognitive load (e.g., Debey, 
Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Xhu, 2004; Walczyk et al., 
2005; for a summary, see Walczyk et al., 2013). There is even evidence from brain 
imaging studies (e.g., Abe, 2009; Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & 
McDermott, 2009) showing that telling lies, particularly those involving short 
responses, requires greater involvement of and access to key mental resources than 
truth-telling (Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vosse, 2008). 
Cues to deception theoretically connected to the cognitive load perspective 
have been found in previous meta-analyses, particularly for nonverbal and 
paraverbal behaviors (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 
2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007). In comparison with truth-tellers, liars had 
longer response latencies, tended to communicate shorter stories, made more 
speech errors, nodded less, and displayed fewer hand, foot, and leg movements. 
Particularly relevant for the analysis of linguistic markers are findings on verbal 
content cues that demonstrate that compared to true accounts, deceptive accounts 
appear less plausible, coherent and detailed while including more phrase and word 
repetitions. These indices can be signs of the experience of cognitive load either 
from a taxed system (e.g., longer response latencies) or because of liars' strategies 
to reduce cognitive load (Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). 
Predictions. From a cognitive load/working memory perspective, we predict 
that compared to true accounts, false accounts will be (a) shorter as indicted by word 
and sentence quantity cues, (b) less precisely elaborated as indicated by fewer 
content words (expressing lexical meaning), a lower type-token ratio (number of 
distinct content words, e.g., house, walk, mother) divided by total number of words), 
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and shorter words (i.e., less than six letters; average word length), (c) involve less 
complex stories as indicated by fewer verbs, fewer causation words (because, effect, 
hence) and fewer exclusive words (but, except, without), and (d) include more writing 
errors (possibly moderated by mode of production [orally telling a lie, hand writing, or 
typing]). (For a list of the operational definition of all cues included see Appendices A 
and B.) 
From a different perspective, based on DePaulo's self-presentational 
perspective (DePaulo et al., 2003), one would expect that liars are less likely than 
truth-tellers to take their credibility for granted and therefore may take a greater effort 
and deliberately edit their communication (cf. Derrick et al., 2012). Note, however, 
that this editing process will also usurp cognitive resources detracting from 
successful lie constructions. 
Research Question 2: Are Liars Less Certain Than Truth-Tellers? 
DePaulo et al. (2003) contend that deceptive self-presentations are not as 
convincingly embraced as truthful ones. This may be a result either of the speakers’ 
moral scruples, which may lead them to feel guilty or ashamed when lying, or of liars 
not having as much personal investment in their claims as truth-tellers. The 
psychological closeness or distance between a speaker and his or her message 
might be reflected in language (Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968). Liars should display 
more linguistic markers indicative of psychological detachment than truth-tellers 
(Buller, Burgoon, Busling, & Roiger, 1996; Kuiken, 1981; Wagner and Pease, 1976; 
Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004; Zhou, Burgoon, Twitchell, Qin, & 
Nunamaker, 2004). Indeed, in their meta-analysis DePaulo et al. (2003) found that 
liars were verbally and vocally less involved and more verbally and vocally uncertain 
than truth-tellers but observed no reliable differences for tentative constructs and 
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shrugs. Uncertainty words have been proposed as markers of psychological distance 
between a speaker and his or her account (e.g., Kuiken, 1981). Thus, liars’ accounts 
should contain more uncertainty words than truth-tellers’ accounts. 
It may also be the case that deceivers withhold information not to give their 
lies away. Indeed, research shows that when lying to conceal their transgressions, 
people indicate that they try not to provide incriminating details (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Herrero, 2013), and try to keep the story simple 
(Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006) or vague (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 
2010). DePaulo et al. (2003) found liars to be significantly more 
discrepant/ambivalent than truth-tellers. Therefore, liars might provide vague, 
ambiguous, or uncertain replies in order not to expose their lies (Buller et al., 1996; 
Cody, Marston, & Foster, 1984). 
Predictions. From these perspectives, it is expected that liars will be less 
certain and definite than truth-tellers. Consequently, deceptive accounts should 
contain fewer certainty words (always, clear, never) and more tentative words 
(guess, maybe, perhaps, seem) and modal verbs (can, shall, should) than truthful 
accounts. (It should be noted that modal verbs also include the verb “must” that 
expresses more certainty and purposiveness whereas all other modal verbs indicate 
more uncertainty). 
It may be argued that liars are aware that uncertainty indicates deception and 
thus may strategically incorporate certainty indicators to evade detection (e.g., 
Bender, 1987). However, research does not support this contention. To our 
knowledge, around ten reports have been published so far on liars’ and truth-tellers’ 
strategies to be convincing (for a brief review, see Masip & Herrero, 2013). Only 
rarely has certainty (or any related construct) emerged as a strategy, and in these 
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instances it has been mentioned (a) only infrequently, and (b) equally often by liars 
and truth-tellers (e.g., Hines, Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Garrett, Ansarra, & 
Montalvo, 2010: “admit uncertainty”; for an exception see Strömwall et al., 2006). 
Research Question 3a: Do Liars Use More Negations and Negative Emotion 
Words? 
Emotional approach.1 When people lie, they may experience feelings of guilt 
and fear of getting caught (Ekman, 1988, 2001).2 Even when telling everyday lies of 
little consequence, people report feeling uncomfortable (DePaulo et al., 2003). Vrij 
(2008a) also noted that liars might make negative comments or use negative words 
that reflect negative affect induced by guilt and fear. 
Numerous studies have shown that arousal is associated with specific 
emotions (see the meta-analysis by Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011), some of which 
are likely to be experienced by liars, such as guilt and fear of punishment (Ekman, 
2001; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). These emotional states may elicit 
specific nonverbal and verbal cues to deception (see DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006; Vrij, 2008a). Recent studies have used brain-imaging technology to 
specifically investigate the role of emotion in deception (for a review see Abe, 2011). 
For example, Abe, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh, and Fujii (2007) found that neural structures 
associated with heightened emotions were also uniquely associated with deceiving 
an interrogator, and that self-reported feelings of immorality (sense of sin) and 
anxiety were higher in deceptive conditions than in truth-telling conditions. These 
results support the notion that deception is associated with negative emotions. 
Predictions. From an emotional approach perspective, we predict that 
compared to true accounts, lies will include (a) more negation words (no, never, not) 
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because these reveal a more defensive tone or denial of wrongdoing, which is likely 
to be accompanied by negative emotions of the liar, and (b) more words denoting 
overall negative emotions (enemy, worthless, skeptic), anger (hate, kill, weapon), 
anxiety (unsure, vulnerable) and sadness (tears, useless, unhappy). 
Research Question 3b: Do Liars Use Fewer Positive Emotion Words? 
Research on autobiographical memory suggests that people’s emotional 
appraisal of past events tends to be positively biased (Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 
1997). One mechanism by which this bias occurs is a tendency for emotions 
associated with negative-event memories to fade faster than emotions associated 
with positive-event memories (Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003). In a review 
of this research, Walker and Skowronski (2009) suggest that this fading affect bias 
leads people to generally remember events less negatively regardless of the original 
affect associated with the event. This effect is not due to forgetting of event details, 
as the accuracy of the memories is comparable for negative and positive events. It is 
the memory of the emotional intensity associated with the event that fades, with 
negative events fading at a faster rate than positive events. 
Predictions. Because truth-tellers have a specific memory of the event, 
whereas liars cannot draw on such an episodic memory, we predict that compared to 
true accounts, lies will contain fewer words denoting positive emotions (happy, 
pretty, good) or feelings (luck, joy). 
Research Question 3c: Do Liars Express More or Less Unspecified Emotion 
Words? 
Many researchers from different fields, such as social psychology, psychology 
and law, or computer linguistics (e.g., Ali & Levine 2008; Fuller et al., 2006, Newman 
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et al., 2003), have investigated the frequency of occurrence of emotional and 
affective terms in true and deceptive accounts without taking the valence of these 
emotions into account. Therefore, we decided to also investigate the cues of 
unspecified emotions (positive and negative) and pleasantness or unpleasantness of 
the story despite the lack of theoretical specification of the direction in the original 
studies. Predictions could be derived from a social psychological perspective. 
Depending on the seriousness of a lie, from a trivial lie in everyday life to high stake 
lies, the situation may become increasingly emotional. Hence, one would predict 
higher frequencies of unspecified emotion words in lies than in truths. 
Research Question 4: Do Liars Distance Themselves More From Events? 
In the preceding section, we have assumed that people are more likely to 
experience different types of negative emotions when telling a lie. Given such 
negative experiences and emotions, from DePaulo et al.'s (2003) self-presentational 
perspective we further assume that liars will distance themselves more from the 
story being told, and, relatedly, will be less forthcoming than truth-tellers (see also 
Research Question 2 on certainty cues above). Possible linguistic indicators for this 
assumption are personal pronouns, cues to responsibility and verb tense shifts. To 
clarify the predictions of specific cues we present them within the theoretical 
accounts of immediacy, self-organization, egocentric bias, and narrative 
conventions.  
Immediacy. A possible way to express ownership and take responsibility for 
an action or event is to tell a story from a first-person perspective, where the sender 
is reporting an event where he/she is the actor, not an observer-bystander. Evidence 
for this assumption comes from the long tradition of research on verbal and 
nonverbal communication which has investigated immediacy as a cue to truthful 
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messages (Cody et al., 1984; Knapp et al., 1974; Kuiken, 1981; Mehrabian, 1972; 
Wagner & Pease, 1976; Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker et 
al., 2004; Zhou, Burgoon, Twitchell et al., 2004). In these studies, one aspect of 
immediacy has been operationalized as the psychological distance between the 
speaker and his/her communication. More specifically, immediacy can indicate the 
degree to which there is directness and intensity between the communicator and the 
event being communicated (Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968, p. 4). Taking this aspect of 
the definition of immediacy, deception researchers consider nonimmediacy as an 
indicator of deceptive communication by way of the speaker distancing from his/her 
own statement (e.g., Buller et al., 1996; Kuiken, 1981; Wagner & Pease, 1976; Zhou 
et al., 2004).  
However, evidence for nonverbal and verbal indicators of the relationship 
between immediacy and deception is mixed. In the meta-analysis by DePaulo et al. 
(2003) there were no significant effects for self- or other-references, but more 
general indices of verbal immediacy (all categories) as well as verbal and vocal 
immediacy (impressions) were observed significantly more frequently or to a higher 
extent in truthful than fabricated messages. This latter effect appeared to be stronger 
when immediacy was measured subjectively than when assessed via more objective 
measures. 
The self as an organizational structure. Another line of research we 
consider is social psychological theorizing on social memory, which has emphasized 
the role of the self as an organizational structure. In fact, one of the primary 
distinctions between episodic and autobiographical memory is that the self provides 
an organizing principle, which relates experiences to one's self-schema. 
Experimental evidence comes from research on the self-reference effect (Rogers, 
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Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), which demonstrated that information is particularly well 
remembered when it has been encoded in relation to oneself, or when the person 
plays an active, rather than passive role (e.g., Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Variations on 
this theme are discussed under ego-defensive, self-serving, egocentric or egotistic 
biases (see Greenwald, 1980). Greenwald (1980) has gone as far as referring to the 
self as a "totalitarian ego" that puts itself in the foreground, assuming a central role 
and ownership when talking about self-experienced past events and actions. This 
prevailing tendency should lead to more frequent uses of first-person pronouns (I, 
me, we, us, our, etc.) when telling the truth relative to lying. 
However, while the egocentric bias may play a role when reporting (complex) 
autobiographical events, it may be restricted to positive outcomes, and reversed for 
negative outcomes (Greenwald, 1980). Also, the so-called “better than average 
effect” refers to the tendency to evaluate oneself more favorably than an average 
peer (e.g., Brown, 2012). For instance, 70% of high school seniors estimated that 
they had above average leadership skills, whereas only 2% said their leadership 
skills were below average (College Board, 1976–1977). Another example of the 
positive outcome bias is a classic study by Bahrick, Hall, and Berger (1996; see also 
Bahrick, 1996) who found that students accurately recalled better high school grades 
than worse ones. Relatedly, in a classical study on the self-enhancing bias by 
Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, and Sloan (1976, Experiment 2) college 
students not only donned their school colors on Monday after their team had won, 
but also identified, or distanced, themselves by use of different personal pronouns 
("we won"; "they lost"). This suggests that first-person pronouns and statements of 
personal responsibility will be more prevalent among truth-tellers than liars, 
particularly for positive outcomes. 
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Predictions. In summary, from different theoretical perspectives we assume 
more frequent use of first-person pronouns, and less frequent use of third-person 
pronouns for reports of self-experienced events. Self-experienced events should also 
be characterized by more statements of own responsibility, at least for positive 
outcomes. This prediction is more likely to hold for first-person singular than first-
person plural because the plural may designate both the group the storyteller 
belongs to, and identifies with, as well as a communication partner who acts as an 
antagonist in an interaction (e.g., "we quarreled"). Thus, with plural pronouns, 
ownership and responsibility are less clear-cut than with singular pronouns. On the 
other hand, passive voice or generalizing terms in phrases like "one has to..." or 
“everybody does this...” signal less personal involvement and hence should be found 
more frequently in lies than truthful accounts. 
Narrative conventions and verb tense shifts. Communication about past 
events follow narrative conventions (acquired during childhood) that require the 
storyteller to talk about who, what, when, where, and why (Brown & Kulik, 1977; 
Neisser, 1982) and to adhere to a temporal structure (Bruner, 1990). Anecdotal 
evidence from research on autobiographical memory for significant life events shows 
that people sometimes switch from telling a story in the past tense to the present 
tense at crucial moments of the event (Pillemer, Desrochers, & Ebanks, 1998). In 
many of these examples, it appears that the protagonist is reliving the past event, 
describing his or her sensory and perceptual experiences, making the accounts to 
appear more vivid (cf. the reality monitoring approach described in Research 
Question 5). Although present tense may be less concrete than past tense when it 
refers to repeated or routine actions (e.g., “I [usually] go to church on Sunday” 
versus “I went to church on Sunday”), when talking about a specific past event 
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present tense is more vivid than past tense. Whether verb tense shifts occur 
involuntarily or unconsciously, or are strategically used by skillful storytellers (like 
fiction writers) to communicate intensity and feeling to a recipient, cannot be 
answered by these archival type studies, nor by our meta-analyses. 
Predictions. We expect reports of true events to be more likely to contain 
present tense verbs than lies, at least in accounts of personally significant events. 
For other types of lies, this prediction may not hold. The live character of these 
narratives may also diminish with repeated retellings of a story. Conversely, lies 
should contain more past tense verbs than true accounts. 
Research Question 5: Do Liars Use Fewer (Sensory and Contextual) Details? 
Reality monitoring framework applied to deception. The reality monitoring 
model by Johnson and Raye (1981) describes how individuals differentiate between 
externally generated memories of actual experiences versus memories of internally 
generated events that involve thoughts, fantasies, or dreams. In contrast to imagined 
events, experienced events are encoded and embedded in memory within an 
elaborate network of information that typically includes more perceptual details, 
contextual and semantic information. Conversely, internally generated memories are 
characterized by cognitive inferences or reasoning processes. 
People differentiate between their own external and internal memories on the 
basis of these phenomenal characteristics (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), 
and similar features are also useful to differentiate between accounts of external and 
internal memories of other people (an attribution process that has been tagged 
“interpersonal reality monitoring”; Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998; Johnson & 
Suengas, 1989; Sporer, 2004; Sporer & Sharman, 2006). 
Meta-analysis of computer-assessed linguistic cues to deception 
 
40 
Deceptive accounts can be characterized as representing internally generated 
memories, because in a deceptive situation people imagine the event at the time of 
its construction (Sporer, 2004). Even if people lie by borrowing from actual 
experience, the time and place or the context in which the event occurred may be 
changed during construction (Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2008a). Therefore, even partially 
true deceptive accounts may lack the typical characteristics of true accounts. With 
these considerations in mind, researchers have extrapolated from the reality 
monitoring model to make predictions about specific sets of criteria that may 
discriminate between true and deceptive accounts (e.g., Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Olsson, 2001; Sporer, 1997; for reviews see Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 
2005; Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2008a). DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis, which only 
included a few studies available then, showed small and nonsignificant effects sizes 
for reality monitoring criteria. However, in a more comprehensive review of studies, 
Masip et al. (2005) found that some of the reality monitoring criteria involving 
perceptual processes, contextual (including time) information, and realism/plausibility 
of the story were useful to discriminate between truth and deception. 
Predictions. From a reality monitoring perspective, we predict that compared 
to true accounts, false accounts will (a) contain fewer perceptual details as indicated 
by sensory and perceptual word cues (taste, touch, smell), (b) be less contextually 
embedded as indicated by space (around, under) and time word cues (hour, year), 
and (c) include fewer descriptive words as indicated by prepositions (on, to), 
numbers (first, three), quantifiers (all, bit, few), modifiers (adverbs and adjectives), 
and motion verbs (walk, run, go). This latter set of cues involves words that describe 
events and actions in the story in more specific terms (e.g., “I took every short cut to 
get to work”). The lack of these words (e.g., “I went to work”) would make the 
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account seem less real or vivid as would be predicted from the reality monitoring 
perspective (Sporer, 1997, 2004). 
Research Question 6: Do Liars Refer Less (yes, Less!) Often to Cognitive 
Processes? 
The reality monitoring approach, unlike other verbal-content cues based 
credibility assessment procedures, such as Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA, 
Steller & Köhnken, 1989), does not only contain "truth criteria" (e.g., spatial and time 
details), but also one lie criterion. Specifically, reality monitoring predicts that 
references to internal processes at the time of the event (cognitive operations like 
reasoning processes) should be more likely contained in imagined than in self-
experienced events. Applied to detecting deception, researchers have consequently 
postulated that references to cognitive operations can be used as a lie criterion 
(Sporer, 1997; Vrij, 2008a). 
However, empirical evidence regarding this proposition is mixed. Perhaps, 
depending on the operationalization of this construct, some studies have found more 
references to cognitive operations in lies (e.g., Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2004), 
many studies have found no differences (e.g., Sporer & Sharman, 2006; 14 out of 19 
studies reviewed in Vrij, 2008a), and some studies have found reliably more 
references to internal processes (like memory processes and rehearsal as well as 
thoughts) in true accounts (Granhag, Strömwall, & Olsson, 2001; Sporer, 1998; 
Sporer & Walther, 2006; Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000). 
From a different perspective, some thirty years of research on 
autobiographical memory has emphasized the associative nature of memories. 
Recollecting (personally significant) life events involves not only the conscious 
utilization of retrieval cues but also cross-referencing to supporting memories related 
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to the event in question. It also involves rehearsal processes, which are important 
determinants of remembering (Conway, 1990). These processes can also be 
subsumed under cognitive operations. To the extent that studies on deception 
involve complex (autobiographical) events, like being questioned about a crime or 
reporting an alibi, such retrieval processes and supporting memories (cf. the Criteria-
Based Content Analysis criterion "External Associations") are likely to be used and 
mentioned when recalling true events (e.g. “I know it was the day before Easter 
because Good Friday was my birthday.”). 
Finally, there is empirical evidence from several studies that cognitive 
operations are positively correlated not only with other reality monitoring criteria 
(Sporer, 1997, 2013) but also with many Criteria-Based Content Analysis criteria like 
"External Associations", "Own Psychological Processes", "Spontaneous Corrections" 
or "Doubts about one's own Testimony", loading on a common underlying factor 
(Sporer, 2004, Table 4.4). All of these criteria are assumed to indicate truthfulness. 
Predictions. Consequently, we predict that linguistic cues referring to 
cognitive operations including memory processes are more likely to be found in 
truths than in lies. The two cues under this research question are cognitive 
processes (cause, ought), and insight words (think, know, consider). 
Miscellaneous Category 
Because many linguistic cues were investigated without a specific theoretical 
background or directed predictions, we created a miscellaneous category including 
linguistic cues analyzed in more than five studies (e.g., inhibition, social processes, 
health, sports; see Appendix B). 
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Hypotheses for Moderator Variables 
It would be unwise to assume that the above predictions will hold across all 
types of lies, motivation, level of interaction, production mode, and other contextual 
factors. Hence, we conducted a series of moderator analyses within the theoretical 
frameworks provided above. 
Event type and personal involvement. Across studies, senders described 
events or attitudes that differed in terms of personal involvement. We organized the 
studies into three categories. In the “Attitude/liking” paradigm, senders described 
their attitude towards a specific topic or person they like or dislike. In the “First-
person experience” paradigm senders experienced a staged event or mock crime, 
described a personal life event, or were involved in a real criminal case. Lastly, the 
“Miscellaneous” category included studies where participants solved a problem, 
performed a specific task, or described a video scene.3 We do acknowledge, 
however, that some attitudes/liking studies may also reflect high involvement but this 
would work against our hypothesis. 
We argue that the higher the personal involvement in the event the higher the 
cognitive load (for example, due to a preoccupation with an interaction partner’s 
reactions) and arousal (negative or unspecified emotions) will be when telling a lie. 
Also, liars might express more uncertainty terms or try to distance themselves more 
from events when their personal involvement is high. In other words, we expect the 
effects under Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c, and 4 to be larger for the “First-
person experience” compared to the “Attitude/liking” or the “Miscellaneous” 
paradigms in the aforementioned direction. 
Emotional valence. The topics or events senders were asked to talk about 
were classified as positive (e.g., holidays), neutral (e.g., task performance), or 
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negative (e.g., confession of wrongdoing) in nature. If we assume that more negative 
emotions accompany telling a negative rather than a neutral event, liars should 
express even more negative emotion words when the event is negative (Research 
Question 3a). Also, we assume that the amount of unspecified emotion words 
(Research Question 3a) will be higher when the event is not neutral. Moreover, 
cognitive load might also be higher because senders have to deal with additional 
negative emotions that may induce concern, leading to a decrease in word count and 
diverse and exclusive words (Research Question 1--Cognitive Load: cues 01, 02, 
03). 
Also, if liars are more negatively involved in their story, they could appear 
more uncertain (Research Question 2--Certainty) and try to distance themselves 
more using less self- and more other-references (Research Question 4--Distancing). 
In summary, we hypothesized that effect sizes under Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 
3c, and 4 would be highest (in the expected direction) if the emotional valence was 
negative rather than neutral (or positive). 
Intensity of interaction. The degree of interactions between the storyteller 
and another person varies widely in deception detection research (Vrij & Granhag, 
2012). We differentiated four interaction levels: (a) no interaction: participants are 
only given a written or spoken instruction; (b) computer-mediated communication: 
participants are communicating via connected computers (e.g., only by typing words 
in studies included); (c) interview: interviewees are simply responding to questions 
from an interviewer (one-way direction); and (d) person to person interactions: 
sender and receiver are present in person and interacting bidirectionally.4 We 
hypothesized that with increasing intensity of interactions from (a) to (d) (cf. Buller & 
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Burgoon, 1996), effects would become stronger under Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 
3c, and 4. 
Motivation. Researchers varied the level of motivation for their senders to 
appear credible. Some researchers did not motivate their senders at all, some others 
tried to motivate them with incentives or written instructions, and still others used 
accounts from real criminal cases, where the motivation to appear credible must 
have been high due to real consequences for getting caught (high-stake lies; cf. 
DePaulo et al., 2003). 
DePaulo and Kirkendol (1989, p. 54) postulated the motivational impairment 
effect, according to which highly motivated liars try to control their expressive 
behaviors to appear credible, but they are only successful in doing so with their 
verbal behavior, while their nonverbal behavior appears disrupted. In other words, 
liars’ nonverbal behavior should be impaired whereas their verbal behavior (i.e., the 
content of messages) should be improved. DePaulo, Lanier, and Davies (1983) 
provided support for these hypotheses, as highly motivated liars were easier to 
detect in the visual or audiovisual conditions, but less successfully detected in the 
verbal (transcript) condition (there was no difference in the audio-only condition). 
Assuming that the motivational impairment effect also applies to linguistic 
cues as a form of verbal behavior, we hypothesized that highly motivated liars might 
try harder to control their words, so differences between liars and truth-tellers should 
become smaller under Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c, and 5. 
Production mode. Participants’ accounts were either handwritten, typed on a 
keyboard, or spoken (and audio- or videotaped). Horowitz and Newman (1964) 
proposed that, in general, speaking is easier than writing, because speakers have 
more liberty and feel less inhibited than writers. Also, writing involves more 
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deliberateness (see also Hancock, Woodworth, & Goorha, 2010) and more serious 
commitment. Horowitz and Newman found support for their hypothesis in that 
speaking is more productive and elaborative than writing. This resulted in more 
words, more phrases and more sentences when speaking than when writing. More 
recently, Kellogg (2007) hypothesized that writing is slower and less practiced than 
speaking and thus results in higher demands on working memory. He found that 
accounts of a recalled story were more complete and more accurate when spoken 
than written (cf. also Sauerland & Sporer, 2011). 
Hence, we hypothesized that liars produce even fewer words, diverse words, 
and sentences (Research Question 1--Cognitive Load ) when writing than speaking 
due to an increased cognitive load and decreased working memory capacity. 
Furthermore, liars should also use fewer (sensory and contextual) details when 
writing than speaking compared to truth-tellers (Research Question 5; see Elntib, 
Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2014, for a recent empirical investigation of this issue). 
Regarding emotion-related cues (under Research Questions 3a, and 3c), we 
hypothesized that liars use more negative and unspecified emotion words than truth-
tellers when speaking than when writing, because emotions might be expressed 
more directly and frequently in direct speech. 
An empirical issue for studies involving writing is whether handwriting or 
typing comes easier. Therefore, we separated written accounts into hand-written vs. 
typed for our moderator analysis. Unfortunately, we do not know the level of typing 
skill of participants. 
To sum up, differences between liars and truth-tellers should be more 
pronounced in written (typed or handwritten) compared to orally given accounts for 
linguistic cues under Research Questions 1 (cognitive load) and 5 (details), whereas 
Meta-analysis of computer-assessed linguistic cues to deception 
 
47 
for emotion-related cues (Research Questions 3a, and 3c), the effect sizes should be 
larger if stories were spoken than written. 
Program type. Researchers from various fields used different computer 
programs to analyze deceptive and truthful accounts. The most common one is 
LIWC. Although it is a general program (i.e., not specifically designed to detect 
deception), we separated it from other general programs such as Coh-Metrix or 
WordScan. This is because LIWC was used in a disproportionally large number of 
studies. Other software, such as Agent99Analyzer or Automated Deception Analysis 
Machine, were specifically developed to detect deception. We hypothesized that 
studies applying deception-specific programs should yield stronger effects for any 
linguistic cue than studies using LIWC or any other general program based on 
simple word counts. 
Publication status. The tendency that studies with nonsignificant findings are 
less likely to be written, submitted, and accepted for publication in peer-reviewed 
journals, is referred to as publication bias (Cooper, 2010; Sutton, 2009). In short, the 
publication of a study may partially depend on its results rather than on its theoretical 
or methodological quality (Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). One method to 
statistically quantify a publication bias is to compare the effect sizes of published and 
unpublished studies (see Appendix E in supplemental online materials); another is to 
test for the association between effect sizes and sample sizes (Levine, Asada, & 
Carpenter, 2009). 
Experimental design. We also assessed experimental design as a 
moderator (between- vs. within-participants), assuming larger effects for the latter 
(see results in Appendix F in supplemental online materials). 
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Goals of the Meta-Analysis 
The main goals of our meta-analysis were (a) to provide a comprehensive set 
of operational definitions for each linguistic marker, (b) to offer an elaborate 
theoretical background in order to specify directed predictions for each cue, (c) to 
provide a quantitative and comprehensive synthesis of linguistic cues to deception 
assessed with computer programs obtained from interdisciplinary research areas, 
and (d) to analyze the influence of important theoretical and methodological 
moderator variables on the outcome of linguistic cues to deception. 
Method 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Studies had to meet the following eligibility criteria to be included in our meta-
analysis: (1) Use of software to locate linguistic cues; (2) Reports of specific linguistic 
cues (not just paraverbal/paralinguistic or nonverbal or physiological cues); studies 
that reported word counts only, but no other linguistic cues were excluded5; (3) 
Independence of data sets: when analyses of the same data set of transcripts and 
cues were reported in multiple publications, we only included the source published in 
the journal with the highest publication standard [e.g., peer review] and excluded the 
other source(s) to ensure independence of all data sets; and (4) Sufficiency of data 
to calculate effect sizes (see Effect Size Measure section below). Furthermore, (5) 
whenever a field study with statements from real criminal cases met the 
aforementioned criteria (e.g., ten Brinke & Porter, 2012), special care was taken to 
assure ground truth had not been established solely on the basis of a court verdict, 
but in addition from more than one type of external and independent source of 
evidence (e.g., physical evidence, witness statements, confessions, etc.). However, 
Meta-analysis of computer-assessed linguistic cues to deception 
 
49 
these studies should be treated with caution because linguistic aspects of the 
account may have affected the final case disposition (e.g., lie or truth). 
Literature Search and Study Retrieval 
As a first step, we searched through reference lists of most relevant studies or 
reviews (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Newman et al., 2003; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 
2010; Zhou et al., 2004). Next, several exhaustive literature searches were 
conducted from September 2011 to February 2012 in the most important 
psychological research literature databases, such as the Social Sciences Citation 
Index (with cited reference search), PsycInfo, Dissertation Abstracts, and Google 
Scholar, examining articles published between 1945 and February 2012. 
The combination and permutations of four keyword clusters were used: (a) 
decept*, deceit, lie; (b) verbal, linguistic, language; (c) automatic, computer, 
software, artificial. These searches resulted in 948 published and unpublished 
articles, which were reduced to 394 after removing duplicates. Then, the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria were carefully applied. This reduced the number of articles to 
99, from which we still had to exclude 54 for different reasons (Appendix G in 
supplemental online materials), mostly incomplete reporting of data necessary for 
our analysis. This resulted in 44 relevant data sets that met all inclusion criteria. 
Linguistic Cues to Deception 
A total of 202 linguistic cues were extracted from the articles and sorted 
based on their name and operational definition (if available). In some cases, we 
merged cues with different names that had very similar operational definitions. For 
example, type-token ratio, unique words, lexical diversity, or different words, were all 
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similarly operationally defined and refer to the same construct. We chose the name 
most commonly used (e.g., type-token ratio in the prior example). 
All linguistic cues had to be calculated as a ratio of all other words (except raw 
frequencies of words, verbs and sentences), and had to be investigated in at least k 
= 4 hypothesis tests. This resulted in 79 linguistic cues of which 50 were allocated to 
one of the six research questions based on their content and theoretical meaning. 
The remaining 29 cues could not be allocated to a theory or one of the research 
questions, and were assigned to the Miscellaneous category. All linguistic cues, with 
all of their names and final operational definitions, are listed in Appendices A and B. 
Effect Size Measure 
As an effect size measure we used Hedges’s gu (Hedges, 1981; Borenstein, 
2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), an unbiased estimator of the standardized mean 
difference (Cohen’s d). Here, it is the standardized mean difference of the average 
frequency or ratio for each linguistic cue between deceptive and true accounts. If a 
specific linguistic cue occurred more often during deception than truth, gu has a 
negative sign. If it occurred more often during truth than deception, gu was assigned 
a positive value. To calculate gu, we coded means, standard deviations, and ns 
separately for deceptive and true stories. If this information was not given, other 
appropriate measures (t- or F-values with 1 degree of freedom in the numerator, or 
p-values) were coded (for formula collections see Borenstein, 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001). 
If no relevant statistical data were available, we e-mailed the researchers to 
request them. In some instances, there may be discrepancies between the effect 
sizes reported here and those in the original articles. Reasons for such differences 
are that some authors provided us with more (differentiated) data, that we 
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sometimes chose specific subgroups for the analyses, or calculated the average 
effect size across subgroups, as explained in more detail under Meta-Analytic 
Techniques below. 
Independent Variables and Moderator Variables 
After coding typical study characteristics (e.g., study ID, author names, year of 
publication, number of senders and gender, etc.), we coded for information that 
defined the moderator variables or further independent variables of potential interest. 
These were: Publication status (e.g., published, thesis, etc.), type of computer 
program (LIWC; other general programs like Wordscan, Microsoft Word, or Coh-
Metrix; or specific programs like ADAM (Automated Deception Analysis Machine), 
Agent99Analyzer, GATE (General Architecture for Text Engineering), iSkim, CueCal, 
or Connexor), language of accounts, theory presented (if any), cue selection (a 
priori, reported all or significant cues only), age of the senders, experimental design 
(between- or within-participants), preparation time, event type, event valence, 
interaction between sender and receiver, mode of production, and type/level of 
motivation to lie successful. 
Coding Procedures and Intercoder Reliability 
Two trained raters coded all dependent and independent variables from the 
articles with a standardized coding manual. After discussing two articles as 
examples and agreeing on order of article review, each coder worked independently. 
For eleven continuous variables, inter-coder reliabilities were highly satisfactory, with 
all coefficients ranging from Pearson’s r = .86 to r = 1.0 (except for preparation time: 
r = .77). For eight categorical variables, inter-coder reliabilities were excellent, with 
Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) ranging from .75 to 1.0. For six additional categorical 
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variables, Cohen’s kappa ranged from .51 to .67, which was still a fair to good 
agreement (according to Fleiss, 1981). The few disagreements were resolved by 
discussion between the two coders. Final coding decisions of the moderator 
variables for each study are displayed in Appendix C. 
Meta-Analytic Techniques 
Dependencies of effect sizes. In some studies, in addition to accounts’ truth 
status, other independent variables were manipulated as between- or within-
participants factors and the data were reported separately for these subgroups (e.g., 
Schelleman-Offermans & Merckelbach, 2010: high- vs. low-fantasy-proneness). In 
studies with additional within-participants factors, dependency was avoided by 
calculating effect sizes separately for each subgroup and averaging them to ensure 
that only one effect size per study per linguistic cue was included (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001). In two other studies, a second between-participants factor (Ali & Levine, 
2008: denials or confessions; Qin et al., 2005: text-chat, audio, face-to-face) was 
examined; here we included each of these subgroups (with different stimulus 
persons) as independent data sets. 
Superordinate categories and sub-cues. Sometimes a linguistic category of 
cues had differentiated effect sizes that seemed to represent a single construct. As 
an example, we defined cue 19 with the superordinate category (“umbrella term”) 
positive emotions and feelings including results from positive emotions only and 
positive feelings only. In studies using LIWC 2001, positive feelings and positive 
emotions/affects are treated as two different linguistic cues--and the data are 
reported separately for each (in LIWC 2007, they are combined). To ensure that only 
one effect size per construct is included, we combined sub-cues to a superordinate 
category (by averaging their effect sizes). However, we also calculated separate 
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meta-analyses for each of these sub-cues (here: cue 19.1 positive emotions only 
and 19.2 positive feelings only) to investigate whether the results are more 
differentiated, or if merging these cues was justifiable. The same procedure was 
applied to cue 18 negative emotions and to cue 28 sensory-perceptual processes 
(see Table 1). These superordinate categories make results from LIWC more 
comparable with studies using other computer programs that did not differentiate 
between different sub-cues (e.g., anger, anxiety, sadness). 
Weighted average effect size. For each of the 79 linguistic cues, individual 
meta-analyses under the fixed-effects model (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Shadish & 
Haddock, 2009; Sporer & Cohn, 2011) were calculated. Average effect sizes were 
weighted by the inverse of the variance to give more weight to studies with larger 
samples. For six studies the total number of accounts was extremely large. To avoid 
unjustified extra-ordinary large weights we adjusted the number of total accounts for 
these studies (see Results section). 
Homogeneity of effect sizes. We report both the homogeneity test statistic 
Q (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) and the descriptive homogeneity statistic I2 (Higgins & 
Thompson, 2002; Shadish & Haddock, 2009). In rare cases where I2 resulted in a 
negative value, it was set to 0. In case of heterogeneity, outlier and moderator 
analyses were conducted. 
Outlier analysis. To test for the presence of outliers, we applied the two 
methods recommended by Hedges and Olkin (1985, Chapter 12, and programmed 
by the fourth author). The number of outliers did not exceed 15% of the total number 
of effect sizes to avoid an artificial restriction of the variance between effect sizes. If 
outliers were detected, we calculated each meta-analysis with and without the 
outliers as sensitivity analyses (Greenhouse & Iyengar, 2009). Due to space 
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limitations, we only report results without outliers in Table 1 (results with and without 
outliers are displayed in Appendix H in supplemental online materials). 
Moderator analyses. We used categorical variables as potential moderators 
with Hedges’s analogue to ANOVA (Hedges, 1982; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
Moderator analyses were only conducted if the homogeneity statistic was significant 
and if an individual meta-analysis of a specific linguistic cue contained enough 
hypothesis tests to avoid empty cell sizes and to increase power. Moderator 
analyses were only conducted without outliers to prevent biased results. To clarify 
potential confounds between moderator variables, we calculated their 
intercorrelations as well as all two-way and three-way cross-tabulations for each 
variable combination, to avoid empty or low frequency cells. As a consequence, only 
moderator analyses for k ! 13 hypothesis tests are reported. 
Computer-software for calculations. For computing individual effect sizes, 
weights and confidence intervals, formulae were programmed in Microsoft Office 
Excel (2011) spreadsheets by the first and fourth author. Calculations of meta-
analyses and outlier analyses were conducted using Excel spreadsheets 
programmed by the fourth author and cross-validated using Lipsey and Wilson’s 
(2001) SPSS macros (Wilson, 2002). Moderator analyses were also conducted using 
these macros. 
Results and Discussion 
Study Characteristics 
We included k = 44 independent studies or data sets (see Appendix C for all 
individual coding decisions), dated between 2002 and February 2012. Most studies 
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were published (k = 27), 11 were conference presentations (poster or paper), and 
the rest were 4 Dissertations, 1 Master’s Thesis, and 1 submitted manuscript. 
Computer program. More than half of the studies (58.1%) used LIWC (2001 
or 2007), 23.3% used other general programs, and 18.6% applied a program 
specifically developed to detect deception. Three studies, where the type of program 
was not specifically described or labeled (e.g., “automated analysis method”, “natural 
language processing tool”, “message analyzing software”), were categorized under 
other general programs. 
Senders. There were a total of 3,780 senders (k = 43) with an average of 
87.91 (SD = 19.60, Mdn = 53) senders per study, ranging from eight to 800. 
Information about senders’ gender was provided in 30 studies, with more male than 
female participants in total (Nmale = 1,254; Nfemale = 895), and on average per study 
(Mmale = 41.80; SDmale = 9.22; Mfemale = 29.83; SDfemale = 5.76). Exact information 
about senders’ age was reported in only 29.5% of the studies. Across all age groups, 
senders’ mean age was 19.33 years (SD = 8.45), ranging from 4 to 58 years. The 
mean age of N = 1,015 adults only was 24.17 (SD = 4.11) with a range of 17 to 58 
years, whereas the mean age of N = 218 children (k = 4) was 8.45 years (SD = 
1.57), ranging from 4 to 14 years. 
Accounts. There were a total of 11,680 (Ntruth = 5,650, Nlie = 6,030) accounts 
originally. However, six studies contained an extremely large number of accounts, 
ranging from N = 608 (Schafer, 2007, Experiment 1) to N = 3,162 (Derrick et al., 
2012), with a mean of 1295.17 accounts (SD = 948.98). In the other 38 studies, the 
mean was M = 102.87 (SD = 73.17), ranging from N = 13 (Ali & Levine, 2008, 
confessions) to N = 322 (Cooper, 2008). Therefore, we decided to adjust the number 
of total accounts for these six studies to N = 500 (ntruth = 250, nlie = 250) to avoid 
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extra-ordinary high weights. Consequently, the final average number of accounts per 
study was M = 157.02 (SD = 153.66, Mdn = 103), with M = 82.02 (SD = 80.71) for 
truths and M = 75.00 (SD = 76.68) for lies. All accounts were provided in English 
except for four studies (two Spanish, one Dutch, one Arabic).  
Preparation. Only eight studies provided information about how long senders 
had time to prepare their accounts. In four of these, senders had no opportunity, for 
the other four studies, senders had on average 1.31 minutes (SD = 0.71; range: 1 to 
5 minutes) to prepare. 
Theoretical background. Twelve studies referred to Newman et al.’s (2003) 
explanations (“LIWC approach”) to predict the outcome of specific linguistic cues, 
three used Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT, Buller & Burgoon, 1996), two reality 
monitoring (RM; Sporer, 2004), and 12 a combination of IDT and reality monitoring. 
Twelve additional studies referred to other theoretical backgrounds, for example, 
Media Richness Theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986), or Verbal Immediacy (Mehrabian & 
Wiener, 1966), and three studies did not mention any theory at all. A-priori selections 
of linguistic cues were made for 37 studies while seven reported only significant 
findings. 
Interpretation of Effect Sizes 
As a rule of thumb, Cohen (1988) classified the effect size d into three 
categories, with d = 0.20 as small, d = 0.50 as medium and d = 0.80 as large effect 
sizes. However, in meta-analyses about cues to deception, effect sizes are often 
much smaller (DePaulo et al., 2003: Mdn gu = 0.10; similarly low for Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006, 2007). Richard, Bond, and Stokes-Zota (2003) examined 322 
meta-analyses in social psychology and provided an empirically based effect size 
distribution that might serve as a good comparison for our results (cf. Sporer & Cohn, 
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2011). It should be noted that in DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis positive effect 
sizes refer to stronger or more frequent cues in lies. 
Research Questions 
In this section, we present results for 50 linguistic cues to deception grouped 
according to six research questions (see Table 1). The weighted average gu, with the 
95% confidence interval (CI), is reported for all analyses. Recall that positive effect 
sizes denote stronger presence in true accounts (similarly to Sporer & Schwandt, 
2006, 2007, but contrary to DePaulo et al., 2003). A data file with all dependent and 
predictor variables coded is available in supplemental online materials. 
Research Question 1: Do Liars Experience Greater Cognitive Load? 
(a) Are liars’ accounts shorter in terms of number of words (cue 01), 
number of sentences (cue 07), and average sentence length (cue 08)? As 
expected, liars used fewer words than truth-tellers (word quantity, 0.24 [0.19, 0.29]), 
with gus ranging from -1.25 to 1.43, but no shorter sentences than truth-tellers 
(average sentence length, 0.05 [-0.03, 0.13]). Contrary to our prediction, liars used 
more sentences than truth-tellers (-0.33 [-0.44, -0.21]), although the distribution of 
effect sizes was also quite heterogeneous. The effect size for sentence quantity was 
derived from a small subset of nine studies compared to 42 studies serving data for 
word quantity. Therefore, word quantity is a more precise estimate for statement 
length. 
Note that DePaulo et al. (2003) did not examine number of words per se but 
only response length defined as "length or duration" (cue 01, d = -0.03, k = 49, ns), 
or as talking time (cue 02, d = -0.35, k = 4, p < .05). Sporer and Schwandt (2006) 
found no reliable associations for number of words (d = -0.018, k = 8), nor for 
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message duration (d = -0.078, k = 23). These differences in findings may be due to 
the stimulus accounts used. More recent studies analyzing verbal content cues to 
deception sometimes do (e.g., Ansarra, Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Hines, Fleck, 
Cole, & Belarde, 2011) and sometimes do not find (e.g., Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher, 2013) differences between liars’ and truth-tellers’ length of 
accounts operationalized by the number of words. 
(b) Are deceptive accounts less elaborated in terms of content word 
diversity (cue 02), type-token ratio (cue 03), or word length cues (cues 04, 05)? 
Indeed, liars used fewer diverse content words (0.48 [0.34, 0.61]) and distinct words 
(type-token ratio: 0.14 [0.07, 0.21]) than truth-tellers. These findings could be 
attributed to liars’ increased cognitive load and reduced working memory capacity 
(relative to truth-tellers), which in turn is associated with a limitation of creative word 
production in speaking or writing. These findings also favor a cognitive over a social 
psychological explanation, as it is unlikely that liars strategically use fewer diverse 
content and distinct words. However, the prediction that liars would provide shorter 
words was not supported (see Table 1). Presumably, the number of distinct words 
and word diversity indices are more sensitive to cognitive load and working memory 
capacity than word length. 
(c) Are deceptive accounts less complex than true accounts, as 
indicated by fewer verbs (cue 06), causation (cue 09) and exclusive words (cue 
10)? Liars indeed used fewer exclusive words like but, except, or without, than truth-
tellers (0.24 [0.17, 0.31]). Using few exclusive words results in simpler stories 
(Newman et al., 2003). Liars may resort to telling simple stories because their 
cognitive system is more taxed than that of truth tellers. Our predictions that liars 
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would use fewer words assigning a cause to his or her behavior (causation), or use 
fewer verbs than truth-tellers, were not confirmed (Table 1). 
(d) Do liars commit more writing errors (cue 11) than truth-tellers? No 
support was found for this hypothesis with or without two outliers (Lee, Walker & 
Odom, 2009; Zhou & Zhang, 2004). This can be reconciled with DePaulo’s self-
presentational perspective (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003). Liars might be 
more self-aware and deliberate than truth-tellers; hence, they may edit their typing 
errors. Derrick et al. (2012) showed that liars were significantly more likely to edit 
their words on the keyboard (e.g., in using the backspace and delete button) than 
truth-tellers (-0.12 [-0.19; -0.05]). Whether or not their edits were aimed at correcting 
explicit typing errors or not, was not investigated and should be examined more 
closely. In six of the ten studies exploring writing errors, participants typed their 
stories on a computer keyboard; unfortunately, they did not measure editing behavior 
(with the exception of Derrick et al., 2012). 
Research Question 2: Are Liars Less Certain Than Truth-Tellers? 
Effects for certainty and modal verbs were not significant. The difference 
between DePaulo et al.’s (2003) findings (who found liars to appear more verbally 
and vocally uncertain: cue 31, k = 10, d = 0.30, p < .05) and ours could be due to 
different operationalizations. Whereas we included studies that automatically 
counted words expressing certainty, DePaulo et al. considered the subjective 
impression of uncertainty (“the speaker seems uncertain, insecure, (...)”, p. 114). The 
opposing findings suggest that (a) there is a difference between objective and 
subjective assessments of (un)certainty, and/or (b) liars may nonverbally give the 
impression of being uncertain without using fewer certainty words than truth-tellers. 
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Contrary to our prediction, deceptive accounts contained slightly fewer 
tentative words (such as may, seem, perhaps) than truthful accounts (0.13 [0.06, 
0.20] for an exception, see ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). A reason for this unexpected 
finding could be that liars think that tentative expressions diminish their credibility 
and therefore try to avoid them, although we are not aware of any empirical evidence 
that liars pursue this strategy to appear more credible. Note that DePaulo et al. 
(2003) also reported less “tentative constructions” (cue 30, k = 3, d = -0.16, ns) in 
lies. A different explanation for this finding could be derived from the literature on 
credibility assessment (e.g., Steller & Köhnken, 1989). The underlying assumption is 
that due to their motivation to appear credible, liars (here: alleged victims of sexual 
abuse) would probably not correct themselves spontaneously, admit a lack of 
memory or raise doubts about their own statement. These criteria relate to 
uncertainty or tentative words to the extent that liars try to hide any kind of 
deficiencies or ambiguities in their statement in order to appear or stay credible 
(Sporer, 2004). Especially the criterion “admitting lack of memory” is less often 
expressed by liars than truth-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003, cue 73: k = 5, d = -0.42, p 
< .05; Vrij, 2005). Research also shows that guilty suspects attempt to be firm in their 
denial of guilt (Hartwig et al., 2007); this is contrary to showing uncertainty. 
Research Question 3a: Do Liars Use More Negations and Negative Emotion 
Words? 
(a) To the extent that liars defend themselves or deny something they 
have done, do they use more negation terms such as no, never, or not (cue 
17)? This prediction was supported, with a significant negative effect of -0.15 [-0.22, 
-0.09] based on 20 studies (but large heterogeneity). Our results contradict Hancock, 
Curry, Goorha and Woodworth’s (2008) view, who considered negations as a form of 
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distinction marker (in addition to exclusive terms) expected to occur less frequently in 
deceptive accounts, presumably to avoid contradictions by being less specific than 
truth-tellers.  
Our findings concur with those of DePaulo et al. (2003), who found a 
significant effect for negative statements and complaints (cue 52: d = 0.21, k = 9, p < 
.05) showing that liars use slightly more negative utterances than truth-tellers. 
(b) Do liars use more negative emotion words in general (cues 18, 18.1), 
as well as more specific negative-emotion words, such as anger (cue 18.2), 
anxiety (cue 18.3), or sadness (cue 18.4), than truth-tellers? Contrary to the 
prediction that people might feel negative emotions while lying (Ekman, 2001; 
Zuckerman et al., 1981), liars did not use more negative emotion words (cue 18; -
0.07 [-0.15, 0.01]). However, the sub-cue negative emotions only revealed a small 
but reliable negative effect (-0.18 [-0.24, -0.12]). The difference between these 
results can be explained with their different operationalization. Whereas the 
superordinate category negative emotions (cue 18) contained all types of negative 
emotions (including anger, anxiety, and sadness), cue 18.1 encompassed only a 
reduced set of negative emotion words (e.g., hate, worthless, enemy). 
A more differentiated picture of various negative emotions under investigation 
emerged when we look at the more specific type of emotion words used. Liars used 
more anger terms than truth-tellers (cue 18.2, -0.27 [-0.35, -0.19]), although no 
significant differences were found for anxiety (cue 18.3) or sadness (cue 18.4, see 
Table 1). Newman et al.’s (2003, p. 672) assertion that “anxiety words are more 
predictive than overall negative emotion” was not supported. Rather, the present 
findings indicate that there are differences in words expressing feelings and/or 
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different negative emotions while lying. Liars might not feel anxious or sad but rather 
feel angry, and this might be manifested in words like worthless, or annoyed. 
Research Question 3b: Do Liars Use Fewer Positive Emotion Words? 
Did truth-tellers express more positive emotion (cue 19.1) or positive feeling 
(cue 19.2) words than liars? While the effect for positive emotions only just missed 
significance (-0.07 [-0.15, 0.00], overall, there was no support for this prediction 
(Table 1). DePaulo and colleagues (2003) also did not find a significant effect for 
being friendly and pleasant (cue 49: d = -0.16, k = 6, ns). 
Research Question 3c: Do Liars Express More or Less Unspecified Emotion 
Words? 
For 21 studies investigating unspecified emotion words (cue 15), liars used 
more unspecified emotion words than truth-tellers (-0.11 [-0.19, -0.04]). However, 
liars and truth-tellers did not differ in words expressing unpleasantness or 
pleasantness (cue 16, -0.10 [-0.25, 0.06]). DePaulo et al. (2003) also found no 
significant difference for being “friendly and pleasant” (cue 49: d = -0.16, k = 6, ns). 
Conversely, DePaulo et al.’s findings for two other subjectively rated cues associated 
with pleasantness, namely “cooperation” (cue 50: d = -0.66, k = 3, p < .05), and 
“facial pleasantness” (cue 54: d = -0.12, k = 13, p < .05), showed that truth-tellers 
appeared more pleasant than liars. These differences might indicate that the 
pleasantness construct tracked by DePaulo et al.’s human-rated cues (subjective 
impressions) is different from the one operationalized in computer-based studies 
(objective word count). Alternatively, truth-tellers might only appear more pleasant 
than liars in their nonverbal or paraverbal behavior, but not in their choice of words. 
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Research Question 4: Do Liars Distance Themselves More From Events? 
 (a) Do liars use fewer first-person pronouns (cues 21, 22, 23) and more 
second-person (cue 24) and third-person pronouns (cue 25) than truth-tellers? 
Although no significant differences were found for first-person singular, or first-
person plural references (see Table 1), the weighted average effect size for total 
first-person pronouns was significant in the expected direction, that is, liars used 
fewer total first-person pronouns than truth-tellers (0.14 [0.06, 0.22], when the 
extreme negative effect size found by Brunet, 2009, both conditions: -1.63 [-1.98, -
1.29] was excluded).  
On the other side of the coin, we predicted second-and third-person pronouns 
to occur more often in liars’ than truth-tellers’ accounts. Our meta-analyses 
supported this prediction, with a negative gu = -0.10 (Table 1). The results indicated 
that liars in general tried to redirect the focus of attention to other people by using 
more references to their interaction partner(s) (you), or to (a) third person(s) (he, 
she, they) than truth-tellers. 
Overall pronoun use. As researchers seem to be interested in the use of any 
type of pronouns (total pronouns, cue 20), we aggregated all of the pronoun effect 
sizes. The resulting effect size was not significant (0.06 [-0.02, 0.14]). 
(b) Do deceptive accounts contain more passive voice verbs (cue 26) 
and generalizing terms (cue 27) than truthful accounts? Although effect sizes for 
passive voice verbs varied considerably (see Table 1), all were nonsignificant. This 
is probably due to small sample sizes or a generally low frequency of occurrence 
(floor effect). Generalizing terms had a medium negative effect size (-0.37 [-0.79, 
0.05]) that was nevertheless not significant because of the small number of studies 
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and large heterogeneity. Similarly, DePaulo et al. (2003) did not find a significant 
effect for generalizing terms (cue 21: d = 0.10, k = 5, ns). 
(c) Do lies include more past tense verbs (cue 47) and fewer present 
tense verbs (cue 48) than true accounts? Significant differences were neither 
found for past tense verbs nor for present tense verbs (Table 1). A potential reason 
why the data did not support our predictions could be the way the dependent 
variable was operationalized. It is important to note that Pillemer et al.’s (1998) 
hypothesis stated that verb tense shifts occur more often in critical parts of 
experienced (i.e., true) autobiographical events. Here we did not consider verb tense 
shifts, but absolute number of present and past tense verbs. Future research could 
construct a more suitable linguistic cue than counting the number of verbs only. 
Research Question 5: Do Liars Use Fewer (Sensory and Contextual) Details? 
(a) Do liars use fewer sensory and perceptual details than truth-tellers? 
They did, according to our findings for sensory-perceptual processes only (cue 28.1), 
although the average effect size was very small (0.06 [0.00, 0.13]). For the variable 
sensory-perceptual processes overall (cue 28), the effect size was not significant 
(0.05 [-0.01, 0.12], after two outliers were excluded). 
Some support came from the more specialized cue hearing (cue 28.4, 0.17 
[0.09, 0.25]), showing that liars used fewer words expressing their acoustic 
impressions (like listen, sound, or speak) than truth-tellers. Indeed, in case of entirely 
fabricated lies (compared to partially fabricated lies or lies of omission), persons may 
not experience any audio(visual) impressions at all and do not seem to deliberately 
include these words in their lies. However, the cues seeing (cue 28.2) and feeling 
(cue 28.3) yielded nonsignificant results (see Table 1). Although DePaulo et al. 
(2003) also found no significant effects for sensory information (cue 05: d = -0.17, k 
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= 4, ns) there have been many new reality monitoring studies we are currently 
synthesizing in an updated large scale meta-analysis. 
(b) Are liars’ accounts less contextually embedded than those of truth-
tellers, as indicated by fewer time and space words? No significant effects 
emerged for time (cue 29), space (cue 30), or the combination of spatial and 
temporal details (cue 31). Our results for temporal and spatial details are in line with 
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) nonsignificant finding for contextual embedding (cue 76: d = -
0.21, k = 6, ns), though it should be noted that contextual embedding goes beyond 
temporal and spatial details in that the event has to be connected to everyday 
occurrences, habits, relationships, and so forth (e.g., Steller & Köhnken, 1989). 
Again, many newer Criteria-Based Content Analysis and reality monitoring studies 
found support for this assumption (see Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2005, 2008a) but 
linguistic analyses by computers do not seem to capture them. 
(c) Relative to truth-tellers, do liars use fewer descriptive words, such as 
prepositions (cue 32), numbers (cue 33), quantifiers (cue 34), modifiers 
(adverbs and adjectives, cue 35), and motion verbs (cue 36)? The only 
significant effect size was obtained for quantifiers (0.14 [0.02, 0.25]) indicating a 
slightly lower use of words such as all, bit, few, less, among liars. However, this 
finding was synthesized from four studies only, so we should not make strong 
conclusions for this cue in general. 
Interestingly liars produced more motion verbs (such as walk, go, or move) 
than truth-tellers (-0.09 [-0.17, -0.01]) after removing the only significant positive 
effect size (Liu, Hancock, Zhang, Xu, Markowitz, & Bazarova, 2012; 0.38 [0.21, 
0.56]), which was found to be an outlier. This finding is contrary to our prediction but 
is in line with the cognitive load approach (Research Question 1) and Newman et 
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al.’s (2003) assumption that, when constructing a lie, “simple, concrete actions are 
easier to string together than false evaluations” (p. 667). Therefore, liars, who are 
cognitively taxed by the act of lying, “should use more motion verbs and fewer 
exclusive words” (Newman et al., 2003, p. 667). 
Research Question 6: Do Liars Refer Less Often to Cognitive Processes? 
As predicted, weighted average effect sizes for both cues (37 and 38) were 
significantly positive (see Table 1), indicating that liars expressed words relating to 
their inner thoughts (insight) and cognitive processes less often than truth-tellers. 
Miscellaneous Category 
Twenty-nine cues that could not be allocated to any research question were 
subsumed under the miscellaneous category. As displayed in Appendix D (in 
supplemental online materials), significant positive effect sizes (without outliers) were 
obtained for inhibition, humans, and for three cues expressing biological processes, 
namely: biology, physical states, and eating. Liars used fewer words from all of these 
word classes than truth-tellers. In contrast, negative effect sizes for future tense and 
leisure terms indicated that these terms occurred more frequently in deceptive than 
truthful accounts. 
Moderator Analyses 
Due to the large number of potential moderator analyses for all linguistic cues, 
we only report significant findings (all QBs were significant at p < .05) for both 
theoretically and methodologically important moderator variables. Specifically, we 
examined six moderator variables for 25 linguistic cues, with each analysis 
containing at least 13 studies.7 Note that the overall number of studies is smaller for 
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the moderator analyses as many studies did not report enough information to code 
them. Analyses of two additional moderators, experimental design (between- vs. 
within-participants) and publication status are available in supplemental online 
materials (Appendices E and F). Also, it must be acknowledged that blocking groups 
of studies in meta-analyses analogous to ANOVA often introduces confounds (see 
Pigott, 2012) although we have taken great care to minimize them (see Method). 
Event type and personal involvement. We hypothesized that larger effect 
sizes would be found for Research Questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c and 4 if the event was 
personally relevant to the participant (“First-person experience”, k = 21) than in the 
“Attitude/liking” paradigm (k = 7) or the “Miscellaneous” paradigms (k = 14; see Table 
2). First, concerning cognitive load (Research Question 1), event type affected 
average sentence length only. Liars used shorter sentences than truth-tellers when 
articulating attitudes (0.17), but not under the other two paradigms. Second, 
regarding negative emotions and negations (Research Question 3a), liars used more 
negative emotion words than truth-tellers only if they had to tell a personally relevant 
story (-0.37, -0.57), and expressed more negations only in miscellaneous paradigms 
(-0.59). Thus, although liars might experience and express more negative emotions 
when the topic is personally relevant, they do not necessarily use more negations. 
Third, as expected, liars also expressed more unspecified emotions (Research 
Question 3c; -0.45) when talking about a personal experience than when having 
performed other tasks. Fourth, concerning distancing (Research Question 4), liars 
used fewer first-person plural pronouns primarily when describing a video (0.38), but 
fewer total first-person pronouns when talking about attitudes (0.31). This 
unexpected finding suggests that it may be especially hard for liars to refer to 
themselves while articulating a false attitude; however, liars may still use self-
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references while telling a personal event because it is common (in the English 
language) to refer to oneself as the actor. Also, it would be hard to avoid self-
references when telling a story with oneself as the acting person, even when lying. 
Liars used more total second-person pronouns only when talking about 
attitudes (-0.18), and more total third-person pronouns in all kinds of events except 
the miscellaneous paradigms. In general, thus, the predicted differences for 
Distancing (Research Question 4) between liars and truth-tellers appear enhanced in 
the attitude/liking paradigm--compared to the other two paradigms. 
Emotional valence. We predicted effects for cues under Research Questions 
1 to 4 to be larger for negative (k = 18) than for neutral events or themes (k = 17; see 
Table 3).8 Indeed, liars used fewer words (Research Question 1--Cognitive Load; 
0.54) only when the event was negative. In terms of negative emotions (Research 
Question 3a), liars also used considerably more negations (-0.42) and negative 
emotions (-0.39, -0.65) than truth-tellers, most notably when the event was negative. 
This supported the notion that telling a negatively toned lie might be accompanied by 
negative emotions. 
However, contrary to our predictions regarding the cognitive load cues 
(Research Question 1), differences between lies and truths for type-token ratio (0.32) 
and exclusive words (0.47) were larger when telling a neutral event rather than a 
negative event. Perhaps truth-tellers reporting a negative event are as emotionally 
involved as liars. This may imply using less elaborate language (compared to neutral 
events), which would explain the lack of difference in type-token ratio between liars 
and truth-tellers. Finally, no difference in the use of unspecified emotions (Research 
Question 3c) was found between neutral and negative topics: Liars used more 
emotion words overall for both (-0.54; -0.45). 
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Regarding distancing (Research Question 4), somewhat contradictory findings 
occurred for self-references. When telling neutral events, liars used more first-person 
singular pronouns (-0.25) but fewer total first-person pronouns (0.22) than truth-
tellers. Also, when telling negative events liars used fewer first-person singular 
pronouns than truth-tellers (0.27) but about the same amount of total first-person 
pronouns (-0.13). These findings clearly show that (a) differences exist between liars 
and truth-tellers in terms of referring solely to oneself or to oneself in addition to 
one’s group, and (b) these differences depend on the valence of the event. If we 
think about examples of wrongdoing as typical negative events, it perfectly makes 
sense to distribute responsibility to “we” (or “you and me”, “they and me”) than to 
take it on one’s own shoulders (“I”). Finally, liars expressed more total second-
person pronouns only when the event was neutral (-0.40). 
Intensity of interaction. We predicted that the higher the interaction level, 
the larger the effect sizes would be (Table 4). Indeed, effect sizes for word count 
(Research Question 1--Cognitive Load; 0.69), negative emotions (Research 
Question 3a; -0.48, -0.79), unspecified emotions (Research Question 3c; -0.63), and 
first-person singular pronouns (Research Question 4--Distancing; 0.34) were largest 
in person to person interactions. Note also that for computer-mediated 
communication the direction of effect (-0.41) reversed compared to other conditions. 
Furthermore, in the interview condition (which was considered as the second intense 
interaction category), effect sizes for word count, exclusive words, and negative 
emotions only, were in the expected direction. Interestingly, when no interaction took 
place, liars used significantly more first-person singular pronouns (-0.22) and total 
third-person pronouns than truth-tellers (-0.31). 
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Together, this evidence suggests that some verbal differences between liars 
and truth-tellers manifest themselves most when a bidirectional interaction between 
two persons--not only a one-way interview--took place. 
Motivation. In support for our hypotheses, larger effects occurred for not-
motivated liars, who used fewer words (Research Question 1--Cognitive Load) than 
truth-tellers (0.47), compared to moderately (0.19), or highly motivated liars (0.18; 
see Table 5). Also, liars used fewer temporal details (Research Question 5 regarding 
details) only when no motivation was induced (0.20). These findings support the 
notion that highly motivated liars are more successful than unmotivated liars in 
controlling their verbal behavior (at least in terms of number of words and temporal 
details). Note that liars seem to be less able to control their paraverbal behavior 
under high motivation (e.g., for pitch, response latency; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006) 
nor their visual nonverbal behavior (e.g., for eye contact; DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Other linguistic cues under various research questions showed findings 
contrary to our hypothesis (see Table 5): (a) only highly motivated liars used fewer 
different words (type-token ratio: 0.67); (b) only moderately motivated liars built 
slightly shorter sentences (average sentence length: 0.15) than truth-tellers; (c) liars 
expressed more negative emotional words than truth-tellers only when they were 
highly (-0.56, -1.03) or not motivated (-0.20, -0.19); (d) liars expressed more 
unspecified emotions (-0.53) than truth-tellers when highly motivated; and (e) both 
highly (0.21, 0.25) and moderately motivated (both 0.12) liars reported fewer 
sensory-perceptual processes than truth-tellers, whereas not motivated liars tended 
to refer more often to these processes than truth-tellers (-0.22, -0.29). 
Taken together, these results show a mixed picture. Our prediction that highly 
motivated liars would control their verbal behavior better than less motivated liars 
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was confirmed for only two cues. However, our findings should not be over-
interpreted because the number of studies with highly motivated participants was 
very small--calling for more research with highly motivated liars. 
Production mode. Moderator analyses showed mixed findings (see Table 6). 
Liars used fewer words (Research Question 1--Cognitive Load) than truth-tellers 
under all production modes, though effects were larger for handwritten texts (0.33) 
and for transcripts from spoken accounts (0.26) than for typed texts (0.10). It seems 
that storytellers may use the opportunity to edit their accounts when typing, thus 
reducing the number of errors. More direct evidence for this point comes from a 
study by Derrick et al. (2012) who developed a specialized computer applet that 
clandestinely recorded edits and revisions during real time synchronous 
communication between a computer interviewer and senders. They found that when 
deceiving, people were significantly more likely to take longer and perform a greater 
number of edits to their responses (more frequently using the delete and backspace 
keys) than when telling the truth. To the extent that deceptive individuals are more 
likely to engage in such editing, differences in writing errors between true and false 
statements may be obscured. This might explain why the effect for number of typed 
words is smaller than for number of handwritten or spoken words. 
In line with our hypothesis concerning details (Research Question 5), liars 
expressed fewer sensory-perceptual words than truth-tellers only when writing their 
accounts by hand (0.33, 0.34), whereas liars used fewer spatial details than truth-
tellers only in typed accounts (0.13). Contrary to our hypothesis (but in line with 
Newman et al.’s (2003) assumption), liars used more motion verbs than truth-tellers 
when handwriting (-0.28) or speaking (-0.16), but not when typing them (0.00). 
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Our hypothesis concerning negative emotions (Research Question 3a) was 
not supported: Liars expressed more negations and negative emotions than truth-
tellers when handwriting (-0.60 -0.28, respectively) rather than when speaking or 
typing. A potential reason for the larger effect in the handwriting condition could be 
that a writer might take more time to re-experience a negative emotion linked to the 
process of lying (see Ekman, 1988). Also, the special advantage to edit typed words 
could be a reason why the difference between liars and truth-tellers disappeared 
under this condition. Interestingly, regarding unspecified emotions (Research 
Question 3c), liars’ spoken messages--compared to truth-tellers’--showed no 
differences (-0.04) in unspecified emotion words but more when typing (-0.44) or 
handwriting (-0.25). 
In conclusion, the question of how the mode of production affects the 
language of lying is not sufficiently answered. Again, other moderators such as 
interaction type or motivation may be confounded in these analyses. The pattern of 
findings that typed accounts showed smallest effects also converges with the finding 
that computer-mediated communication showed smallest effects (Table 4 above). 
Future studies should investigate interaction intensity and production mode in more 
detail, perhaps controlling for language proficiency and typing skill. 
Computer program. The hypothesis that effects would be larger if 
statements were analyzed with programs specifically designed to detect deception (k 
= 8) rather than with LIWC (k = 26) or general programs (k = 11) was only confirmed 
for first-person plural pronouns (-0.31; see Table 7). Specific programs were more 
sensitive than LIWC or other general programs to differences in first-person plural 
pronouns, finding more of these words among liars than among truth-tellers. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, four linguistic cues were found to have larger effects if 
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LIWC or other general programs were used than with more specific programs. The 
direction of the effect for word quantity was even reversed if specific lie detection 
software was used. A parsimonious explanation may be that these specific programs 
were developed and used for different types of accounts. It also demonstrates that 
the validity of linguistic cues to deception depends on the kind of program used. 
However, this conclusion is limited by the fact that we had to exclude quite a few 
studies using specialized software as these did not contain sufficient information to 
calculate effect sizes. Journal editors and grant agencies should emphasize 
completeness of data reporting including effect sizes (APA, 2008). 
Publication bias. The correlation between sample sizes (number of 
accounts) and the absolute value of all effect sizes (excluding extremely large 
samples to avoid skewed distributions) was r(904) = -.11, p < .001. This negative 
correlation could be due to a publication bias, that is, a tendency for significant 
findings to be more likely to be published than unpublished (Levine et al., 2009). On 
the other hand, our moderator analyses showed that for 7 of 12 cues, for which there 
was a significant difference between published and unpublished studies, effects 
were actually greater in unpublished studies (see Appendix E in supplemental online 
materials). Thus, publication bias is unlikely to be a threat to the validity of our 
conclusions. 
General Discussion 
Setting some of the exceptions discussed under the moderator analyses 
aside we venture some take home message to our research questions, taking also 
rival theoretical approaches into consideration.  
Research Question 1--Cognitive Load. Taken together, the notion that liars 
experience greater cognitive load was mainly supported. As predicted from the 
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working memory model and the cognitive load approach, lies were shorter (fewer 
words and fewer sentences), less elaborated (fewer different words), and less 
complex (fewer exclusive terms) than true stories. Even if liars were to strategically 
withhold information that could give them away, doing so would heighten their 
working memory burden, thus indirectly also supporting the cognitive load approach. 
Research Question 2--Certainty. Because only three cues were investigated 
here and they yielded contradictory results, this question could hardly be answered. 
In general, the prediction for this research question that liars look linguistically less 
certain than truth-tellers due to a lack of personal investment or feelings of ambiguity 
or guilt was not supported. Contrary to our prediction, truth-tellers used more 
tentative words than liars. 
Research Question 3a--Negative Emotions. Altogether, the prediction that 
liars express more negative emotion words and defend themselves to a greater 
extent than truth-tellers due to the experience of negative emotions when lying was 
corroborated. More specifically, liars expressed more terms of anger (rather than 
other negative emotions like anxiety and sadness) and denied accusations more 
often than truth-tellers. 
Research Question 3b--Positive Emotions. Our assumptions based on the 
fading-affect bias that truth-tellers express more positive emotions than liars was not 
supported. While this result may be dependent on the type of lie being told it does 
run counter to our assumptions from the autobiographical memory literature (as well 
as Criteria-Based Content Analysis and reality monitoring research): Taken together, 
it appears wise to differentiate specific emotions and feelings and separate them 
according to their valence. 
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Research Question 3c--Unspecified Emotions. In general, liars expressed 
more unspecified emotions (i.e., negative and positive emotions undifferentiated) 
than truth-tellers. Given the results for different types of negative emotions, linguistic 
researchers should revisit their analyses to separate different types of emotions. 
Research Question 4--Distancing. As expected, liars distanced themselves 
from events more than truth-tellers by using fewer self-references (total first-person) 
and more other-references (total second- and total third-person). On the other hand, 
liars and truth-tellers did not differ in terms of generalizing terms, use of passive 
voice or verb tenses. 
Research Question 5--Details. Overall, the reality monitoring approach was 
only partially supported. We only found small effects for some cues (sensory-
perceptual processes only, particularly when motivation is high or the account is 
handwritten, hearing words and quantifiers) but null-findings for most other cues. In 
their review on international reality monitoring research, Masip et al. (2005) 
concluded that visual and auditory details, contextual and temporal information were 
the most discriminative criteria. The discrepancies may either be due to the fact that 
the reality monitoring criteria cannot easily be captured by word-counting programs 
like LIWC, or the fact that the LIWC categories were not created on the basis of 
reality monitoring theory (see Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). Coding reality 
monitoring criteria and indicators involves much more than mere word counting, and 
only well-trained human raters, who also take the context of specific words or 
sentences, as well as the background or motivation of a statement into account, can 
do it. 
Research Question 6--Cognitions. We found that truth-tellers used more 
words indicating cognitive processes than liars. The findings support our predictions 
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from autobiographical memory theory that persons refer more often to retrieval 
processes, supporting memories, and cognitive operations when talking about true 
events but contradicts the assumption of many reality monitoring deception 
researchers who postulate the opposite (e.g. Vrij, 2008a). 
Limitations 
Several limitations restrict the generalizability of our findings. First, we had to 
exclude more than 50 studies for different reasons (see Appendix G in supplemental 
online materials). Most of these studies did not provide sufficient statistical data, or 
calculated linguistic patterns in a way not suitable for our analysis (e.g., Keila & 
Skillicorn, 2005). While we are grateful to all authors who provided us with additional 
data, journal editors should emphasize the reporting of all results, not just significant 
ones, along with effect sizes like Cohen’s d. 
Second, we were able to find significant effects for many linguistic cues (see 
Table 1). These effects were generally very small according to Cohen (1988), but not 
much smaller than those for nonverbal and paraverbal cues meta-analyzed by 
DePaulo et al. (2003) and Sporer and Schwandt (2006, 2007). However, even if all 
cues had been in the predicted direction, the mean gu = 0.26 is rather disappointing 
compared to mean effect sizes in the social psychological literature (Richard et al., 
2003: mean gu = 0.43; r = 0.21, SD = 0.15). 
Third, for those linguistic cues where effect size distributions were quite 
heterogeneous, and sensitive to moderator variables, general conclusions can only 
be very tentative. Specific circumstances of individual studies documented in 
Appendix C should be considered for specific types of lies, topics, paradigms or 
production modes. 
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Fourth, most findings were only available for the English language. As 
Newman et al. (2003) discussed, deception may be manifested through different 
linguistic cues in different languages. For example, Romanic languages do not 
require the use of specific personal pronouns, because pronouns are already 
expressed by the verb form (e.g., Masip, Bethencourt, Lucas, Sánchez-San 
Segundo, & Herrero, 2012). Unfortunately, no moderator analysis could be 
conducted for language, because only four studies analyzed accounts in languages 
other than English. Besides language, culture might also make a difference. For 
example, Taylor, Tomblin, Conchie, and Menacere (2011) found that North African 
participants used first-person pronouns most frequently when lying, whereas White 
British participants used them most frequently when telling the truth. 
Fifth, differences between children and adults became evident as three out of 
four studies conducted with children were detected as significant outliers, though not 
for the same cues. This underscores the need to investigate differences between 
adults’ and children’s linguistic cues to deception separately. Further, not all children 
are equal. Linguistic skills develop during childhood, and this may presumably 
influence the frequency of some potential linguistic deception markers. Children of 
different ages may show different linguistic cues to deception. 
Despite these limitations, our meta-analyses were the first large effort to 
quantitatively synthesize research in this area. Therefore, they can be seen as the 
most accurate estimate to date of linguistic differences between liars and truth-tellers 
assessed by computer programs. 
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
The main goal of the present meta-analysis was to assess the extent to which 
computer programs are valid and useful tools to detect deception in verbal accoun
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We provided clear operational definitions for each cue, derived from an analysis and 
integration of definitions from different research domains. We then posed 
theoretically based hypotheses as to the direction of effects for all cues, as well as 
concerning potential moderator variables. While not all results could be reported due 
to space limitations, additional appendices and analyses as well as all our raw data 
are available as supplemental online materials. Researchers are invited to peruse 
our rich database for additional analyses. Future research should also look at the 
intercorrelations between linguistic cues to arrive at a better theoretical 
understanding. 
In addition, future research should consider the context of deceptive vs. 
truthful utterances. A potential reason why only small to medium effect sizes were 
found in general could be that most computer programs simply count single words 
without considering the semantic context. If this suggestion goes beyond what 
computer programs can do at this time, perhaps the linguistic cues with greater 
effect sizes (for the respective paradigms) should be weighted more heavily than 
those with smaller or nonsignificant effects. A recent attempt in this direction was 
made by Chandramouli, Chen, and Subbalakshmi (2011), who employed several 
weighting mechanisms. They applied for an international patent for their invention of 
this weighing mechanism. 
Ultimately, researchers should directly compare the performance of 
computers versus human raters. Since context is relevant in analyzing and judging a 
statement, human raters’ assessments of certain linguistic cues might lead to more 
pronounced differences than objective computer-based codings. On the other hand, 
the advantages of computer-based coding should not be overlooked. Humans and 
computers are best at different skills. Humans are less accurate in manual counting 
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of specific cues or in rendering accurate judgments of complex syntactic 
relationships, whereas computers cannot provide subjective, gestalt like judgments 
or capture the meaning or intention of what people are saying (for an example of 
computer-assisted subjective codings see Sporer, 2012). 
Finally, we encourage researchers to further investigate the impact of (a) 
different interview and interaction conditions, (b) mode of production, (c) types of 
events, (d) age of sender, and (e) language on linguistic markers of deception. In line 
with Hancock and Woodworth (2013), we found that linguistic cues to deception are 
sensitive to contextual factors (see moderator variables). These variables are 
relevant in applied contexts (forensic, work and organizational settings). 
Researchers should strive to design experiments containing psychological features 
analogous to real world deceptive situations to enhance ecological validity (e.g., 
opportunity for preparation, or high motivation). 
In sum, to answer the question whether computer programs are effective lie 
detectors, our answer must be rather skeptical at this time. The effects were not 
significant for many of the variables studied or small in magnitude, or moderated by 
situational variables. Alternative theoretical approaches may find other cues or 
moderators to be important. At this time, researchers’, and particularly practitioners', 
(unrealistic) dream has yet to come true. 
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Footnotes 
1 Similar to Vrij (2008a), we use this term to denote theory regarding both 
emotions or feelings and arousal. While differences between these states have been 
noted, their overlap has also been acknowledged (Zuckerman et al., 1981). 
2 Ekman (2001) noted that a liar may experience joy (“duping delight”). 
However, the link between this emotion and verbal cues to deception is not clear 
(Vrij, 2008a). Therefore, we do not consider it further. 
3 Due to empty cells or small cell sizes in each category, we had to merge 
previously more differentiated categories to broader categories (see Appendix C). 
4 Although we are aware of some potential confounding variables, such as 
production mode, communication medium, perspective of sender (e.g., actor or 
observer), or length of interaction, we developed this moderator variable to find 
subgroups of studies that were similar in terms of the intensity of interaction between 
sender and another person. Originally, the categories were more sophisticated, but 
due to small cell sizes, we had to collapse some related categories. 
5 Although we consider word count an important variable, this variable has 
been investigated in several other meta-analyses (e.g., Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; 
DePaulo et al. 2003, and Zuckerman & Driver, 1985: combination of duration and 
number of words), plus in all the studies that investigated linguistic cues summarized 
here. Also, many studies on content cues to deception assessed by humans have 
reported on word count, usually by using a word processor. To review all these 
studies (likely to be several hundred) where the main focus was not on computer-
aided detection of deception would constitute a meta-analysis of its own and is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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6 Even when four outliers (with two positive and two negative values) were 
excluded for negative emotions only, the effect remained significant (k = 20, -0.12 [-
0.19, -0.04]). 
7 Due to the fairly large number of potential pairwise comparisons for each 
moderator variable and linguistic cue, we did not calculate these specific 
comparisons. More differentiated results for homogeneity test statistics between and 
within groups as well as all other (e.g., nonsignificant) moderator-analytic results can 
be requested from the first author. 
8 Because purely positive events (k = 3) as well as a combination of positive and 
negative events (k = 6) were quite rarely used, they were excluded from moderator 
analyses.
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Table 1 
Meta-Analyses of Linguistic Cues under Research Questions 1 to 6 
Linguistic Cue Pred.  
DOE 
k N Min 
gu 
Max 
gu 
gu CI-
low 
CI- 
high 
Q 
Q     I2 
Research Question 1: Do Liars Experience Greater Cognitive Load? 
(a) Length of Accounts 
01 Word QuantityM T 42 6,713 -1.25 1.43 0.24 0.19, 0.29 315.85 87.02 
07 Sentence Quantity T 9 1,334 -1.31 0.28 -0.33 -0.44, -0.21 104.01 93.31 
08 Average Sentence LengthwO,M T 15/16 2,704 -0.37 0.43 0.05 -0.03, 0.13 20.46 31.58 
 (b) Elaboration of Accounts 
02 Content Word DiversitywO T 7/9 1,076 0.27 1.00 0.48 0.34, 0.61 8.13 26.22 
03 Type-Token RatioM T 22 3,589 -1.40 1.09 0.14 0.07, 0.21 171.95 87.79 
04 Six Letter Words T 10 1,617 -0.28 0.25 -0.05 0.14, -0.05 5.19 0.00 
05 Average Word LengthwO T 7/8 954 -0.42 0.69 0.11 -0.03, 0.25 6.85 12.41 
 (c) Complexity of Accounts 
06 Verb Quantity T 12 2,356 -1.21 0.44 -0.03 0.11, -0.60 78.91 86.06 
09 Causation T 17 2,773 -0.68 0.25 -0.07 -0.14, 0.01 18.61 14.03 
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10 Exclusive WordswO,M T 18/20 2,783 -0.24 0.81 0.24 0.17, 0.31 25.87 25.66 
 (d) Errors in Production 
11 Writing ErrorswO D 8/10 990 -0.65 0.43 -0.01 -0.15, 0.12 13.36 47.61 
Research Question 2: Are Liars Less Certain Than Truth-Tellers? 
12 Tentative WordswO D 19/20 3,145 -1.27 0.36 0.13 0.06, 0.20 20.13 10.56 
13 Modal Verbs D 25 3,889 -0.42 0.80 0.00 -0.07, 0.06 32.73 26.62 
14 Certainty T 18 2,823 -0.25 0.94 -0.06 -0.14, 0.01 25.15 32.40 
Research Question 3a: Do Liars Use More Negations and Negative Emotion Words? 
17 NegationsM D 20 3,659 -0.98 0.53 -0.15 -0.22, -0.09 155.53 87.78 
18 Negative Emotions+,wO,M D 21/24 2,593 -0.39 0.87 -0.07 -0.15, 0.01 21.03 4.88 
18.1 Negative Emotions OnlyM D 24 3,641 -1.90 0.87 -0.18 -0.24, -0.12 214.57 89.28 
18.2 Anger D 12 2,452 -1.32 0.38 -0.27 -0.35, -0.19 165.03 93.34 
18.3 AnxietywO D 11/12 1,952 -0.30 0.44 0.07 -0.02, 0.02 13.55 26.19 
18.4 Sadness D 12 2,452 -0.34 0.25 0.04 -0.04, 0.12 13.01 15.46 
Research Question 3b: Do Liars Use Fewer Positive Emotion Words? 
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19 Positive Emotions and Feelings+,wO T 20/21 2,703 -0.84 0.37 -0.05 -0.12, 0.03 29.59 35.79 
19.1 Positive Emotions OnlywO,M T 20/21 2,703 -0.84 0.35 -0.07 -0.15, 0.00 27.98 32.08 
19.2 Positive Feelings Only T 9 1,422 -0.47 0.40 0.07 -0.03, 0.18 14.88 46.25 
Research Question 3c: Do Liars Express More or Less Unspecified Emotion Words? 
15 EmotionswO,M ? 21/25 2,941 -0.63 0.48 -0.11 -0.19, -0.04 28.92 30.85 
16 Pleasantness and Unpleasantness ? 6 806 -0.35 0.30 -0.10 -0.25, 0.06 8.43 40.68 
Research Question 4: Do Liars Distance Themselves More From Events? 
(a) Personal Pronouns 
21 First-Person SingularM T 22 3,761 -1.00 0.61 -0.06 -0.13, 0.00 274.38 92.35 
22 First-Person PluralwO,M T 22/25 3,224 -0.72 0.39 0.06 -0.01, 0.13 27.98 24.93 
23 Total First-PersonwO,M T 22/23 2,541 -0.39 0.57 0.14 0.06, 0.22 32.26 34.91 
24 Total Second-PersonwO,M D 21/23 3,072 -0.61 0.33 -0.10 -0.17, -0.02 28.64 30.16 
25 Total Third-PersonwO,M D 26/29 3,848 -0.41 0.55 -0.10 -0.16, -0.04 37.20 32.79 
20 Total PronounswO,M - 18/19 2,460 -0.36 0.65 0.06 -0.02, 0.14 19.32 12.02 
(b) Passive Voice and Generalizing Terms 
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26 Passive Voice Verbs D 11 1,221 -0.47 0.49 0.06 -0.06, 0.18 9.52 0.00 
27 Generalizing Terms D 4 93 -1.63 0.44 -0.37 -0.79, 0.05 15.78 80.99 
(c) Past and Present Tense 
47 Past Tense D 16 3,047 -0.53 0.41 0.06 -0.01, 0.14 22.67 33.83 
48 Present TensewO,M T 16/17 2,607 -0.51 0.60 0.01 -0.07, 0.09 19.38 22.61 
Research Question 5: Do Liars Use Fewer (Sensory and Contextual) Details? 
(a) Sensory and Perceptual Details 
28 Sens.-Perceptual Processes+,wO,M T 25/27 3,957 -0.70 0.70 0.05 -0.01, 0.12 36.00 33.33 
28.1 Sens.-Percept. Processes OnlyM T 27 4,177 -0.90 0.70 0.06 0.00, 0.13 89.26 70.87 
28.2 SeeingwO T 9/11 1,740 -0.17 0.34 0.03 -0.06, 0.13 13.34 40.03 
28.3 FeelingwO T 11/12 2,304 -0.49 0.27 -0.03 -0.11, 0.05 15.00 33.31 
28.4 Hearing T 11 2,344 -0.41 0.48 0.17 0.09, 0.25 14.15 29.35 
(b) Contextual Embedding 
29 TimewO T 23/24 3,296 -1.25 0.53 0.03 -0.04, 0.10 28.95 24.00 
30 SpacewO,M T 22/24 3,199 -0.36 0.58 -0.04 -0.13, 0.03 31.74 33.74 
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31 Space & Time T 5 634 -0.25 0.61 -0.04 -0.19, 0.12 10.48 61.84 
(c) Descriptive Words 
32 Prepositions T 14 2,479 -0.55 0.48 0.02 -0.06, 0.10 16.54 21.38 
33 Numbers T 12 2,452 -0.28 0.23 0.05 -0.03, 0.13 9.37 0.00 
34 Quantifier T 4 1,198 0.06 0.22 0.14 0.02, 0.25 1.22 0.00 
35 Modifier T 11 1,361 -1.04 0.43 -0.08 -0.20, 0.03 77.46 87.09 
36 Motion VerbswO,M T 16/17 2,359 -0.72 0.13 -0.09 -0.17, -0.01 16.84 10.92 
Research Question 6: Do Liars Refer Less Often to Cognitive Processes? 
37 Cognitive ProcesseswO T 18/19 2,915 -0.25 0.36 0.09 0.01, 0.16 19.66 13.54 
38 InsightM T 15 2,539 -0.41 0.59 0.13 0.05, 0.21 35.65 60.73 
Notes. gu = effect size Hedges’ gu, positive gus indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative gus indicate higher frequencies in 
deceptive accounts; wO = without outlier: Results after removal of outliers detected using Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) procedure; M = 
Moderator analyses conducted; +indicates that the specific linguistic cue is an umbrella term; Pred. DOE = predicted direction of effect; 
T = occurs more often in true accounts: D = occurs more often in deceptive accounts; k = number of hypothesis tests, where the second 
value behind the slash indicates the number of hypothesis tests with outliers; N = total number of accounts; Min = minimum; Max =  
maximum; Q = homogeneity test statistic; CI = 95% confidence interval; I2 = descriptive measure of heterogeneity; values in bold indicate 
significance (p < .05). 
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Table 2 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when Studies used Different Type of Events and Personal Involvement 
Linguistic Cue 
(Research Question, RQ) 
k Overall gu [CI] k1 Attitude/Liking 
Paradigm 
k3 First-Person 
Experience 
k2 Miscellaneous 
Paradigms 
08 Average Sentence LengthwO 
(RQ1) 
15 0.04 [-0.04, 0.12] 2 0.17 [0.05, 0.29] 8 -0.07 [-0.20, 0.06] 5 -0.07 [-0.17, 0.13] 
17 Negations (RQ3a) 20 -0.15 [-0.22, -0.08] 7 0.08 [-0.02, 0.18] 7 -0.08 [-0.20, 0.05] 6 -0.59 [-0.71, -0.47] 
18 Neg. Emotions+ (RQ3a) 24 -0.13 [-0.19, -0.06] 7 0.03 [-0.06, 0.13] 10 -0.37 [-0.48, -0.25] 7 -0.10 [-0.24, 0.03] 
18.1 Neg. Emotions Only (RQ3a) 24 -0.17 [-0.24, -0.11] 7 0.06 [-0.04, 0.15] 10 -0.57 [-0.69, -0.45] 7 -0.11 [-0.25, 0.03] 
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 24 -0.21 [-0.27, -0.14] 7 -0.08 [-0.17, 0.02] 12 -0.45 [-0.56, -0.34] 5 -0.02 [-0.19, 0.15] 
22 First-Person Plural (RQ4) 24 0.08 [0.01, 0.14] 7 0.09 [-0.01, 0.19] 12 -0.08 [-0.18, 0.03] 5 0.38 [0.23, 0.53] 
23 Total First-PersonwO (RQ4) 22 0.14 [0.06, 0.22] 6 0.31 [0.19, 0.42] 11 -0.11 [-0.27, 0.05] 5 0.10 [-0.05, 0.26] 
24 Total Second-Person (RQ4) 22 -0.04 [-0.01, 0.03] 7 -0.18 [-0.27, -0.08] 10 0.09 [-0.02, 0.20] 5 0.09 [-0.09, 0.26] 
25 Total Third-Person (RQ4) 28 -0.11 [-0.17, -0.05] 7 -0.12 [-0.21, -0.02] 13 -0.22 [-0.32, -0.12] 8 0.06 [-0.07, 0.18] 
Notes. k = number of hypothesis tests; gu = effect size (ES) Hedges’ gu, positive gus indicate higher frequencies in true accounts, negative gus indicate higher  
frequencies in deceptive accounts; CI = 95% confidence interval; wO = without Outlier; + indicates that the specific linguistic cue is an umbrella term; Neg.= 
Negative; bold ES indicate significant difference from zero; ES in italics correspond to the largest difference between liars and truth tellers (in the predicted 
direction according to the RQ) for a specific cue across the moderator variable levels; this indicates under what level of the moderator variable our 
hypotheses were most strongly supported. 
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Table 3 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when the Emotional Valence of the Event was Neutral versus Negative 
Linguistic Cue 
(Research Question, RQ) 
k Overall gu [CI] k1 Neutral k2 Negative 
01 Word Quantity (RQ1) 33 0.25 [0.19, 0.31] 17 0.04 [-0.03, 0.12] 16 0.54 [0.45, 0.62] 
03 Type-Token Ratio (RQ1) 20 0.26 [0.18, 0.33] 11 0.32 [0.24, 0.41]  9 0.04 [-0.12, 0.19] 
10 Exclusive Words (RQ1) 14 0.38 [0.29, 0.46] 8 0.47 [0.36, 0.59]  6 0.26 [0.11, 0.38] 
17 Negations (RQ3a) 14 -0.30 [-0.38, -0.21] 8 -0.13 [-0.26, 0.01] 6 -0.42 [-0.53, -0.31]  
18 Neg. Emotions (RQ3a) 17 -0.26 [-0.35, -0.18] 10 -0.16 [-0.28, -0.05] 7 -0.39 [-0.52, -0.26]  
18.1 Neg. Emotions OnlywO (RQ3a) 17 -0.41 [-0.50, -0.32] 10 -0.22 [-0.34, -0.10] 7 -0.65 [-0.79, -0.52]  
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 18 -0.50 [-0.58, -0.42] 8 -0.54 [-0.65, -0.43] 10 -0.45 [-0.57, -0.33] 
21 First-Person SingularwO (RQ4) 15 -0.04 [-0.12, 0.05] 9 -0.25 [-0.36, -0.13] 6 0.27 [0.14, 0.40]  
23 Total First-PersonwO (RQ4) 17 0.10 [0.01, 0.20] 8 0.22 [0.10, 0.34]  9 -0.13 [-0.30, 0.05] 
24 Total Second-PersonwO (RQ4) 15 -0.20 [-0.28, -0.12] 9 -0.40 [-0.50, -0.29]  6 0.09 [-0.05, 0.22] 
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when Studies Applied Different Type of Interaction Levels (between Sender and 
Receiver) 
Linguistic Cue 
(Research Question, 
RQ) 
k Overall gu [CI] k1 No Interaction k2 Computer-
Mediated 
Communication  
k3 Interview k4 Person to 
Person 
Interaction 
01 Word Quantity (RQ1) 37 0.22 [0.17, 0.28] 13 0.14 [0.07, 0.21] 5 -0.41 [-0.65, -0.18] 16 0.35 [0.23, 0.46] 3 0.69 [0.53, 0.85] 
10 Exclusive Words (RQ1) 19 0.30 [0.23, 0.36] 9 0.37 [0.29, 0.45] 2 -0.02 [-0.31, 0.26] 6 0.25 [0.04, 0.46] 2 0.17 [0.02, 0.33] 
18 Neg. Emotions+ (RQ3a) 22 -0.14 [-0.21, -0.07] 8 0.03 [-0.07, 0.12] 3 -0.18 [-0.46, 0.10] 7 -0.16 [-0.34, 0.01] 4 -0.48 [-0.63, -0.34] 
18.1 Neg. Emotions Only 
(RQ3a) 
22 -0.20 [-0.27, -0.13] 8 0.05 [-0.05, 0.14] 3 -0.18 [-0.46, 0.10] 7 -0.18 [-0.36, -0.01] 4 -0.79 [-0.94, -0.64] 
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 24 -0.34 [-0.41, -0.28] 11 -0.36 [-0.44, -0.28] 0  11 -0.04 [-0.19, 0.11] 2 -0.63 [-0.79, -0.47] 
21 First-Person SingularwO 
(RQ4) 
21 -0.06 [-0.12, 0.01] 9 -0.22 [-0.30, -0.13] 2 -0.04 [-0.33, 0.24] 7 0.01 [-0.16, 0.19] 3 0.34 [0.20, 0.49] 
25 Total Third-Person 
(RQ4) 
27 -0.21 [-0.27, -0.15] 10 -0.31 [-0.40, -0.23] 2 -0.21 [-0.52, 0.09] 12 -0.04 [-0.18, 0.09] 3 -0.09 [-0.23, 0.06] 
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 2. 
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Table 5 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when Studies Induced Different Levels of Motivation 
Linguistic Cue 
(Research Question, RQ) 
k Overall gu [CI] k1 No  
Motivation 
k2 Low to Medium 
Motivation 
k3 High  
Motivation 
01 Word Quantity (RQ1) 37 0.27 [0.21, 0.32] 11 0.47 [0.36, 0.57] 22 0.19 [0.12, 0.26] 4 0.18 [0.04, 0.31] 
03 Type-Token Ratio (RQ1) 19 0.00 [-0.08, 0.08] 4 -0.17 [-0.39, 0.05] 12 -0.12 [-0.21, -0.02] 3 0.67 [0.47, 0.87] 
08 Average Sentence LengthwO (RQ1) 13 0.08 [-0.01, 0.16] 5 0.09 [-0.09, 0.28] 6 0.15 [0.04, 0.26] 2 -0.21 [-0.42, 0.01] 
18 Neg. Emotions+ (RQ3a) 21 -0.14 [-0.21, -0.07] 6 -0.19 [-0.36, -0.03] 13 -0.01 [-0.10, 0.07] 2 -0.56 [-0.74, -0.39] 
18.1 Neg. Emotions Only (RQ3a) 21 -0.20 [-0.27, -0.13] 6 -0.20 [-0.37, -0.03] 13 0.00 [-0.09, 0.09] 2 -1.03 [-1.21, -0.86] 
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 23 -0.22 [-0.29, -0.15] 4 -0.20 [-0.42, 0.01] 15 -0.10 [-0.19, -0.02] 4 -0.53 [-0.66, -0.39] 
28 Sens.-Perc. Processes+ (RQ5) 25 0.08 [0.02, 0.15] 7 -0.22 [-0.39, -0.06] 15 0.12 [0.03, 0.20] 3 0.21 [0.07, 0.35] 
28.1 Sens.-Perc. Processes Only (RQ5) 25 0.08 [0.02, 0.15] 7 -0.29 [-0.45, -0.13] 15 0.12 [0.03, 0.20] 3 0.25 [0.12, 0.38] 
29 TimewO (RQ5) 21 0.03 [-0.05, 0.10] 4 0.20 [0.01, 0.40] 15 -0.02 [-0.10, 0.07] 2 0.09 [-0.12, 0.30] 
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 2. 
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Table 6 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when Studies used Different Modes of Producing an Account 
Linguistic Cue 
(Research Question, RQ) 
k Overall gu [CI] k1 Handwritten k2 Typed k3 Spoken 
01 Word Quantity (RQ1) 38 0.19 [0.13, 0.24] 6 0.33 [0.21, 0.44] 14 0.10 [0.03, 0.17] 18 0.26 [0.15, 0.36] 
17 Negations (RQ3a) 19 -0.19 [-0.26, -0.12] 5 -0.60 [-0.72, -0.46] 5 0.06 [-0.05, 0.17] 9 -0.14 [-0.28, -0.01] 
18.1 Neg. Emotions Only (RQ3a) 23 -0.04 [-0.11, 0.03] 3 -0.28 [-0.51, -0.05] 8 0.07 [-0.03, 0.16] 12 -0.14 [-0.25, -0.02] 
15 Emotions (RQ3c) 21 -0.29 [-0.36, -0.22] 4 -0.25 [-0.44, -0.07] 6 -0.44 [-0.54, -0.35] 11 -0.04 [-0.16, 0.08] 
28 Sens.-Perc. Processes+ (RQ5) 24 0.06 [-0.01, 0.13] 3 0.33 [0.11, 0.54] 8 0.01 [-0.08, 0.11] 13 0.06 [-0.06, 0.17] 
28.1 Sens.-Perc. Processes Only (RQ5) 24 0.05 [-0.01, 0.12] 3 0.34 [0.12, 0.56] 8 0.00 [-0.09, 0.10] 13 0.05 [-0.07, 0.16] 
30 Space (RQ5) 22 0.04 [-0.03, 0.11] 3 0.03 [-0.19, 0.24] 6 0.13 [0.02, 0.23] 13 -0.06 [-0.17, 0.05] 
36 Motion VerbswO (RQ5) 16 -0.09 [-0.17, -0.01] 2 -0.28 [-0.57, 0.00] 4 0.00 [-0.11, 0.11] 10 -0.16 [-0.29, -0.04] 
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 2. 
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Table 7 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when Studies used LIWC, a General Program or a Specific Program 
Linguistic Cue k Overall gu [CI] k1 LIWC k2 General  
Program 
k3 Specific 
Program 
01 Word Quantity 41 0.25 [0.20, 0.30] 23 0.28 [0.21, 0.34] 10 0.53 [0.43, 0.63] 8 -0.19 [-0.30, -0.07] 
15 Emotions 25 -0.25 [-0.41, -0.28] 19 -0.39 [-0.45, -0.32] - - 6 -0.14 [-0.29, 0.02] 
17 Negations 20 -0.15 [-0.22, -0.08] 17 0.05 [-0.03, 0.12] 3 -0.82 [-0.96, -0.69] - - 
20 Total PronounswO 18 0.29 [0.20, 0.38] 13 0.38 [0.28, 0.49] 2 0.06 [-0.17, 0.28] 3 -0.13 [-0.44, 0.17] 
   k1 LIWC + General Program k2 Specific 
Program 
22 First-Person Plural 25 -0.04 [-0.10, 0.02] 18 0.01 [-0.05, 0.08] 7 -0.31 [-0.46, -0.15] 
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 2. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of all absolute values effect sizes (k = 1,093). 
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Appendix A 
Definition of Linguistic Cues to Deception assigned to Research Questions 
 Linguistic Cue Final Operational Definition 
Research Question 1: Do Liars Experience Greater Cognitive Load? 
01* Word Quantity // Word Count // Number of 
Words // Productivity 
Total number of words. 
02 Content Word Diversity // Diversity // 
Content Diversity 
Total number of different content words divided by total number of content words, 
where content words express lexical meaning. 
03 Type-Token Ratio // Unique Words // 
Lexical Diversity // Different Words 
% of distinct words divided by total number of words. 
04 Six letter words // Percentage Words 
longer than six letters  
% of words that are longer than six letters. 
05 Average Word Length (AWL; Complexity) // 
Lexical complexity 
Total number of letters divided by the total number of words. 
06* Verb Quantity // Verb Count Total number of verbs. 
07* Sentence Quantity // Number of Sentences Total number of sentences. 
08 Average Sentence Length (Complexity 
Measure) // Words per Sentence 
Total number of words divided by total numbers of sentences. 
09 Causation % of words that try to assign a cause to whatever the person is describing (e.g., 
because, effect, hence). 
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10 Exclusive % of words that make a distinction what is in a category and what is not (e.g., 
without, except, but). 
11 Writing Errors // Typographical error ratio 
(Informality) // Typo ratio // Misspelled Words 
% of writing errors or misspelled words divided by number of words. 
Research Question 2: Are Liars Less Certain Than Truth-Tellers? 
12 Tentative % of tentative words (e.g., maybe, perhaps, see). 
13 Modal Verbs // Uncertainty // Discrepancy % of modal verbs or auxiliary verbs or words expressing uncertainty (e.g., should, 
would, could). 
14 Certainty % of words that express certainty (e.g., always, never). 
Research Question 3a: Do Liars Use More Negations and Negative Emotion Words? 
17 Negations // Less Positive Tone // 
Spontaneous Negations // Negation 
Connectives 
% of words that express negations (e.g., no, never, not). 
18+ Negative Emotions // Negative Affect // 
Anger // Anxiety, Fear // Sadness 
% of words that express negative emotion / affect (e.g., hate, worthless, enemy) 
AND anger (e.g., hate, kill, annoyed) AND anxiety (e.g., worried, fearful, nervous) 
AND sadness (e.g., crying, grief, sad). 
18.1 Negative Emotions (only) // Negative 
Affect 
% of words that express negative emotion / affect (e.g., hate, worthless, enemy). 
18.2 Anger % of words that express anger (e.g., hate, kill, annoyed). 
18.3 Anxiety % of words that express anxiety (e.g., worried, fearful, nervous). 
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18.4 Sadness % of words that express sadness (e.g., crying, grief, sad). 
Research Question 3b: Do Liars Use Less Positive Emotion Words? 
19+ Positive Emotions and Feelings // Positive 
Emotions // Positive Affects // Positive 
Feelings 
% of words that express positive emotion / affect (e.g., happy, pretty, good) AND 
positive feelings (e.g., joy, love). 
19.1 Positive Emotions (only)// Positive Affect % of words that express positive emotion / affect (e.g., happy, pretty, good). 
19.2 Positive Feelings (only) % of words that express positive feelings (e.g., joy, love). 
Research Question 3c: Do Liars Express More or Less Unspecified Emotion Words? 
15 Emotions // Emotional / Affective Processes 
// Affect (Ratio) // Positive and Negative 
Affect 
% of words that express any type of emotions / affects (e.g., happy, ugly, bitter). 
16 Pleasantness and Unpleasantness % of words that express pleasantness / unpleasantness. 
Research Question 4: Do Liars Distance Themselves More From Events? 
20 Total Pronouns // Personal Pronouns % of all personal (e.g., I, our, they) or total pronouns (e.g., that, somebody, the). 
21 First-Person Singular % of first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, my, me). 
22 First-Person Plural % of first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, us, our). 
23 Total First-Person % of first-person singular and first-person plural pronouns (e.g., I, we, me). 
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24 Total Second-Person % of second-person pronouns (e.g., you, you'll). 
25 Total Third-Person // Other References // 
Third-Person Singular // Third-Person Plural 
% of third-person pronouns (e.g., she, their, them). 
26 Passive Voice Verbs // Verbal 
Nonimmediacy 
% of passive voice verbs (e.g., “it was searched for”). 
27 Generalizing Terms // Leveling terms % of generalizing terms (e.g., everybody, all, anybody). 
47 Past Tense Verb % of past tense verbs (e.g., went, drove, ate). 
48 Present Tense Verb % of present tense verbs of all words (e.g., walk, run, cry). 
Research Question 5: Do Liars Use Fewer (Sensory and Contextual) Details? 
28+ Sensory-Perceptual Processes // 
Perceptual Processes/Information // 
Perceptions and Sense // Sensory ratio // 
See // Hear // Feel 
% of words that express sensory-perceptual processes (e.g. taste, touch, feel) 
AND visual (e.g., view, saw, seen) AND haptical (e.g., feels, touch) AND aural 
(e.g., listen, hearing) sensory-perceptual processes. 
28.1 Sensory-Perceptual Processes (only) // 
Perceptual Processes // Perceptual 
Information // Perceptions and Sense // 
Sensory ratio 
% of words that express sensory-perceptual processes (e.g. taste, touch, feel). 
28.2 Seeing % of words that express visual sensory-perceptual processes (e.g., view, saw, 
seen). 
28.3 Feeling % of words that express tactile sensory-perceptual processes (e.g., feels, touch). 
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28.4 Hearing % of words that express aural sensory-perceptual processes (e.g., listen, hearing). 
29 Time // Temporal ratio // Temporal specificity 
// Temporal cohesion 
% of temporal words (e.g., hour, day, o’clock). 
30 Space // Spatial Terms // Spatial Ratio // 
Spatial Specificity // Spatial Cohesion 
% of spatial words (e.g., around, over, up). 
31 Temporal-spatial Terms // Temporal and 
Spatial Details Total // Spatio-Temporal 
Information // Space and Time 
% of temporal (e.g., hour, day, o’clock) AND spatial words (e.g., around, over, up). 
32 Prepositions % of prepositions (e.g., on, to, from). 
33 Numbers % of numbers (e.g., first, one, thousand). 
34 Quantifier % of quantifier (e.g., all, bit, few, less). 
35 Modifiers (Adverbs & Adjectives) // Rate of 
Adjectives and Adverbs (Specificity and 
Expressiveness) 
% of modifier: adverbs & adjectives (e.g., here, much, few, very). 
36 Motion Verbs // Motion Terms % of words that describe movements (e.g., walk, move, go). 
Research Question 6: Do liars refer less often to cognitive processes? 
37 Cognitive Processes // All Connectives % of words related to cognitive processes (e.g., cause, know, ought). 
38 Insight % of words related to a person’s insight (e.g., think, know, consider). 
Notes. Bold font indicate the name of the linguistic cue chosen for this meta-analysis; * No ratio; + indicates that the specific linguistic  
cue is an umbrella term; % = number of specific words divided by total number of words. 
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Appendix B 
Definition of Linguistic Cues to Deception--Miscellaneous Category 
 Linguistic Cue Final Operational Definition 
39 Redundancy Ratio of function words to number of sentences. Function words, such as articles and 
pronouns, are used to form grammatical relationships between other words. // The ratio 
of the number of function words to the number of messages. // Repetitive words. // 
Argument overlap: Explicit overlap between two sentences by tracking the common 
nouns in either single or plural form. 
40 Assent % of words that express an assent (e.g., agree, ok, yes). 
41 Articles % of articles (e.g., a, lot, an, the). 
42 Inhibition % of words that express inhibition (e.g., block, constrain, stop). 
43 Social Processes % of words that express social processes e.g., (talk, us, friend). 
44 Friends % of words that are related to friends (e.g., buddy, friend, neighbor). 
45 Family % of words that are related to family (e.g., daughter, husband, aunt). 
46 Humans % of words that are related to humans (e.g., adult, baby, boy). 
49 Future Tense Verb % of future tense verbs (e.g., will, going to). 
50 Inclusive % of inclusive words (e.g., with, and, include). 
51 Achievement % of words that express achievement (e.g., earn, hero, win). 
52 Leisure % of words that express leisure activities (e.g., cook, chat, movie). 
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53 Emotiveness Total number of adjectives and total numbers of adverbs divided by total number of 
nouns and total numbers of verbs. 
54 Pausality Total number of punctuation marks divided by total number of sentences. 
55 Swear Words % of swear words (e.g., ass, heck, shit). 
56 Biology % of words that express biological processes/states (e.g., eat, pain, wash). 
57 Health % of words that express health issues (e.g., hospital, pill, flu). 
58 Sexual % of words that express sexual activities/states (e.g., passion, rape, sex). 
59 Optimism % of words that express optimism (e.g., certainty, pride, win). 
60 Communication % of words that express communication (e.g., talk, share, converse). 
61 Occupation % of words that express occupation (e.g., work, class, boss). 
62 School % of words that express school issues (e.g., class, student, college). 
63 Job / Work % of words that express job issues (e.g., employ, boss, career). 
64 Home % of words that express home issues (e.g., bed, home, room). 
65 Sports % of words that express sport (e.g., football, game, play). 
66 Money % of words that express money and financial issues (e.g., cash, taxes, income). 
67 Physical % of words that express physical states and functions (e.g., ache, breast, sleep). 
68 Body % of words that express body states and symptoms (e.g., asleep, heart, cough). 
69 Eating % of words that express eating, drinking, dieting issues (e.g., eat, swallow, taste). 
Notes. % = number of specific words divided by total number of words. 
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Appendix C 
Coding Decisions for Moderator Variables for Each Study 
Authors (Year) 
Publ.  
Type 
Program Lang. Theory Select. Age 
Prepa
-ration 
Event  
Type 
Vale-
nce 
Inter-
action 
Moti-
vation 
Mode 
Ali & Levine (2008, denials) publ. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a mock crime neg. interview low spoken 
Ali & Levine (2008, confess.) publ. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a mock crime neg. interview low spoken 
Almela et al. (2012) publ. LIWC01 S none a-priori adults n/a att./liking neg./pos. none low typed 
Bedwell et al. (2011) publ. Coh-Metrix E other sign. adults prep. trivial LE neutral instruct. low spoken 
Bond & Lee (2005) publ. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a-priori adults prep. video neg. interact. low spoken 
Brunet (2009)* Thesis LIWC01 E LIWC a-priori child. n/a sign. LE neg./pos. interview none spoken 
Burgoon & Qin (2006) publ. GATE E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a other neutral interview low spoken 
Chen (2010; Dataset 3) Diss. LIWC01 E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a n/a neutral none n/a typed 
Colwell et al. (2002) publ. Wordscan E other a-priori adults n/a live neg. interview n/a n/a 
Cooper (2008) Diss. Connexor+ E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a other neutral n/a n/a typed 
Derrick et al. (2012) pres. ADAM E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a other neutral none low typed 
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Dzindolet & Pierce (2005) pres. LIWC01 E LIWC a-priori adults n/a att./liking neg./pos. instruct. n/a written 
Evans et al. (2012, Interv. 1) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC a-priori child. n/a other pos. interview none n/a 
Fuller et al. (2006, Agent99A.) pres. Agent99A.+ E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a real case neg. n/a high written 
Hancock et al. (2008) /  
Duran et al. (2010) 
publ. 
LIWC01/ 
Coh-Metrix 
E IDT/RM a-priori adults prep. trivial LE neg./pos. cmc n/a typed 
Humpherys et al. (2011) publ. Agent99A. E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a real case neutral none high typed 
Jensen et al. (2011) publ. LIWC01 E other a-priori adults n/a real case neg. interview high n/a 
Koyanagi & Blandón-Gitlin 
(2011) 
pres. LIWC07 E IDT/RM a-priori child. no other neutral interview none spoken 
Krachow (2010) publ. LIWC07 E IDT/RM a-priori adults prep. trivial LE neg./pos. instruct. none spoken 
Lee et al. (2009) publ. LIWC01 E other a-priori adults n/a other neutral cmc low typed 
Liu et al. (2012) pres. LIWC07+ E LIWC a-priori adults n/a real case neg. interact. high n/a 
Masip et al. (2012) publ. LIWC07 S IDT/RM a-priori adults no trivial LE pos. instruct. low written 
Morgan et al. (2011, free 
recall) 
publ. 
“automated 
analysis method” 
E none a-priori adults n/a n/a neg. interview low spoken 
Morgan et al. (2008, free 
recall) 
publ. n/a (general) A none a-priori adults no mock crime neg. interview med. spoken 
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Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 1) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neutral instruct. low spoken 
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 2) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neutral instruct. low typed 
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 3) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neutral none low written 
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 4) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a att./liking neg./pos. instruct. low spoken 
Newman et al. (2003, Exp. 5) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC sign. adults n/a mock crime neg. interview low spoken 
Ott et al. (2011) pres. LIWC07 E IDT/RM sign. adults n/a att./liking pos. none low typed 
Qin et al. (2005, audio) pres. GATE E other a-priori adults n/a mock crime neg. interview low spoken 
Qin et al. (2005, face-to-face) pres. GATE E other a-priori adults n/a mock crime neg. interview low n/a 
Qin et al. (2005, text chat) pres. GATE E other a-priori adults n/a mock crime neg. interview low typed 
Rowe & Blandón-Gitlin (2008) pres. LIWC07 E IDT/RM a-priori adults no other neutral interview none spoken 
Schafer (2007, Exp. 1) Diss. MS Word E other a-priori adults n/a video neg. n/a none written 
Schafer (2007, Exp. 2) Diss. MS Word E other a-priori adults n/a video neg. n/a none written 
Schelleman-Offermans & 
Merckelbach (2010) 
publ. LIWC01 D LIWC a-priori adults n/a sign. LE neg. n/a none typed 
Suckle-Nelson et al. 
(2011, free recall) 
publ. Wordscan E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a staged neg. interview none spoken 
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ten Brinke & Porter (2012) publ. LIWC01 E LIWC a-priori adults n/a real case neg. interact. high spoken 
Van Swol et al. (2012) publ. LIWC07+ E IDT/RM a-priori adults n/a other neutral interact. med. spoken 
Williams et al. (2012) subm.° LIWC07 E LIWC a-priori child. n/a sign. LE neutral interview none spoken 
Zhou (2005) publ. “NLP tool” E other a-priori adults n/a other neutral cmc low typed 
Zhou et al. (2004) publ. iSkim/CueCal E other a-priori adults n/a other neutral cmc none typed 
Zhou & Zhang (2004) pres. 
“Message 
analyzing software” 
E other a-priori adults n/a other neutral cmc low typed 
Notes. confess. = confessions; Publ. = Publication; publ. = published; pres. = presented (Poster or Paper); subm. = submitted; Diss. = Dissertation; LIWC01 = 
LIWC 2001; LIWC07 = LIWC 2007; GATE = General Architecture for Text Engineering; ADAM = Automated Deception Analysis Machine; Agent99A. = 
Agent99Analyzer; MS Word = Microsoft Word; NLP = natural language processing; + = Study additionally applied a second program; Lang. = Language; A = 
Arabic; D = Dutch; E = English; S= Spanish; n/a = not available; IDT = Interpersonal Deception Theory; RM = reality monitoring; Select. = Selection; child. = 
children; Prepar./prep. = preparation; att. = attitude; staged = staged event; sign. = significant; LE = life events; cmc = computer-mediated communication; 
instruct. = instruction; med. = medium; * = In the meantime, Brunet, Evans, Talwar, Bala, Lindsay, and Lee (2013) formally published the data of Brunet’s 
Thesis; ° = In the meantime, Williams, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala & Lee (2012) published their (at the time of conducting the meta-analyses unpublished) 
manuscript. 
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Appendix D 
Meta-Analyses on Miscellaneous Linguistic Cues with and without Outliers 
Linguistic Cue k N Min gu Max gu gu CI-low CI-high Q I2 
39 Redundancy 9 1,262 -0.33 0.42 0.00 -0.12, 0.12 9.12 12.30 
40 Assent 12 2,452 -0.23 0.38 -0.01 -0.09, 0.07 12.50 12.02 
41 Articles 14 2,479 -1.95 0.26 -0.01 -0.08, 0.08 39.49 67.08 
41 ArticleswO 12 1,777 -1.95 0.15 -0.02 -0.11, 0.07 18.68 41.12 
42 Inhibition 12 2,452 -0.37 0.31 0.12 0.04, 0.20 19.27 42.91 
43 Social Processes 15 2,979 -1.69 0.26 -0.26 -0.33, -0.18 236.03 94.07 
43 Social 
ProcesseswO 
14 2,479 -0.48 0.26 -0.04 -0.12, 0.04 16.97 23.39 
44 Friend  11 2,344 -0.47 0.51 0.08 -0.01, 0.16 23.89 58.15 
44 FriendswO 9 1,734 -0.47 0.39 0.00 -0.10, 0.09 11.95 33.07 
45 Family 10 2,284 -0.39 0.36 -0.03 -0.11, 0.06 30.77 70.75 
45 FamilywO 9 1,784 -0.16 0.36 0.07 -0.02, 0.17 10.09 20.70 
46 Humans 11 2,344 -0.45 0.42 0.03 -0.06, 0.11 27.85 64.09 
46 HumanswO 9 1,734 -0.27 0.42 0.12 0.02, 0.21 12.82 37.58 
49 Future Tense 15 2,979 -1.00 0.48 -0.24 -0.31, -0.16 98.26 85.75 
49 Future TensewO 14 2,497 -0.35 0.48 -0.10 -0.18, -0.02 22.02 40.97 
50 Inclusive 15 2,979 -1.00 0.16 -0.16 -0.23, -0.09 106.73 86.88 
50 InclusivewO 14 2,497 -0.43 0.16 -0.01 -0.01, 0.07 13.77 5.60 
51 Achievement 11 2,344 -0.55 0.46 0.04 -0.04, 0.12 17.96 44.31 
52 Leisure 11 2,344 -0.41 0.21 -0.05 -0.13, 0.03 24.37 58.97 
52 LeisurewO 10 1,844 -0.41 0.11 -0.12 -0.21, -0.03 13.96 35.54 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Linguistic Cue k N Min gu Max gu gu CI-low CI-high Q I2 
53 Emotiveness 9 1,158 -0.39 0.27 0.04 -0.09, 0.16 9.06 22.74 
54 Pausality 8 1,158 -0.31 0.75 -0.09 -0.21, 0.04 16.57 57.76 
54 PausalitywO 7 1,128 -0.31 0.46 -0.11 -0.24, 0.01 11.23 46.59 
55 Swear Words 10 2,284 -0.17 0.31 -0.04 -0.12, 0.04 5.11 0.00 
56 Biology 4 1,198 -0.41 0.40 0.16 0.05, 0.28 9.87 69.61 
57 Health 4 1,198 -0.11 0.22 0.05 -0.06, 0.16 6.51 53.89 
58 Sexual 9 2,190 -0.31 0.57 0.08 -0.01, 0.16 12.02 33.42 
59 Optimism 8 1,254 -0.28 0.30 0.01 -0.10, 0.12 9.02 22.40 
60 Communication 8 1,254 -0.25 0.20 0.07 -0.04, 0.18 2.87 0.00 
61 Occupation 7 1,146 -0.39 0.09 -0.07 -0.18, 0.05 4.87 0.00 
62 School 7 1,146 -0.16 0.28 0.03 -0.08, 0.15 4.12 0.00 
63 Job 11 2,344 -0.31 0.20 0.02 -0.06, 0.11 9.27 0.00 
64 Home 11 2,344 -0.36 0.36 0.03 -0.05, 0.11 24.06 58.43 
64 HomewO 10 1,844 -0.36 0.36 -0.03 -0.12, 0.06 16.64 45.91 
65 Sports 7 1,146 -0.55 0.08 -0.08 -0.19, 0.04 8.16 26.44 
66 Money 12 2,446 -0.85 0.43 -0.01 -0.08, 0.08 33.62 67.28 
66 MoneywO 11 2,344 -0.41 0.43 0.03 -0.05, 0.11 17.96 45.33 
67 Physical 7 1,146 0.03 0.31 0.15 0.04, 0.27 1.52 0.00 
68 Body 11 2,344 -0.39 0.44 0.02 -0.07, 0.10 13.40 25.38 
69 Eating 7 1,146 -0.08 0.59 0.12 0.01, 0.24 7.85 23.54 
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 1.
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Appendix E 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when Studies were Unpublished or Published 
Linguistic Cue k Overall gu [CI] k1 Unpublished k2 Published 
01 Word Quantity 42 0.24 [0.19, 0.29] 17 0.27 [0.21, 0.34]  25 0.19 [0.11, 0.27] 
03 Type-Token Ratio 22 0.14 [0.74, 0.21] 9 0.24 [0.15, 0.33]  13 0.03 [-0.07, 0.13] 
15 Emotions 25 -0.34 [-0.41, -0.28] 10 -0.56 [-0.65, -0.48]  15 -0.11 [-0.20, -0.02] 
18.1 Negative Emotions 24 -0.18 [-0.24, -0.11] 8 -0.24 [-0.33, -0.14] 16 -0.12 [-0.21, -0.03] 
20 Total PronounswO 18 0.29 [0.20, 0.37] 7 0.45 [0.33, 0.58]  11 0.13 [0.01, 0.25] 
21 First-Person Singular 21 -0.06 [-0.13, 0.00] 8 -0.29 [-0.38, -0.20]  14 0.19 [0.10, 0.29] 
23 Total First-PersonwO 22 0.14 [0.06, 0.22] 8 0.05 [-0.08, 0.18] 14 0.20 [0.10, 0.30]  
24 Total Second-Person 23 -0.16 [-0.23, -0.10] 12 -0.21 [-.29, -0.13]  11 -0.09 [-0.19, -0.01] 
25 Total Third-Person 29 -0.21 [-0.27, -0.15] 13 -0.31 [-0.38, -0.23]  16 -0.08 [-0.17, -0.01] 
28.1 Sens.-Percept. Processes+ 27 0.06 [0.00, 0.13] 11 0.00 [-0.09, 0.09] 16 0.13 [0.04, 0.22]  
30 Space 23 0.00 [-0.07, 0.06] 10 0.07 [-0.03, 0.16] 13 -0.07 [-0.16, 0.02] 
36 Motion VerbswO 16 -0.10 [-0.17, 0.01] 5 0.01 [-0.12, 0.14] 11 -0.15 [-0.26, -0.05]  
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 2.
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Appendix F 
Effect Sizes of Linguistic Cues to Deception when Studies Applied either a Between- or Within-Participants Design 
Linguistic Cue k Overall gu [CI] k1 Between- 
Participants 
k2 Within- 
Participants 
01 Word Quantity 42 0.24 [0.19, 0.29] 24 0.07 [-0.01, 0.15] 18 0.36 [0.30, 0.43]  
03 Type-Token Ratio 22 0.14 [0.07, 0.21] 16 0.33 [0.24, 0.42]  6 -0.08 [-0.18, 0.02] 
12 Tentative WordswO+ 19 0.13 [0.06, 0.20] 9 0.03 [-0.09, 0.14] 10 0.19 [0.11, 0.28]  
15 Emotions 25 -0.35 [-0.41, -0.28] 14 -0.50 [-0.58, -0.40]  11 -0.22 [-0.30, -0.13] 
17 Negations 20 -0.15 [-0.22, -0.08] 7 0.17 [0.03, 0.30] 13 -0.25 [-0.32, -0.17]  
18 Negative Emotions+ 24 -0.13 [-0.19, -0.06] 11 0.04 [-0.08, 0.15] 13 -0.22 [-0.29, 0.13]  
18.1 Negative Emotions Only 24 -0.18 [-0.24, -0.11] 11 0.09 [-0.02, 0.20] 13 -0.32 [-0.40, -0.24]  
19 Positive Emotions and Feelings+ 20 -0.04 [-0.13, 0.04] 11 -0.16 [-0.27, -0.05] 9 0.13 [-0.01, 0.26]  
19.1 Positive Emotions OnlywO 20 -0.07 [-0.15, 0.00] 11 -0.15 [-0.26, -0.04]  9 0.00 [-0.11, 0.10] 
20 Total PronounswO 18 0.29 [0.10, 0.38] 8 -0.05 [-0.23, 0.14] 10 0.38 [0.28, 0.48]  
21 First-Person Singular 22 -0.06 [-0.13, 0.00] 9 -0.70 [-0.80, -0.59]  13 0.28 [0.20, 0.36] 
22 First-Person Plural 25 -0.04 [-0.10, 0.03] 15 -0.16 [-0.25, -0.08]  10 0.09 [0.01, 0.18] 
23 Total First-PersonwO 22 0.14 [0.06, 0.22] 14 0.00 [-0.12, 0.12] 8 0.26 [0.15, 0.37]  
24 Total Second-Person 23 -0.16 [-0.23, -0.10] 10 -0.42 [-0.52, -0.32]  13 0.00 [-0.08, 0.08] 
25 Total Third-Person 29 -0.21 [-0.27, -0.15] 15 -0.34 [-0.42, -0.25]  14 -0.11 [-0.19, -0.03] 
48 Present TensewO 16 0.01 [-0.06, 0.09] 7 -0.10 [-0.24, 0.04]  9 0.06 [-0.03, 0.15] 
28.1 Sens.-Percept. Processes Only 27 0.06 [0.00, 0.13] 15 -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] 12 0.14 [0.06, 0.23]  
30 Space 24 0.00 [-0.06, 0.07] 12 0.21 [0.11, 0.32]  12 -0.12 [-0.20, -0.04] 
37 Cognitive ProcesseswO 18 0.09 [0.01, 0.16] 7 -0.03 [-0.17, 0.10] 11 0.13 [0.05, 0.22]  
38 Insight 15 0.13 [0.05, 0.21] 7 -0.07 [-0.21, 0.06] 8 0.23 [0.14, 0.32]  
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 2. 
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Appendix G 
Excluded Studies and Reason for Exclusion 
Authors Reason for Exclusion 
Adams (2002) No additional data from authors 
Adams & Jarvis (2006) No additional data from authors 
Bachenko, Fitzpatrick & Schonwetter (2008) Data not applicable  
Burgoon, Blair, Qin, & Nunamaker (2003) Same data as Qin, Burgoon, Blair, & Nunamaker (2005) 
Churyk, Lee, & Clinton (2008) Truth status of management discussion not clear (could be fraud), no data 
Dilmon (2009) Response from author: No computer program used. A statistician conducted the coding. 
Dulaney (1982) Data (means, F-value) are not sufficient to calculate appropriate ES for within-participants 
design 
Duran, Crossley, Hall, McCarthy, & Namara (2009) Same data as Duran, Hall, McCarthy, & McNamara (2010) 
Dzindolet & Pierce (2004) First author could not provide data 
Elkins (2011) Data not applicable  
Enos (2009) Not enough data to calculate effect sizes 
Enos, Shribergy, Graciarena, Hirschberg, & Stolcke 
(2007) 
Not enough data to calculate effect sizes 
Fornaciari & Poesio (2011) Parts of speech instead of whole account. Not enough statistical data (use of "vectors") 
Fuller (2008) Data not applicable  
Fuller, Biros, & Delen (2008) Data not applicable 
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Appendix G (continued) 
Authors Reason for Exclusion 
Fuller, Biros, & Delen (2011) Not enough data to calculate effect sizes, no independent dataset (same as Fuller, Biros, & 
Wilson, 2009) 
Fuller, Biros, & Wilson (2009) Not enough data and no independent dataset 
Graciarena, Shriberg, Stolcke, Enos, Hirschberg, 
& Kajarekar (2006) 
No linguistic categories outlined specifically - used a superordinate category 
(Prosodic/Lexical) 
Gupta (2007) Not enough data to calculate effect sizes 
Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth (2004) Exactly the same data as in Hancock et al. (2008) 
Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth (2005) Exactly the same data as in Hancock et al. (2008) 
Hirschberg, Beus, Brenier, Enos, Friedman, 
Gilman, Girand, Graciarena, Kathol, Michaelis, 
Pellom, Shriberg, & Stolcke (2005) 
Not enough data to calculate effect sizes 
Jensen, Burgoon, & Nunamaker (2010) Hybrid detection system whereby humans interact with the program to aid them in making 
truth and deception decisions 
Jensen, Lowry, Burgoon, & Nunamaker (2010) Hybrid detection system whereby humans interact with the program to aid them in making 
truth and deception decisions 
Jensen, Lowry, & Jenkins (2011) Hybrid detection system whereby humans interact with the program to aid them in making 
truth and deception decisions 
Jensen, Meservy, Burgoon, & Nunamaker (2010) No independent data. Same transcripts as in Burgoon, et al. (2003) 
Keila & Skillicorn (2005) Data not applicable  
Knapp, Hart, & Dennis (1974) No standard deviations reported and first author could not provide them 
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Appendix G (continued) 
Authors Reason for Exclusion 
Leuprecht (2011) No data available 
Little (2007) Not enough data to calculate effect sizes 
Mihalcea & Strappavara (2009) Not enough data and no independent dataset 
Morgan, Rabinowitz, Christian, & Hazlett (2009) Analyses of interviewers speech only. 
Morgan, Steffian, Clark, Coric, & Harzlett (2008) No data available 
Qin & Burgoon (2007) Same dataset as Burgoon & Qin (2006) 
Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker (2004) Same data as Qin, Burgoon, Blair, & Nunamaker (2005) 
Rubin & Conroy (2012) Analysis of statements with various (continuous and self-determined) deception levels and 
no restricted topics. No data available 
Taylor, Tomblin, Conchie, & Menacere (2011) Not enough data to calculate effect sizes 
Toma & Hancock (2010) No truth condition, only low and high deceptive condition, and no data. Same dataset as 
Toma & Hancock (2012) 
Toma & Hancock (2012) No truth condition, only low and high deceptive condition, and no data 
Twitchell (2005) Same data as Twitchell, Adkins, Nunamaker, & Burgoon (2004) 
Twitchell, Nunamaker, & Burgoon (2004) Only one linguistic cue investigated 
Twitchell, Biros, Adkins, Forsgren, Burgoon, 
Nunamaker (2006) 
Data not applicable  
Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher (2007) First author could not provide data 
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Appendix G (continued) 
Authors Reason for Exclusion 
Watson (1981) Statistical data is not useful for computing effect sizes 
Zhou, Burgoon, Twitchell, Qin, & Nunamaker 
(2004) 
No additional data from authors 
Zhou, Burgoon, Zhang, & Nunamaker (2004) Same data as Zhou et al. (2004), but two additional dependent variables: "intensity" and 
"subjunctive language". Data for those cues is neither provided in the article, nor in data 
sent from the authors. 
Zhou, Shi, & Zhang (2008) Data not applicable 
Zhou & Sung (2008) First author recommend us to exclude this study because it does not have an independent 
data set 
Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker 
(2003) 
First author recommend us to exclude this study because it does not have an independent 
data set 
Zhou & Zenebe (2005) Data not applicable  
Zhou & Zenebe (2008) Data not applicable  
Zhou & Zhang (2006) First author recommend us to exclude this study because it does not have an independent 
data set 
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Appendix H 
Meta-Analyses of Linguistic Cues under Research Questions 1 to 6 with and without Outliers 
Linguistic Cue Pred.  
DOE 
k N Min 
gu 
Max 
gu 
gu CI-
low 
CI- 
high 
Q 
Q     I2 
Research Question 1: Do Liars Experience Greater Cognitive Load? 
 (a) Length of Accounts 
01 Word QuantityM T 42 6,713 -1.25 1.43 0.24 0.19, 0.29 315.85 87.02 
07 Sentence Quantity T 9 1,334 -1.31 0.28 -0.33 -0.44, -0.21 104.01 93.31 
08 Average Sentence Length T 16 2,880 -0.37 0.81 0.10 0.02, 0.17 42.83 64.98 
08 Average Sentence LengthwO,M T 15 2,704 -0.37 0.43 0.05 -0.03, 0.13 20.46 31.58 
 (b) Elaboration of Accounts 
02 Content Word Diversity T 9 1,194 -0.30 1.00 0.39 0.26, 0.51 22.77 64.87 
02 Content Word DiversitywO T 7 1,076 0.27 1.00 0.48 0.34, 0.61 8.13 26.22 
03 Type-Token RatioM T 22 3,589 -1.40 1.09 0.14 0.07, 0.21 171.95 87.79 
04 Six Letter Words T 10 1,617 -0.28 0.25 -0.05 0.14, -0.05 5.19 0.00 
05 Average Word Length T 8 1,158 -0.59 0.69 -0.03 -0.16, 0.09 25.95 73.02 
05 Average Word LengthwO T 7 954 -0.42 0.69 0.11 -0.03, 0.25 6.85 12.41 
 (c) Complexity of Accounts 
06 Verb Quantity T 12 2,356 -1.21 0.44 -0.03 0.11, -0.60 78.91 86.06 
09 Causation T 17 2,773 -0.68 0.25 -0.07 -0.14, 0.01 18.61 14.03 
10 Exclusive Words T 20 3,403 -0.24 0.81 0.31 0.24, 0.38 43.91 56.73 
10 Exclusive WordswO,M T 18 2,783 -0.24 0.81 0.24 0.17, 0.31 25.87 25.66 
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Appendix H (continued) 
Linguistic Cue Pred.  
DOE 
k N Min 
gu 
Max 
gu 
gu CI-
low 
CI- 
high 
Q 
Q     I2 
 (d) Errors in Production 
11 Writing Errors D 10 1,077 -0.65 0.86 -0.03 -0.16, 0.11 22.10 59.29 
11 Writing ErrorswO D 8 990 -0.65 0.43 -0.01 -0.15, 0.12 13.36 47.61 
Research Question 2: Are Liars Less Certain Than Truth-Tellers? 
12 Tentative Words D 20 3,197 -1.27 0.36 0.11 0.04, 0.18 36.76 48.31 
12 Tentative WordswO D 19 3,145 -1.27 0.36 0.13 0.06, 0.20 20.13 10.56 
13 Modal Verbs D 25 3,889 -0.42 0.80 0.00 -0.07, 0.06 32.73 26.62 
14 Certainty T 18 2,823 -0.25 0.94 -0.06 -0.14, 0.01 25.15 32.40 
Research Question 3a: Do Liars Use More Negations and Negative Emotion Words? 
17 NegationsM D 20 3,659 -0.98 0.53 -0.15 -0.22, -0.09 155.53 87.78 
18 Negative Emotions+ D 24 3,641 -1.90 0.87 -0.13 -0.19, -0.06 99.80 76.95 
18 Negative Emotions+,wO,M D 21 2,593 -0.39 0.87 -0.07 -0.15, 0.01 21.03 4.88 
18.1 Negative Emotions OnlyM D 24 3,641 -1.90 0.87 -0.18 -0.24, -0.12 214.57 89.28 
18.2 Anger D 12 2,452 -1.32 0.38 -0.27 -0.35, -0.19 165.03 93.34 
18.3 AnxietywO D 11/1
2 
1,952 -0.30 0.44 0.07 -0.02, 0.02 13.55 26.19 
18.4 Sadness D 12 2,452 -0.34 0.25 0.04 -0.04, 0.12 13.01 15.46 
Research Question 3b: Do Liars Use Fewer Positive Emotion Words? 
19 Positive Emotions and Feelings+ T 21 3,203 -0.84 0.45 0.03 -0.04, 0.10 55.42 63.91 
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Appendix H (continued) 
Linguistic Cue Pred.  
DOE 
k N Min 
gu 
Max 
gu 
gu CI-
low 
CI- 
high 
Q 
Q     I2 
19 Positive Emotions and Feelings+,wO T 20 2,703 -0.84 0.37 -0.05 -0.12, 0.03 29.59 35.79 
19.1 Positive Emotions Only T 21 3,203 -0.84 0.45 0.01 -0.06, 0.08 56.68 64.71 
19.1 Positive Emotions OnlywO,M T 20 2,703 -0.84 0.35 -0.07 -0.15, 0.00 27.98 32.08 
19.2 Positive Feelings Only T 9 1,422 -0.47 0.40 0.07 -0.03, 0.18 14.88 46.25 
Research Question 3c: Do Liars Express More or Less Unspecified Emotion Words? 
15 Emotions ? 25 4,129 -1.57 0.48 -0.34 -0.41, -0.28 246.69 90.27 
15 EmotionswO,M ? 21 2,941 -0.63 0.48 -0.11 -0.19, -0.04 28.92 30.85 
16 Pleasantness and Unpleasantness ? 6 806 -0.35 0.30 -0.10 -0.25, 0.06 8.43 40.68 
Research Question 4: Do Liars Distance Themselves More From Events? 
 (a) Personal Pronouns 
21 First-Person SingularM T 22 3,761 -1.00 0.61 -0.06 -0.13, 0.00 274.38 92.35 
22 First-Person Plural T 25 4,353 -1.12 0.79 -0.04 -0.10, 0.02 228.85 89.51 
22 First-Person PluralwO,M T 22 3,224 -0.72 0.39 0.06 -0.01, 0.13 27.98 24.93 
23 Total First-Person T 23 2,709 -1.63 0.57 0.05 -0.03, 0.13 127.30 82.72 
23 Total First-PersonwO,M T 22 2,541 -0.39 0.57 0.14 0.06, 0.22 32.26 34.91 
24 Total Second-Person D 23 4,072 -1.18 0.33 -0.16 -0.23, -0.10 168.24 86.92 
24 Total Second-PersonwO,M D 21 3,072 -0.61 0.33 -0.10 -0.17, -0.02 28.64 30.16 
25 Total Third-Person D 29 4,807 -1.18 0.55 -0.21 -0.27, -0.15 181.71 84.59 
25 Total Third-PersonwO,M D 26 3,848 -0.41 0.55 -0.10 -0.16, -0.04 37.20 32.79 
20 Total Pronouns - 19 2,960 -0.64 0.65 -0.06 -0.13, 0.02 68.18 73.60 
20 Total PronounswO,M - 18 2,460 -0.36 0.65 0.06 -0.02, 0.14 19.32 12.02 
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Appendix H (continued) 
Linguistic Cue Pred.  
DOE 
k N Min 
gu 
Max 
gu 
gu CI-
low 
CI- 
high 
Q 
Q     I2 
 (b) Passive Voice and Generalizing Terms 
26 Passive Voice Verbs D 11 1,221 -0.47 0.49 0.06 -0.06, 0.18 9.52 0.00 
27 Generalizing Terms D 4 93 -1.63 0.44 -0.37 -0.79, 0.05 15.78 80.99 
 (c) Past and Present Tense 
47 Past Tense D 16 3,047 -0.53 0.41 0.06 -0.01, 0.14 22.67 33.83 
48 Present Tense T 17 3,107 -1.41 0.60 -0.18 -0.25, -0.11 195.37 91.81 
48 Present TensewO,M T 16 2,607 -0.51 0.60 0.01 -0.07, 0.09 19.38 22.61 
Research Question 5: Do Liars Use Fewer (Sensory and Contextual) Details? 
28 Sens.-Perceptual Processes+ T 27 4,177 -0.70 0.70 0.06 0.00, 0.13 58.84 55.81 
28 Sens.-Perceptual Processes+,wO,M T 25 3,957 -0.70 0.70 0.05 -0.01, 0.12 36.00 33.33 
28.1 Sens.-Percept. Processes OnlyM T 27 4,177 -0.90 0.70 0.06 0.00, 0.13 89.26 70.87 
28.2 Seeing T 11 2,344 -0.56 0.35 0.07 -0.01, 0.16 33.25 69.93 
28.2 SeeingwO T 9 1,740 -0.17 0.34 0.03 -0.06, 0.13 13.34 40.03 
28.3 Feeling T 12 2,412 -0.49 0.40 -0.01 -0.09, 0.07 19.64 44.00 
28.3 FeelingwO T 11 2,304 -0.49 0.27 -0.03 -0.11, 0.05 15.00 33.31 
28.4 Hearing T 11 2,344 -0.41 0.48 0.17 0.09, 0.25 14.15 29.35 
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Appendix H (continued) 
Linguistic Cue Pred.  
DOE 
k N Min 
gu 
Max 
gu 
gu CI-
low 
CI- 
high 
Q 
Q     I2 
 (b) Contextual Embedding 
29 Time T 24 3,796 -1.25 0.53 0.10 0.03, 0.16 53.32 56.86 
29 TimewO T 23 3,296 -1.25 0.53 0.03 -0.04, 0.10 28.95 24.00 
30 Space T 24 3,851 -0.47 0.58 0.00 -0.06, 0.07 60.12 61.74 
30 SpacewO,M T 22 3,199 -0.36 0.58 -0.04 -0.13, 0.03 31.74 33.74 
31 Space & Time T 5 634 -0.25 0.61 -0.04 -0.19, 0.12 10.48 61.84 
 (c) Descriptive Words 
32 Prepositions T 14 2,479 -0.55 0.48 0.02 -0.06, 0.10 16.54 21.38 
33 Numbers T 12 2,452 -0.28 0.23 0.05 -0.03, 0.13 9.37 0.00 
34 Quantifier T 4 1,198 0.06 0.22 0.14 0.02, 0.25 1.22 0.00 
35 Modifier T 11 1,361 -1.04 0.43 -0.08 -0.20, 0.03 77.46 87.09 
36 Motion Verbs T 17 2,859 -0.72 0.38 -0.01 -0.08, 0.07 39.59 59.59 
36 Motion VerbswO,M T 16 2,359 -0.72 0.13 -0.09 -0.17, -0.01 16.84 10.92 
Research Question 6: Do Liars Refer Less Often to Cognitive Processes? 
37 Cognitive Processes T 19 2,995 -0.25 0.82 0.10 0.03, 0.18 28.97 37.88 
37 Cognitive ProcesseswO T 18 2,915 -0.25 0.36 0.09 0.01, 0.16 19.66 13.54 
38 InsightM T 15 2,539 -0.41 0.59 0.13 0.05, 0.21 35.65 60.73 
Notes. Please consult notes from Table 1
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META-ANALYSIS II: 
Can Credibility Criteria be Assessed Reliably? 
A Meta-Analysis of Criteria-based Content Analysis 
Discerning between truths and lies is crucial in many settings. Therefore, it is 
no wonder that scholars from diverse disciplines have studied deception and its 
detection. These disciplines include (but are not limited to) psychophysiology and 
neurosciences (e.g., Farah, Hutchinson, Phelps, & Wagner, 2014; National 
Research Council, 2003); social, cognitive, developmental, clinical, forensic, 
evolutionary, and organizational psychology (e.g., Ekman, 2009; Granhag and 
Strömwall, 2004; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, & Marksteiner, 2011; Vrij, 2008); 
communication (e.g., Levine, 2014; Miller & Stiff, 1993); behavioral economics (e.g., 
Ariely, 2012); and computational linguistics (see Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, Masip, & 
Sporer, 2014). 
Most research has focused on identifying valid indicators of deception--that is, 
observable behaviors displayed by communicators (senders) that are assumed to be 
correlated with the act of lying. However, meta-analyses reveal only few and small 
behavioral differences between truths and lies, and many of these differences are 
moderated by numerous moderator variables (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, 
Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Sporer & Schwandt, 
2006, 2007).  
However, not all behavioral cues are the same. Specifically, meta-analyses 
suggest that verbal content cues may be more revealing of veracity than nonverbal 
cues (DePaulo et al., 2003), that deception-detection training focused on verbal cues 
is more effective than training focused on nonverbal cues (Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & 
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Meissner, 2014), and that receivers judging veracity reach greater accuracy rates 
when they focus on verbal (rather than nonverbal) information (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006; Reinhard et al., 2011). 
In fact, verbal content cues have brought about a number of systematic and 
structured approaches to detect deception, corroborate truthfulness, or--more 
generally--to “assess credibility”. Best known among these are Criteria-based 
Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) and the Reality Monitoring (RM) 
approach (e.g., Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2008). 
Here we focus on CBCA. 
Credibility Assessment and CBCA 
In Germany, there is a long tradition of calling expert evaluators (usually 
psychologists) to help the court to assess the credibility of children or adults’ 
allegations of sexual abuse (Sporer, 1983; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Wegener, 
1989). Almost 60 years ago, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof: BGH, 
1954) ruled that expert witnesses, such as psychiatrists or psychologists, could be 
called to assess the credibility of statements in sexual abuse cases, particularly 
when no other evidence existed to confirm the truthfulness of the statement. This 
allowed expert witnesses to evaluate children’s credibility in probably more than 
100,000 sexual abuse cases in Germany (Arntzen, 1992; Sporer, 1983; Steller, 
2013). Authors like Undeutsch (1967, 1982) and Arntzen (1970, 1983), along with 
other experts from formerly East Germany (Dettenborn, Fröhlich, & Szewczyk, 1984; 
Szewczyk 1973) and Sweden (Trankell, 1972), developed individual verbal content 
criteria to systematically assess credibility. Köhnken (1982) and Steller and Köhnken 
(1989) integrated the criteria described in different sources under 19 “content criteria 
for statement analysis” subdivided into five major categories (see Table 1), termed 
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Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller, 1989; Köhnken, 2004). These 
criteria are not to be used in isolation but are embedded in a more general 
hypothesis testing approach referred to as Statement Validity Analysis (SVA; see 
below). 
Although the necessity to call upon an expert has been debated over the 
years (for a comprehensive review, see Jansen, 2012), in 1999 the German 
Supreme Court (BGH, 1999) reached a milestone decision by declaring SVA as the 
standard procedure experts should follow in sexual abuse cases. Apparently, the 
decision became necessary because experts had provided inadequate expert 
testimony in several cases. In particular, in the case to be decided in that decision, 
the defense had obtained an additional expertise that questioned the credibility 
assessment procedure used by a court-appointed expert. In other words, two 
different "experts" did not reach the same conclusion. The BGH called upon 
(inter)nationally renowned experts to evaluate the scientific quality of this type of 
expert testimony. In a nutshell, the BGH appointed experts found flaws in the 
procedures and conclusions of the court-appointed "expert". So far, we have only 
described CBCA within the context of the (central European) inquisitorial system. We 
return to CBCA's potential role in an adversary legal system (e.g., in the U.S. or 
U.K.) in the discussion. 
In this paper we focus on the reliability issue of assessing the presence of 
content criteria as part of a credibility as a prerequisite of its validity. If experts are 
unable to apply these credibility criteria in an objective and reliable manner, then 
their testimony is of no help to the courts (cf. Küpper & Sporer, 1995; van Koppen & 
Saks, 2003). 
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Steller and Köhnken's Content Criteria for Statement Analysis 
The presence of each CBCA criterion in Table 1 is considered an indicator of 
the truthfulness of a statement, whereas its absence does not necessarily indicate 
that the statement is a lie (Raskin & Esplin, 1991; Steller, 1989). The first CBCA 
category, “general characteristics”, contains three criteria that apply to the whole 
statement without going into specific details. The second and third categories, 
specific contents and peculiarities of the event, contain criteria that would be 
cognitively difficult to purposefully include unless the narrator has actually 
experienced the event (Köhnken, 1990). In addition, the criteria in the third cluster 
“enhance concreteness and vividness” of a statement (Steller & Köhnken, 1989, p. 
226). The fourth category of criteria, “motivation-related contents”, is based on the 
premise that a person making a false allegation would not include such contents 
because this would give the impression of a lack of veracity (Köhnken, 1990, 2004). 
The final category, “offense-specific elements”, consists of one single criterion 
examining whether the account contains descriptions of characteristics typical of this 
sort of event (e.g., sexual abuse cases) rather than misguided commonsense 
notions.  
For a statement to be analyzed with CBCA, it has to be collected properly 
(e.g., Lamb, Sternberg, & Esplin, 1994; Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin, Hershkowitz, & 
Orbach, 1997a; Köhnken, 2004; Masip & Garrido, 2006; Raskin & Explin, 1991). The 
main part of the statement has to be given orally in a free report. Preferably, it should 
be the first time the narrator ever tells the story. It is important that diagnostically 
relevant parts of the statement--those which may distinguish between a fabricated 
and a truthful event--are of considerable length. After the free report, the expert may 
ask some more specific but open-ended, non-leading questions if necessary (“You 
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said something about the kitchen; please tell me more about it.”). Closed-ended 
(“Was his name Jim or John?”), leading or suggestive questions (“Were you afraid 
when he touched your leg?”), and yes/no questions should be avoided. The entire 
dialogue should be audio- or videotaped and transcribed later (Jansen, 2012). The 
CBCA analysis is to be performed on these transcripts. 
When used in real criminal cases, CBCA is embedded in a more general and 
complex assessment procedure (SVA), which not only examines fabrication as an 
alternative hypothesis to accounts based on experience but also other problems like 
suggestive or repeated questioning, the origin of the first statement, or coaching. 
Likewise, personal characteristics of the witness--such as her or his cognitive, 
developmental, social and personality background--have to be taken into account 
(e.g., Köhnken, 2004; Steller, 1989; Volbert & Steller, 2014). In SVA, on the basis of 
an initial case-file analysis, rival hypotheses about the source of the statement are to 
be framed, tested, and falsified (Jansen, 2012; Steller, Volbert, & Wellershaus, 
1993). Originally, SVA and CBCA were designed to assess the credibility of the 
statements of alleged victims of (child) sexual abuse. However, in the last three 
decades, many authors used CBCA criteria as a "tool" to detect deception, applying 
it not only to potential victims but also to statements of perpetrators, witnesses and 
other protagonists of complex (autobiographical) events in field and laboratory 
analogue simulations (Köhnken, 2004; Vrij, 2005, 2008). 
Although SVA and CBCA are diagnostic and clinical assessment procedures 
rather than standardized psychometric tests, their inter-rater reliability and validity are 
of utmost importance for their practical application (Köhnken, 2004; Steller, 1989; 
Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Wells & Loftus, 1991). The validity of CBCA deals with the 
question of whether these criteria do indeed discriminate between truthful and 
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fabricated statements, and whether trained evaluators can assess the truth status 
above chance performance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). But reliability is important, too: 
A known truism from psychometric theory is that the validity of an assessment 
procedure is limited by its reliability (Anastasi, 1990; Cronbach, 1990). Thus, here we 
examined CBCA reliability. Of the different forms of reliability, we specifically 
investigated the reliability of coding of CBCA by different assessors, that is, their 
intersubjective agreement. 
Main Hypotheses 
Individual CBCA criteria vary widely with respect to the precision with which 
they are operationalized. Also, some criteria are more global and/or more subjective 
than others (Anson, Golding, & Gully, 1993). Hence, criteria that have more 
straightforward or intuitive operationalizations, like quantity of details or reproduction 
of conversation, should result in higher reliabilities than criteria with more 
complicated or less clearly-defined operationalizations, such as unstructured 
production, descriptions of interactions, unusual details and superfluous details (see 
Table 1). 
Also, we assume that different reliability indices (percentage agreement, 
Cohen’s kappa, Pearson’s r, etc.) may reflect different degrees of reliability. For 
example, due to the mathematical fact that percentage agreement does not correct 
for chance agreement (Cohen, 1960; Frick & Semmel, 1978), it will result in relatively 
high inter-rater agreement rates compared to other indices. 
Hypotheses for Moderator Variables 
We expected inter-rater reliability as measured with correlation coefficients to 
be associated with at least four predictor variables: The research paradigm of a 
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study, the amount of training raters were exposed to, the type of rating scale used, 
and the frequency of occurrence of each criterion, that is their base rate. 
Research Paradigm. Field studies examine reports of alleged sexual abuse 
(or other criminal) cases which are recorded by police officers, psychologists, or 
other specialized occupational groups. On the other hand, in an experiment, 
situations, tasks, and procedures are set up by the researchers. Participants are 
randomly assigned to conditions (i.e., telling lies or the truth). For example, after 
having watched a video or having taken part in a mock crime, participants are asked 
to tell the truth or lie about what they have just experienced. In a quasi-experiment, 
participants are allocated to conditions on the basis of specific personal experiences 
(e.g., having experienced a traumatic life event) rather than being randomly 
assigned. For example, some participants are asked to tell a negative, stressful self-
experienced life event (e.g., chosen from a prepared list of traumatic events), while 
other participants are asked to invent such an event they never experienced. 
It can be argued that field studies and quasi-experiments share a number of 
characteristics that are absent in experiments. Having experienced a traumatic or 
stressful life event (the most frequent topic of field studies and quasi-experiments) 
has higher ecological validity than the manipulations used in laboratory experiments. 
These conceptual similarities between field studies and quasi-experiments, as well 
as the fact that CBCA was developed for autobiographical life events, led us to the 
hypothesis that inter-rater reliability would be higher in field studies and quasi-
experiments than in laboratory experiments. 
Rater training. Rating CBCA criteria is a complex and difficult task (Köhnken, 
2004; Steller, 1989). Therefore, a prerequisite for the correct application of CBCA is 
that raters are well trained. Otherwise, the understanding that different raters will 
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have of the same criteria might differ, which will decrease reliability. In the studies 
reviewed, training took several forms: Raters had to read background literature on 
CBCA and SVA, heard a lecture held by an expert, were given definitions and 
examples for each CBCA criterion, and/or had the opportunity to practice and 
discuss example ratings prior to target ratings. In line with Steller’s (1989) and 
Köhnken’s (2004) reasoning that intensive training is required to correctly and 
reliably apply CBCA, we predicted that the higher the intensity of the training, the 
higher the inter-rater reliability for CBCA criteria. 
Rating scale. CBCA criteria can be coded in different ways: Researchers or 
practioners either use dichotomous ratings (0 = not present vs. 1 = present), an 
extended presence rating (0 = not present, 1 = present, 2 = strongly present), Likert 
scales (e.g., 1 to 5, 1 to 7, 1 to 10), or frequency counts. Because more fine-grained 
scales allow more possibilities to disagree (e.g., rater X assigning a "6", rater Y a "7" 
on a 7-point scale), we expected that more fine-grained scales should be associated 
with lower reliabilities. However, this may depend on the type of reliability coefficient 
used. 
Base rates. Inter-rater reliability may be related to the base rates (frequency 
of occurrence) of specific CBCA criteria. Different CBCA criteria vary widely in 
frequency (e.g., Anson et al., 1993). For example, in his vote-counting review, Vrij 
(2005) found that criteria 01, 03, 04, and 19 occurred relatively often, whereas 
criteria 10, 13, 16, and 17 occurred only rarely. Sporer (1997a) observed that content 
criteria with either very low (e.g., unstructured production) or rather high (e.g., logical 
consistency) base rates were associated with particularly low inter-rater reliabilities 
(measured with Pearson’s r or Cohen's kappa; presumably due to a restriction of 
range) but high percentage agreement rates (for similar findings, see Gödert, 
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Gamer, Rill, & Vossel, 2005). In the statistical literature, there is evidence that 
Cohen's kappa is generally lower when base rates are much lower or much higher 
than .50 (Shrout, Spitzer, & Fleiss, 1987; Spitznagel & Helzer, 1985). 
We hypothesized that Pearson's r and Cohen's kappa should be lower with 
either very low (floor effects) or very high base rates (ceiling effects). Conversely, 
percentage agreement was expected to be rather high when base rates are either 
very low or very high. 
Goals of the Meta-Analysis 
The major aim was to provide the first comprehensive meta-analysis on the 
inter-rater reliability of CBCA criteria. The second goal was to explore potential 
differences between estimates provided by different reliability indices used in CBCA 
research (namely Pearson’s r, percentage agreement (PCA), Cohen’s kappa, 
weighted kappa, intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), and Maxwell’s RE). Our 
third goal was to examine the type of research paradigm, the amount of rater 
training, the type of rating scale used, and base rates as moderators of inter-rater 
reliability. 
Method 
Eligibility Criteria 
Primary studies had to meet the following inclusion criteria to be integrated 
into the meta-analysis. First, studies had to analyze truthful or fabricated accounts of 
past experiences with at least one CBCA criterion. These accounts had to originate 
from spoken or written samples (transcripts) either in an experiment, quasi-
experiment or field setting. Second, at least two raters had to evaluate some or all of 
the statements in the study. Third, raters had to be blind regarding truth status and 
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had to rate the statements independently. This was an important requirement to 
avoid any unintentional source of error such as confirmation bias. Fourth, raters had 
to be trained to identify CBCA criteria. Fifth, datasets had to be independent from 
each other to avoid dependencies within the data. If results from the same dataset 
judged by the same raters were published in several sources, we included the 
source with the highest publication standards (e.g., peer review). Sixth, the main 
study had to be written in English or German. 
Studies meeting one or several of the following criteria were excluded: 
Senders had been coached in CBCA criteria before giving their statements; 
statements had been manipulated by the investigator (e.g., by changing specific 
sentences to manipulate the occurrence of CBCA criteria); only a single case was 
described in the study; or computer programs had been used to analyze the 
statements (see Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, et al., 2014; Sporer, 2012). 
Literature Search and Study Selection 
In a first step, we located all 37 CBCA studies reviewed by Vrij (2005, 2008). 
Then, we searched through the reference lists of these studies to find more related 
papers and to create an author list. Then, we conducted several exhaustive literature 
searches up to January 2014 in the Web of Science, PsycInfo, WorldCat, 
Dissertation Abstracts, and Google Scholar. The authors’ names, “criteria-based 
content analysis”, or “CBCA” served as keywords. For the literature search in 
German databases (e.g., OPAC, PSYNDEX, ZPID-Datenbank Diplomarbeiten), the 
keyword “Glaubwürdigkeit” (in combination with “-merkmale”, “-kriterien”, “-
diagnostik”), “Realkennzeichen”, “Merkmals-”, or “Kriterien-orientierte Inhaltsanalyse” 
were used. More than 800 sources published between 1982 and 2014 were located 
and examined with regard to the eligibility criteria.1 To reduce publication bias, 
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special effort was made to locate and integrate unpublished studies. Authors or 
supervisors were asked personally, via telephone or email. 
In total, 74 reports (52 in English and 22 in German) were included. Because 
three reports described more than one experiment (see Appendix A), the number of 
independent studies increased to 78. 
Four reports provided reliability indices separately for different subgroups of 
senders or raters (Herrmann & Jena, 1995; Joffe, 1992; Petersen, 1997; Ruby & 
Brigham, 1998), increasing the final number of hypothesis tests to a maximum of k = 
82 but was usually lower because many studies did not investigate all 19 CBCA 
criteria. 
Independent Variables 
Several study and sampling characteristics were coded, such as source of 
publication, research paradigm (experiment, quasi-experiment, field study), 
experimental design (between-participants design or within-participants design), 
language of statements, mode of production (spoken, handwritten, or typed), number 
of accounts per sender, number of senders, senders’ gender, and senders’ age. 
Also, some further descriptive variables were coded: status of the liar (witness, actor, 
victim, or perpetrator), type of event (watch video, observe an event, participate in 
event, attitude, mock crime, trivial life event, significant life event, sexual abuse, or 
other real crime), emotional valence (neutral, negative, positive), senders’ motivation 
(none, low, medium, high), and interview style (free report only, semi-structured 
interview, structured interview, Cognitive Interview). Individual coding decisions for 
the aforementioned variables are displayed in Appendix A. 
Furthermore, variables concerning the rater and the rating process were 
coded as follows (see Appendix B): number and occupation of raters (students or 
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experts), mode of presentation of statements (transcript, audio only, audiovisual), 
rating scale used (frequency count, dichotomous [0/1] , 0/1/2, 0 to 4, 1 to 5, 1 to 7, 1 
to 10, or other Likert scale), training duration in hours on average per rater, and 
amount of training. Amount of training was coded as a summary score (0 to 6) of five 
separately coded (dichotomous [0 = No; 1 = Yes], or 0/1/2 rating) training 
components: (a) background information (0/1), (b) operational definitions (0/1), (c) 
example statements (0/1), (d) lecture (0/1), (e) example ratings, feedback, and/or 
homework (0/1/2). For component (e), when no sub-component was fulfilled we 
coded 0, when one component was fulfilled we coded 1, and when two or three 
components were fulfilled we coded 2. Finally, the base rate of each CBCA criterion 
was noted or calculated as the mean of the base rates of fabricated and truthful 
accounts. 
Coding Procedure and Inter-Coder Reliability 
Three expert coders who had read dozens of background articles and books 
on CBCA and had published articles on detection of deception in peer-reviewed 
journals served as coders. They were trained on example studies with a 
comprehensive coding manual. After a fair amount of agreement was established, 
each coder independently rated approximately 66% of the 52 English reports 
(randomly assigned), so that all independent and dependent variables of each 
English study were coded twice. Across the three coders, inter-rater reliability was 
highly satisfactory: For 20 categorical variables, kappa values ranged from .69 to 
1.00 (M = .84, Mdn = .85), and ICCsingle consistency values from .62 to 1.00 (M = .87, 
Mdn = .90). Furthermore, seven continuously coded variables yielded Pearson’s r 
values ranging from .99 to 1.00, and ICCsingle consistency values ranging between 
0.98 and 1.00. After the independent coding process, each pair of raters compared 
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their coding decisions for all independent variables and resolved disagreements. For 
every disagreement, the original source was consulted again and the value 
corrected. The 22 German reports were coded by the first author and crosschecked 
by a research assistant. 
Reliability Indices and Meta-Analytic Techniques 
Unit of analysis. The number of statements that were rated by at least two 
independent raters in the original study served as the unit of analysis. We did not 
consider the total number of statements in a study, but only the portion of statements 
that had been rated by two or more independent raters. For example, in the study by 
Vrij, Mann, Kristen, and Fisher (2007), only 50% of their 120 transcripts were coded 
by a second rater. Thus, the number of statements was adjusted to N = 60 for that 
study (see Appendix B).. 
Effect size measures. Inter-rater reliability indices analyzed were Pearson’s r 
(or Spearman rho, or phi), percentage agreement (PCA), Cohen’s kappa, weighted 
kappa, intraclass correlation (ICC), and Maxwell’s RE. 
Pearson’s r. Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient is widely used 
to measure inter-rater reliability. According to Fleiss (1981), values between .40 and 
.74 designate good agreement between two raters, and values equal to or above .75 
designate excellent agreement. As recommended in several standard meta-analysis 
handbooks (e.g., Cooper, Hedges, & Valentine, 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) we 
transformed Pearson’s r (as well as Spearman’s rho, or phi) into Fisher’s Zr as effect 
size measure. Because Fisher’s Zr is not defined for Pearson’s r = 1, we reduced this 
r value to .999. For weighted analyses, Nadj-3 was used as the inverse variance 
weight. For ease of interpretation, Fisher’s Zr was back-transformed to Pearson’s r 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
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Separate meta-analyses were calculated for each of the 19 CBCA criteria 
under the fixed- and random-effects model (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Shadish & 
Haddock, 2009). Here, we report results of the random-effects model (REM) only 
because this model is seen as the state of the art (e.g., Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). 
Results of the fixed-effects model (FEM) are available from the first author. 
Furthermore, we tested whether the observed effect sizes estimated the same 
population parameter with Q (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) and I2 (Higgins & Thompson, 
2002; Shadish & Haddock, 2009) as homogeneity test statistics. Whenever these 
tests indicated heterogeneity, we either calculated moderator analyses as an 
analogue to ANOVA (Hedges, 1982) or meta-regression analyses (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001; Pigott, 2012) under a FEM (due to small sample sizes). To guard against 
potential confounds, that is, systematic associations between predictor variables, we 
first calculated their inter-correlations as well as cross-classification tables of nominal 
predictors. Formulae to calculate effect sizes, weights, confidence intervals, and 
meta-analyses under the FEM and REM were programmed in Microsoft Office Excel 
(2011) spreadsheets by the first and second authors. For cross-validation, meta-
analytic calculations, moderator analyses and meta-regression were additionally 
performed with Wilson’s (2002) SPSS macros (see Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  
Percentage agreement. Percentage agreement (PCA) is another common 
measure of inter-rater agreement. The terms percentage agreement and proportion 
agreement are used interchangeably in article. Here, the number of agreements 
between two raters is divided by the total number of judgments. PCA ranges from 
0% (no agreement) to 100% (perfect agreement). A highly problematic issue is that 
agreement by chance (e.g., with a dichotomous rating, chance agreement is 50%), is 
not taken into account (Cohen, 1960; Maxwell, 1977). Thus, PCA leads to an 
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overestimation of the true agreement between two raters. Many authors consider 
percentages higher than 70% as good agreement. However, many statisticians have 
criticized PCA because it does not correct for chance agreement (Cohen, 1960; 
Fleiss, Levin, & Paik, 2003). 
As we expected the mean PCA to reach a value between 20% and 80%, we 
followed Lipsey and Wilson’s (2001) recommendation to use proportions (i. e., 
proportion agreement) as effect sizes (PCA divided by 100, with values ranging from 
0 to 1). Proportions of 1 were set to a value of .999 in order to calculate the standard 
error (!(p*(1-p))/N)) correctly. Also following Lipsey and Wilson (2001), we used the 
inverse of the squared standard error as the appropriate weight for each study. Due 
to methodological limitations inherent to PCA, we refrained from performing 
moderator analyses with this measure. 
Other reliability indices. Many researchers have used (test-score) reliability 
indices as the main dependent variable in meta-analyses (see Vacha-Haase, 1998, 
for the so-called “reliability generalization studies”; for an overview see Vacha-Haase 
& Thompson, 2011). However, we were not able to locate any appropriate meta-
analytic method to integrate inter-rater reliability indices other than Zr and PCA. The 
main problem is that the authors of primary studies usually provided no information 
about the underlying distributions, nor did they report the necessary values to 
calculate the standard error of a specific measure amenable to meta-analysis (Bayerl 
& Paul, 2011; Donner & Klar, 1996). Because none of the studies that we included 
provided enough information to calculate standard errors, we could not calculate 
confidence intervals or weighted average effect sizes for Cohen’s kappa, weighted 
kappa, ICC, or Maxwell’s RE. Instead, we used each reliability index itself as the 
effect size and calculated only the unweighted average, median, and quartiles. 
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Cohen’s kappa. Kappa (Cohen, 1960) is a chance-corrected measure of 
percentage agreement and is the measure of choice compared to PCA for 
categorical or ordinal data. Hereby, the difference between actual PCA and chance 
agreement is divided by the maximum agreement minus chance agreement. 
However, as noted above, kappa may depend on base rates. Kappa values range 
between -1 and +1, with +1 displaying perfect agreement, 0 chance agreement, and 
negative values denoting agreement worse than chance. According to Landis and 
Koch (1977), agreement as measured with Cohen’s kappa can be described as 
"perfect" (kappa values between .81 and 1.00), "substantial" (.61 to .80), "moderate" 
(.41 to .60), "fair" (.21 to .40), "slight" (.01 to .20) or "poor" (negative values). 
Weighted kappa. Whereas kappa treats all disagreements between raters 
equally, weighted kappa gives different weights depending on the degree of 
deviation between the evaluators’ ratings (Cohen, 1968, Formula 8). Like simple 
kappa, weighted kappa values can vary between -1 and +1. According to Fleiss 
(1981), the interpretation of weighted kappa values should be in line with correlation 
coefficients (below .40 = poor agreement; .40 to .74 = fair to good agreement, ! .75 
= excellent agreement), because under restricted conditions (i.e., contingency table 
with equal marginal distributions and sufficient sample size), weighted kappa is 
equivalent to the product-moment correlation coefficient (Cohen, 1968). 
Intraclass correlation. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) measure an 
association between variables of the same measurement construct (McGraw & 
Wong, 1996a, 1996b). ICCs measure not only the relationship between ratings of 
different raters but also take mean differences between raters into account (see 
Rosenthal, 1995). Six different intraclass correlation coefficients can be distinguished 
(Bartko, 1966; Gwet, 2012; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). ICCs were used to measure 
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reliability in a number of primary studies included in this meta-analysis, but the 
reports often did not specify the type of ICC used. Therefore, we refrained from 
calculating an (unweighted) average in this meta-analysis. Instead, we only report 
the median and other descriptive statistics. 
Weighted kappa and ICC are considered equivalent under certain conditions 
(Fleiss & Cohen, 1973; Krippendorff, 1970). Therefore, and because only a small 
number of studies used these indices, we combined these two measures into a 
single synthesis. Due to the similarity between ICC and weighted kappa, we used 
Fleiss’s (1981) guidelines to interpret these coefficients. 
Maxwell’s random error. Another chance-corrected measure of inter-rater 
reliability for dichotomous ratings is Maxwell’s random error (RE; Maxwell, 1977). 
Maxwell assumed evaluators’ decisions on doubtful cases to be randomly 
distributed--rather than depending on any known probabilities of an outcome. 
Maxwell’s RE values range from -1 to 1. To our knowledge, Anson et al. (1993) 
introduced Maxwell’s RE as a measure of inter-rater reliability for CBCA ratings. The 
authors praised its characteristics, especially the potential that Maxwell’s RE does 
not overestimate the amount of agreement by chance with base rates differing from 
.50 (unlike Cohen’s kappa). Anson et al. suggested the following classification: 
values larger than .50 indicate adequate reliability, between .30 and .50 marginal 
reliability, and below .30 inadequate reliability. 
Missing Data. Whenever inter-rater reliability was not provided for individual 
criteria, or in case only a range or average was given, authors were contacted to 
provide the reliability values for each CBCA criterion. We are very much obliged to 
all authors who responded to our inquiries and took the effort to send the requested 
data.2 
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Results 
Study Characteristics 
The number of hypothesis tests for particular reliability indices varied between 
k = 5 (Maxwell’s RE, details characteristic of the offense) and k = 35 (Pearson’s r, 
quantity of details). Whenever data were reported, the following study characteristics 
are based on the total sample size of k = 82 hypothesis tests. An overview of studies 
reporting on various reliability indices can be obtained in Appendix C. 
As shown in Table 2, about half of the studies were formally published in a 
scientific journal and more than 70% of the reports were composed in English. 
Although laboratory experiments were the most frequently used paradigm (53.66%), 
remarkably almost one half of the studies involved the more ecologically valid quasi-
experiments or field studies. About two-thirds of studies used a between-participants 
design. In one half of the studies the statements were produced in English, and in 
one third they were in German. Researchers have tried to mirror the characteristics 
of real forensic cases for which CBCA was originally designed: (a) in nine out of 
every ten studies the statements were produced orally, (b) the interview styles used 
matched the kind of interviews recommended for forensic settings; (c) in almost one 
third of the studies, the narrator was a victim, and in a substantial proportion of 
studies he or she was either a witness or a perpetrator; (d) the event typically had a 
negative valence and involved direct participation of the sender, and (e) it was a 
significant life event (37% of studies) or a crime (20%: sexual abuse or other crimes). 
However, only a few senders were highly motivated, and most raters were students; 
these latter features are probably a result of most of these studies being conducted 
in universities. Usually, raters were fairly well trained, and in most studies there were 
two raters per study who made dichotomous decisions (criterion absent/present) or 
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used a three-point (0 = criterion absent; 1 = present; 2 = strongly present) 
classification scale (see Table 2). 
In about 70% of the studies, all statements (100%) were evaluated by at least 
two independent raters. In the remaining studies, the percentage of multiply rated 
statements ranged from 12.5% to 83.0% (M = 31.2%, SD = 19.3%, Mdn = 22.5%, 
Mode = 20.0%). After adjustment, the mean number of accounts was 54 per study 
(see Table 2) and ranged from 4 to 200. More than one reliability index was reported 
in 37.8% of all studies. For those studies reporting only one reliability index, 
Pearson’s r was most frequently used (see Table 2).  
Pearson’s r 
For 18 out of 19 criteria, individual effect sizes had large heterogeneities, as 
shown by consistently large significant Q statistics, and by I2 values ranging between 
78.7% and 98.5% (see Table 3). Interquartile ranges ! .30 also indicated high 
heterogeneity for at least 14 criteria. Nevertheless, we calculated unweighted and 
weighted Pearson’s rs for all criteria under the random effects model. 
Inter-rater reliability was good to excellent for most criteria  (Table 3). Six 
criteria (06, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17) had weighted inter-rater reliability values of .75 or 
higher. Eleven criteria reached quite good inter-rater reliability with values ranging 
from .60 to .74, and one criterion (09) reached also good reliability with values 
between .50 and .59. Unstructured production (02) showed the lowest reliability 
(.46). The CBCA sum score yielded a high inter-rater reliability of .90. Given the 
large heterogeneity and the wide confidence intervals of the results, further analyses 
are clearly warranted (see below). 
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Percentage Agreement 
Our decision to set PCA values of 1.00 to .999 prior to calculation proved 
problematic: These values biased the meta-analytic results towards high average 
effect sizes. The more .999 values were included in a meta-analysis, the higher the 
probability that the weighted average effect size approximated .999. Therefore, we 
report only the more conservative calculations without “perfect” (1.00/.999) PCA 
values (Table 4). Thus, one to six values of perfect inter-rater agreement (M = 2.13, 
SD = 1.46) were excluded for sixteen criteria (with no exclusions for criteria 02, 11, 
14, and the sum score). 
Probably the most outstanding finding is the large heterogeneity between 
individual effect sizes for each CBCA criterion. As shown in Table 4, for almost all 
criteria, weighted individual PCA values ranged between poor (e.g., minimum value 
for 15: admitting lack of memory: .16) and high values (e.g., maximum value for 
several criteria: .990 for Criterion 10). Six criteria had interquartile ranges ! .30. Five 
criteria (10, 13, 16, 17, 18) reached high inter-rater agreement (! .80), and all other 
values ranged between .70 and .79, indicating good agreement except for contextual 
embedding (04: .68). 
Cohen’s Kappa 
Again, all estimates were highly heterogeneous, with individual reliability 
values ranging from -.16 to 1.00 (see Table 6). All criteria showed fairly large 
interquartile ranges ! .30. For most criteria, unweighted average inter-rater reliability 
was "moderate" using Landis and Koch’s (1977) guidelines, with six criteria (06, 12, 
13, 15, 17, 18) reaching values higher than .50, and nine criteria (03, 04, 05, 07, 08, 
09, 10, 11, 16) showing values between .40 and .49. The four remaining criteria (01: 
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logical structure, 02: unstructured production, 14: spontaneous corrections, 19: 
characteristics of the offense) exhibited values between .30 and .39, thus still 
indicating "fair" agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Weighted Kappa and ICC 
Values ranged from -.10 (14: spontaneous corrections) to 1.00 (for several 
criteria). Almost all criteria except 03: quantity of details, 07: unexpected 
complications, and 13: attribution of perpetrator’s mental state, showed interquartile 
ranges ! .30 (see Table 6). Seven criteria showed median inter-rater reliability 
values of .60 or larger (03, 06, 08, 10, 12, 15, 17), five (02, 05, 11, 13, 14) yielded 
still good reliability, with medians between .50 and .59, and another five (04, 07, 09, 
16, 18) reached adequate reliability, with medians between .40 and .49. Only logical 
structure (01: Mdn = .18) showed inadequate reliability.  
The reliability of the CBCA sum score as measured with ICCs was reported 
only in two experiments (Leal et al., 2013, Experiments 1 and 2), showing high 
values for both (.91). 
Maxwell’s RE 
Individual Maxwell’s RE values (Table 7) varied widely from -.22 to 1.00 (e.g., 
19: characteristics of the offense). For seven criteria, heterogeneity was quite high 
with interquartile ranges ! .30, whereas for thirteen other criteria, interquartile ranges 
varied from .05 (18: pardoning the perpetrator) to .27 (04: contextual embedding) 
indicating low to medium heterogeneity. Median reliability was adequate ( > .50) for 
16 criteria and the CBCA sum score. For four criteria, median reliability was even 
above .80 (Criteria 10, 16, 17, 18), and for three other criteria it was above .70 
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(Criteria 01, 06, 19). Maxwell’s RE showed marginal values (.30 - .50) for two 
criteria: unstructured production (02: .40) and quantity of details (03: .40). 
Problematic Issues 
The misuse of CBCA summary scores. Although we have reported 
reliability estimates for CBCA summary scores in our tables, these reliability 
coefficients are highly problematic for several reasons, and we will therefore refrain 
from interpreting them. First, two raters may arrive at an identical summary score, 
without agreeing on a single individual criterion (see Sporer, 2012, for details). 
Suppose, rater X has scored criteria 01, 03, 05, 07, and 09 as present, while rater Y 
coded 02, 04, 06, 08, and 10 as present; both would receive a summary score of 5 
(a "100% agreement"), even though both raters did not agree on a single criterion. 
This way, high PCAs as well as high rs can be obtained, without any inter-coder 
agreement at all. Second, in our meta-analysis, different authors used different 
numbers of criteria to build a summary score (e.g., summing criteria 01 to 14, or 01 
to 19; see Appendix C). As we know from classic testing theory, longer tests 
containing more items yield higher reliability (Anastasi, 1990), provided the items 
measure a common underlying construct. Third, although the frequency distributions 
were most likely often skewed researchers used Pearson rs (instead of 
nonparametric coefficients). 
Skewed distributions with frequency counts. Frequency counts in general 
are likely to result in skewed distributions, in particular when accounts vary widely in 
length. Because the presence in CBCA criteria is not corrected for account length 
(as is done with frequency counts in studies on nonverbal or linguistic cues to 
deception; DePaulo et al., 2003; Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, et al., 2014) Pearson rs may 
be artificially inflated (e.g., by outliers). 
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Low and high base rates. To check for the possibility of artificially high 
reliabilities as a function of base rates we conducted preliminary regression analyses 
with base rates as predictors and PCA, kappa, and Pearson rs (or phis) as to be 
predicted variables. Because studies reported base rates in different ways (e.g., as a 
proportion with dichotomous coding, or as an overall mean value for rating scales), 
all base rates were transformed to a standard format of "proportion present", with 0 
for the lower limit and 1 as its maximum. 
Figures 1 to 3 plot the weighted means of PCAs, Pearson rs, and kappas of 
all CBCA criteria against the respective base rates for all studies that reported both 
values (which is less than the number of studies in our overall meta-analyses). 
Besides showing ceiling effects of PCAs for several variables (e.g., 10: details 
misunderstood), the PCA graph shows an U-curve relationship as a function of base 
rates (Figure 1). In other words, PCA was especially high for low and high base 
rates. Plots for Pearson rs (Figure 2) and kappas (Figure 3), on the other hand show 
some evidence of the opposite pattern, that is, lower reliabilities for low and high 
base rates, respectively (i.e., an inverted U-shaped pattern). Besides the postulated 
curvilinear relationships, Figure 2 (Pearson rs) shows some evidence for a positive 
linear trend for lower base rates (< .40) while Figure 3 (kappas) also appears to 
contain a negative linear trend as a function of base rates (> .30). For PCAs (Figure 
1), there may also be a negative linear association because there are few criteria 
with high base rates (like 01: logical consistency). 
Reviewing Shrout et al. (1987) it can be noted that their Figure 1 is quite 
similar in shape to our Figure 1. These authors used this relationship to demonstrate 
that reliabilities measured with kappa are likely to yield low values at the extremes of 
low and high base rates. Altogether, these preliminary analyses clearly show that 
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neither PCAs, Pearson rs, nor kappas can meaningfully be interpreted without taking 
their base rates into account. 
To more formally test for these relationships, we conducted weighted 
regression analyses with both the linear and squared components of the base rates 
as predictors, and the reliabilities as to be predicted variables (see Table 11 below). 
Moderator Analyses for Pearson’s r 
The large heterogeneity of the different reliability coefficients across criteria 
and studies makes it necessary to look for potential moderator variables that may 
help understand the large variations. Many meta-analyses (in psychology and law) 
have used blocking analyses in analogy to ANOVA to find systematic differences. 
The problem with this approach is that by categorizing a given set of studies 
repeatedly for different moderator variables confounded variables are used as 
predictors, which may render the results uninterpretable. For example, if field studies 
were primarily conducted with little training, using dichotomous coding, while 
laboratory studies were conducted with elaborate training of coders using rating 
scales, any comparison between field and laboratory studies would be meaningless. 
To reduce (but not necessarily eliminate) this problem, we first cross-tabulated 
and/or correlated moderator variables with each other to assure that there were no 
empty or low frequency cells, or high correlations between pairs of predictors. 
Furthermore, to control for associations between moderator variables, we used 
meta-regression in addition to blocking analyses (see Pigott, 2012). We restricted 
significance tests of these moderator variables to CBCA criteria with subgroup ks ! 
3. 
Research Paradigm. As expected, inter-rater reliabilities in field studies and 
quasi-experiments were higher than in laboratory experiments for 15 (out of 19) 
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CBCA criteria (Table 8). Only for unstructured production (02), and descriptions of 
interactions (05), moderator analyses did not reveal significant differences. Reliability 
values for pardoning the perpetrator (18) were higher in experiments than in field 
studies or quasi-experiments. 
Rater training. More intense training (operationalized as the number of 
training components: 5 to 6 vs. 2 to 4 components) yielded higher inter-rater 
reliabilities for 10 CBCA criteria (Table 9). No significant differences were found for 
five criteria (02, 06, 07, 09, 17). For four criteria (03, 05, 15, 18) results were contrary 
to expectation. 
Rating Scale. Rating scales were classified into three categories: (a) 
presence rating (not present (0), present (1), and optionally strongly present (2)); (b) 
Likert scale (e.g., 1-5, 1-10) or weighting techniques; and (c) frequency counts. Due 
to the small number of studies (k !  3) using frequency counts, we excluded this 
category from blocked comparisons for 5 criteria (01, 02, 05, 11, 16), and refrained 
from calculating significance tests for 4 criteria (10, 17, 18, 19). Findings were rather 
mixed (Table 10): First, studies using frequency counts compared to other scoring 
options revealed the highest reliability values for four criteria (03, 04, 06, 12). 
Second, presence ratings showed higher reliability values for five criteria (01, 05, 11, 
15, 16) compared to Likert- or weighting techniques. Third, for three criteria (08, 13, 
14) studies using Likert scales tended to have lower reliability values compared to 
the other two rating categories. However, these blocking analyses ought to be 
interpreted with caution due to potential confounds--which are controlled for in the 
meta-regressions below. 
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Meta-Regression Analyses for Pearson’s r 
Base Rates. Fifteen criteria (01-09, 11-16) were included in these meta-
regression analyses (Table 11). For eleven criteria, higher base rates were linearly 
associated with higher inter-rater reliabilities (indicated by positive B/beta weights). 
Curvilinear associations (B2/beta2 component) were observed for eight criteria. No 
associations were found for criteria 01, 05 and 06. The amount of explained variance 
varied from R2 = .07 (04: attribution of perpetrator’s mental state) to R2 = .36 (11: 
related external associations). The residual model remained significant for all criteria, 
indicating that a large amount of heterogeneity was left unexplained. 
Multiple Meta-Regression Analyses. Simultaneous multiple meta-
regression analyses were conducted for 15 CBCA criteria with research paradigm, 
training, and rating scale (without frequency counts) as predictor variables (Table 
12). Further analyses controlling for base rate (entered first as an additional 
predictor) were also calculated but omitted here because of small overall ks 
(available from the first author). Significant models were obtained for 12 criteria. 
First, research paradigm showed significant positive B weights for nine criteria: 
Quasi-experimental or field studies yielded higher reliabilities than laboratory 
experiments. Second, training intensity was associated with higher reliabilities for 
studies using 5 or 6 compared to 2, 3 or 4 training components for five CBCA 
criteria. Opposite results occurred for criteria 03, 05, and 06. Third, rating scale 
resulted in significant negative B weights for seven criteria. In other words, using 
presence ratings was associated with higher reliability values than using Likert 
scales (exception: 11: related external associations).  Note that many of the beta 
values were rather high for this type of analysis, and that the significant regression 
models explained variance from R2 = .04 (criterion 13) to R2 = .49 (criterion 01). 
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Discussion 
We provided a comprehensive and systematic meta-analysis of the extent to 
which each of the 19 CBCA criteria can be reliably assessed by different evaluators. 
The results are important both for theory, future research, and practice: Inter-rater 
reliability is seen as an essential prerequisite of validity (Anastasi, 1990; Cronbach, 
1990; Steller, 1989), and reliable credibility assessments of alleged victims, 
witnesses, and suspects’ statements are much needed in legal settings and in other 
applications of CBCA research. 
Altogether, the present meta-analysis shows that most CBCA criteria can be 
rated with sufficient to good inter-rater reliability. Besides this overall picture, more 
differentiated findings emerged. First, regardless of the specific reliability index used, 
inter-rater agreement was excellent for some criteria, moderate to good for most 
others, and marginal for a few criteria. Second, the findings varied depending on the 
reliability index being used. Third, heterogeneous results could be partially explained 
with moderator variables. 
Most and Least Reliable CBCA Criteria 
Reliability was almost consistently high for five criteria, namely, reproduction 
of conversation (06), accurately reported details misunderstood (10), raising doubts 
about one’s own testimony (16), self-deprecation (17), and pardoning the perpetrator 
(18).3 One of these criteria, reproduction of conversation, was predicted to have high 
inter-rater agreement because of its straightforward definition--a literal replication of 
utterances of at least one person. The excellent reliability for this and the other four 
criteria may similarly be explained in terms of their relatively straightforward 
definitions. 
Meta-analysis on the inter-rater reliability of CBCA 
 
175 
On the other end of the reliability spectrum, unstructured production (02) and 
superfluous details (09) had low reliabilities (as predicted) regardless of the particular 
coefficient used. The result for unstructured production (overall, the criterion with the 
lowest reliability) replicated Vrij’s (2005, 2008) conclusions. This is in line with our 
expectation that assessing whether a story is told in an unstructured or chaotic way, 
while at the same time still being a logical and coherent account with a clear 
storyline, is very subjective and hence a difficult enterprise (Anson et al., 1993). 
Concerning superfluous details, Anson et al. also concluded that this criterion “has a 
complex and possibly confusing definition” (p. 337), and Roma, Martini, Sabatello, 
Tatarelli, and Feracutti (2011) explained the low reliability of this criterion in terms of 
the difficulty for raters to differentiate between superfluous and unusual details. 
Hence, Roma et al. suggested combining these two criteria (see also Sporer, 2004). 
Comparison of Different Reliability Indices 
As assumed, inter-rater reliability as measured with percentage agreement 
was found to be (very) high. These findings can be attributed to the fact that PCA 
does not take agreement by chance into account (Cohen, 1960; Frick & Semmel, 
1978), leading to an overestimation of actual agreement. This problem is more 
pronounced when the number of rating categories is low (e.g., for dichotomous 
ratings, chance agreement is 50%), as was the case in most studies (see rating 
scales in Table 2). Extremely high PCA values may also be an artefact when base 
rates are very low or very high (Sporer, 2012). We found some evidence for this U-
shaped relationship when plotting average base rates against weighted average 
PCAs (Figure 1). 
In line with our assumption, all other indices showed lower inter-rater 
reliabilities. Weighted meta-analyses across all criteria on Pearson’s r (M  = .70, SD  
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= .10), unweighted meta-analyses on Maxwell’s RE (M  = .62, SD  = .12), and kappa 
or ICC (MMdn = .55, SDMdn = .14) revealed adequate to good--but not high or perfect 
inter-rater reliabilities. As expected, unweighted meta-analyses of Cohen’s kappa (M 
= .45, SD = .08) revealed somewhat lower reliability values than the other indices. 
However, according to Landis and Koch (1977), kappa values ranging from .30 to 
.57 still reflect fair to moderate consistency between evaluators. Yet, for forensic 
applications, higher values are desirable. 
Base rates. With base rates substantially below or above .50, kappa 
generally leads to low reliabilities (Shrout et al., 1987). Indeed, in our data, with low 
(< .30) or high (> .65) base rates, mean kappas tended to have low values indicating 
an inverted U-shaped relationship (Figure 3). A similar pattern was found for 
Pearson’s r (Figure 2). In our meta-regressions on Pearson’s r, eleven (out of 15) 
criteria had either positive linear or curvilinear, quadratic relationships with base 
rates. This is another indication that inter-rater reliability of CBCA criteria (measured 
with PCA, kappa, or Pearson’s r) is not independent of their base rates, which should 
always be considered when interpreting these coefficients. 
Attempts to Account for Heterogeneity 
We found reliability values to be highly heterogeneous for almost all criteria. In 
order to explain this variability, we tested specific predictions concerning how the 
research paradigm, the amount of training received, the rating scale used, and the 
base rates (see above) would be associated with reliability. These predictions were 
tested for Pearson’s r. 
Research paradigm. We argued that because CBCA was designed for 
autobiographical events (like sexual abuse) and because of the increased ecological 
validity of field studies and quasi-experiments, inter-rater reliability would be higher 
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for these paradigms than in laboratory experiments. This hypothesis was strongly 
supported for 15 out of 19 criteria in the blocking analyses, and in 9 of 16 meta-
regression analyses. Presumably, field studies and quasi-experiments yield much 
longer, more detailed but also more variable accounts compared to laboratory 
simulations, which in turn may allow for higher reliability correlations. 
Rater training. We expected that the amount of training would increase the 
raters’ expertise, thus leading to higher inter-rater reliability. In the blocking analyses, 
this hypothesis was supported for ten criteria, with no associations for five criteria, 
and significant associations in the opposite direction emerged for the remaining four. 
However, some of these associations disappeared or even became negative when 
rating scale used and research paradigm were controlled for. It might be the case 
that some criteria are easier to train and apply than others. For example, training 
seemed to be particularly useful with the criteria external associations, logical 
consistency, contextual embedding,  subjective mental state, and spontaneous 
corrections whereas it was negatively associated with quantity of details, 
descriptions of interactions and reproduction of conversation in the meta-
regressions. 
It is possible that the way we measured the intensity of training (number of 
differentiated training components) was not sensitive enough. An alternative 
estimate of training intensity is the duration of training, but this information was 
provided for only 30 studies (and Pearson’s r was not used in all of these studies). 
Somewhat surprisingly, the number of training components did not significantly 
correlate with training duration, rho(30) = .087, p = .647). Apparently, short training 
programs might include all training components (e.g., Dunbar et al., 2012), while 
longer training programs may contain a few components only (e.g., Granhag, 
Meta-analysis on the inter-rater reliability of CBCA 
 
178 
Strömwall, & Landström, 2006). In any case, it is remarkable that for the 30 studies 
reporting training duration, the average length of training was quite extensive (M = 
23.09 hs; SD = 40.07; Mdn = 8.75). If these 30 studies are representative of all the 
ones included, then the length of training may explain why reliability was generally 
rather high. Alternatively, only studies that used extensive training also reported in 
detail on the reliability of individual criteria. 
To our knowledge, only Köhnken (2004) and his students (Höfer, 1995; 
Krause, 1997; Petersen, 1997) systematically examined the impact of training 
intensity, length and type on reliability in a direct manner. They developed an 
extensive three-week training program that included several different components 
(e.g., Köhnken, 2004; see also Gödert et al., 2005, for a shorter version). In one of 
the studies, Petersen (1997) demonstrated that reliabilities for all criteria and 
statements were higher for the most extensively trained group, than for less 
extensively trained groups or the control group. To further investigate the relationship 
between training intensity/duration and inter-rater reliability, research should be 
conducted where the duration and intensity of training are manipulated 
systematically. 
Rating scale. When looking at the definitions of CBCA criteria (Table 1) 
readers may wonder why so many researchers have reduced rating scales to 
presence ratings. For most criteria, the underlying construct to be rated is clearly 
continuous (e.g., quantity of details, description of interactions, superfluous details, 
offense specific elements). Perhaps, this (in our view inappropropriate) reduction of 
information may have come about by the desire to apply PCA as a simple measure 
of agreement. Although simple presence ratings can easily be added up to a 
summary score, the German originators of SVA/CBCA have strongly advised against 
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this (e.g., Steller, 2013). Volbert (2008) summarized this most aptly in the title of a 
review article: "Credibility assessment--more than Criteria-based Content Analysis". 
Whether or not it does or does not make sense to create summary scores in 
laboratory simulation studies, is beyond the scope of this paper (see Sporer, 2012). 
Within the context of forensic SVA, it is clearly not appropriate. 
Research Implications and Forensic Applications 
This meta-analysis demonstrated that inter-rater reliabilities for most CBCA 
criteria were fairly adequate, especially in field studies and quasi-experiments. This 
is important because reliability is a central prerequisite for the validity of any 
assessment procedure. However, these conclusions depend on the type of 
coefficient investigated. Conclusions are not as optimistic when Cohen's kappa was 
used. Because kappa is generally lower for criteria with low or high base rates 
(Shrout et al., 1987), dichotomizing criteria into "present" vs. "absent" may 
exacerbate this problem. 
Although the problems with using PCA as a measure of inter-coder 
agreement have been known for over 50 years (Cohen, 1960; Fleiss et al., 2003; 
Shrout et al., 1987; Uebersax, 1987), its frequent use in the CBCA literature is quite 
disconcerting. Hence, we recommend that PCA should not be used as a single 
indicator of reliability (if at all) but should always be supplemented by Cohen's 
(weighted) kappa (for categorical data), or intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) 
for continuous data. ICCs have the advantage that they take systematic differences 
between coders into account. However, the type of ICC used must be specified 
depending on the design. We also recommend that reliabilities always be reported 
for all criteria individually because they may vary depending on the domain and type 
of stimulus materials (due to respective differences in base rates). 
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Many studies have investigated only portions of the accounts to study inter-
coder reliability. We recommend having all accounts coded by two (or even more) 
raters, which would improve reliability estimates for the study at hand (see 
Rosenthal, 1995). As our data have shown, training coders does pay off at least for 
some criteria, and by increasing reliability, validity may also be increased. With an 
eye on validity, we also recommend more fine-grained differentiations (e.g., 0 to 4 
scales) rather than simple presence ratings which should increase the discriminatory 
power of the respective items. However, using more fine-grained rating scales may 
be more difficult to apply and may require additional training (cf. Köhnken, 2004). 
This might explain why presence ratings tended to result in higher reliabilities than 
rating scales in this review. 
For other forms of reliability, in particular test-retest reliability and internal 
consistency, not enough studies were available for a systematic review. 
Nonetheless, these are important aspects of reliability future research needs to 
address. Space limitations prevent us to report results for other related criteria, or for 
refinements in operationalizations, which some researchers have used to 
supplement the 19 CBCA criteria listed in Table 1 (e.g., Niehaus, 2001). For 
example, reliability of some CBCA criteria has been improved by treating them as a 
scale made up of several items (e.g., Küpper & Sporer, 1997; Sporer, 2004). 
Usually, scale reliabilities are higher than reliabilities of individual items, provided the 
scale has satisfactory internal consistency and positive corrected item-total 
correlations (at least > .20; Cortina, 1993). Reliability can also be improved by using 
more than two raters for all observations, employing the Spearman-Brown formula 
(Anastasi, 1990; Rosenthal, 1995). Unfortunately, most studies have excluded 
offense specific elements as inappropriate when a topic other than sexual abuse was 
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investigated. However, criterion 19 can be creatively adapted as "event-specific 
elements" (which can be operationalized by systematic surveys of experts for a 
specific type of event). 
As noted before, in forensic applications CBCA is never used on its own but 
only as an element of a more comprehensive hypothesis testing strategy known as 
SVA. While SVA expert testimony is common in central Europe within the context of 
inquisitorial legal systems, it is usually not admissible in adversary court systems. 
However, CBCA is now discussed (and trained) as a "credibility assessment tool" 
worldwide (although it was never meant to be used as such in isolation). As a 
research instrument, this procedure has to meet traditional psychometric quality 
standards like objectivity, reliability and validity. 
The extent to which CBCA ratings, along with many other factors, contribute 
to positive or negative evaluations of a witness's credibility by experts is still largely 
unknown. If assessments differ between experts, courts will be ill-served and 
miscarriages of justice may ensue. As recent court cases (BGH, 1999; see Jansen, 
2012; Steller, 2013; Volbert & Steller, 2014) have made clear, a thorough training in 
diagnostic and clinical psychology is necessary as a basis for SVA and CBCA in 
individual cases. We are concerned that through the increased availability of various 
"criteria lists" in publications, in workshops and on the Internet, more and more 
people may feel "qualified" to conduct credibility assessments. Without proper 
training, this is a bad idea. 
Due to the complex nature of credibility assessment, the information 
integration inherent in SVA does not lend itself to simple reliability analyses 
(although some authors have at least addressed this problem; e.g., Gumpert & 
Lindblad, 1999). Only when the subjective nature of these evaluations is appreciated 
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by decision makers can responsible decisions ensue, whether in the courtroom or 
any other lie-truth discrimination setting. 
However, the numerous studies we were able to localize and integrate in this 
report do demonstrate that quite a few criteria of CBCA, the core component of SVA, 
can be assessed reliably. We have also demonstrated how reliability can and should 
be measured for any content-oriented approach and hope that future researchers 
and practitioners will heed to our advice. 
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Footnotes 
1 Originally, a search on both CBCA and Reality Monitoring (see Masip et al., 
2005; Sporer, 2004) studies was performed, because the current authors are 
conducting meta-analyses on both sets of content criteria. This might have led to the 
initially high number of references. 
2 We excluded those studies for which we could not obtain reliability data on 
separate CBCA criteria. Also, a table with reported reliability values of the average 
(e.g., sum score) or a range (i.e., highest and lowest reliability) can be requested 
from the first author. 
3 Although most indices indicated high reliability for Criteria 10, 16 and 18, 
some exceptions occurred: kappa values were only .42 for Criterion 10 and .43 for 
Criterion 16. Also, Criteria 16 (.48) and 18 (.48) revealed somewhat lower median 
weighted kappa/ICC values. 
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Table 1 
Content Criteria for Statement Analysis (adapted from Steller & Köhnken, 1989) 
 
Criterion 
Number Criterion Name and Brief Description 
General Characteristics 
01 Logical structure 
Logical coherence or contextual homogeneity of a statement without logical inconsistencies. 
02 Unstructured production 
The described sequence of events is not reported in a chronological order and contains digressions, but can 
nevertheless be joined together into a logical account. 
03 Quantity of details 
Detailed description of persons, events, environments, or circumstances. 
Specific Contents 
04 Contextual embedding 
The described event is intertwined with other events happening at the time, with daily routines, etc. 
05 Descriptions of interactions 
Report of a chain of actions and reactions between the narrator and the perpetrator. 
06 Reproduction of conversation 
Literal reproduction of a dialogue or utterances of at least one person. 
07 Unexpected complications during the incident 
Description of unexpected difficulties that interrupted the normal progress of the event. 
Peculiarities of Contents 
08 Unusual details 
Description of odd or unexpected, but not impossible, details. 
09 Superfluous details 
Report of details that are irrelevant or do not contribute to the accusation (such as peripheral details). 
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10 Accurately reported details misunderstood 
Accurate descriptions of acts or events that the narrator does not understand (e.g., a child accurately 
describes an ejaculation misrepresenting the semen as urine). 
11 Related external associations 
Description of an event involving the narrator and the alleged perpetrator that is different from the target event 
but is related to it (e.g., sexual comments made by the perpetrator to the presumed victim several days before 
the alleged sexual abuse). 
12 Accounts of subjective mental state 
Descriptions of the narrator’s own emotions or cognitions at the time of the event. 
13 Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state 
Descriptions of emotions, motivations, or cognitions attributed to the perpetrator at the time of the event. 
Motivation-Related Contents 
14 Spontaneous corrections 
The narrator corrects herself or himself or adds more differentiating details. 
15 Admitting lack of memory 
The narrator says s/he does not know or cannot remember. 
16 Raising doubts about one’s own testimony 
The narrator expresses concern that his testimony may look implausible or unbelievable. 
17 Self-deprecation 
The narrator provides self-incriminating or self-accusing details. 
18 Pardoning the perpetrator 
The narrator provides information that exonerates the accused perpetrator, or refrains from incriminating 
him/her further. 
Offense-Specific Elements 
19 Details characteristic of the offense 
The narrator provides correct crime-specific details that are not common knowledge. 
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Table 2 
Report, Study and Rating Characteristics 
 
Report Characteristics 
     
Publication Year  (k = 77)  Range Mdn Mode 
  1991 - 
2013 
2000 1997 
     
Publication Status  (k = 81) a   Number % 
 Journal articles   42 51.85 
 Diploma, Bachelor, or Master 
theses 
  14 17.28 
 Dissertations   11 13.58 
 Conference presentations   5 6.17 
 Unpublished manuscripts   3 3.70 
 Book chapters   2 2.47 
 Manuscripts in press   2 2.47 
 Published research reports   1 1.23 
 Manuscript under review   1 1.23 
     
Language of Report (k = 82)   Number % 
 English   58 70.73 
 German   24 29.27 
      
 
Study Characteristics 
     
Research Paradigm (k = 82)   k % 
 Experiment   44 53.66 
 Quasi-experiment   25 30.49 
 Field study   13 15.85 
     
Design (k = 80)   k % 
 Between-participants   49 61.25 
 Within-participants   31 38.75 
      
Senders  M SD Range 
 Number of senders per study (k = 80) 65.18 48.35 1 – 291 
 Number of female senders per study (k = 
67) 
40.40 35.14 0 – 233 
 Number of male senders per study (k = 67) 24.79 22.75 0 – 104 
 Age (k = 58) 20.29 11.49 5.40 – 71.21 
      
Language of Statements (k = 81) a   k % 
 English   40 49.38 
 German   26 32.10 
 Swedish   5 6.17 
 Italian   4 4.94 
 Dutch   3 3.70 
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 Hebrew   1 1.23 
 Polish   1 1.23 
 Spanish   1 1.23 
      
Mode of Production (k = 79)   k % 
 Spoken   70 88.61 
 Handwritten   7 8.86 
 Typed   2 2.53 
      
Status of the Liar (k = 81)   k % 
 Victim   25 30.86 
 Actor   22 27.16 
 Witness   10 12.35 
 Perpetrator   8 9.88 
 Several roles   16 19.75 
      
Type of Event (k = 82) a   k % 
 Significant life event   30 36.59 
 Participate   13 15.85 
 Sexual abuse   11 13.41 
 Watch video   8 9.76 
 Trivial life event   6 7.32 
 Mock crime   5 6.10 
 Other real crime (not sexual 
abuse) 
  5 6.10 
 Observed staged event   2 2.44 
 Several events   2 2.44 
      
Emotional Valence (k = 82)   k % 
 Negative   57 69.51 
 Neutral   15 18.29 
 Both negative and positive   8 9.76 
 Positive   2 2.44 
      
Motivation of Senders (k = 78) a   k % 
 None   34 43.59 
 Low   27 34.62 
 Medium   4 5.13 
 High   13 16.67 
      
Interview Style (k = 75)   k % 
 Free report only   26 34.67 
 Subsequent semi-structured 
interview 
  28 37.33 
 Subsequent structured interview   17 22.67 
 Cognitive Interview   4 5.33 
      
 
Raters and Rating Process Characteristics 
      
Number of raters per study (k = 81)   k % 
 Two   52 64.20 
 Three   13 16.05 
 Four   7 8.64 
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 Between six and 119   9 11.11 
      
Occupation of raters (k = 54) a   k % 
 Graduate students   22 40.74 
 Undergraduate students   18 33.33 
 Psychologists   8 14.81 
 Several groups   3 5.56 
 Ph.D.   2 3.70 
 Police officers    1 1.85 
      
Training components (k = 81)   k % 
 (1) Background literature   50 61.73 
 (2) Operational definitions (k = 82)   77 93.90 
 (3) Examples (k = 82)   46 56.10 
 (4) Lecture(s)   57 70.37 
   (5a) No practice (0/2) 19 23.46 
   (5b) Practice without discussion/feedback/homework 
(1/2) 
13 16.05 
   (5c) Practice with discussion/feedback/homework (2/2) 49 60.49 
      
Rating scales (k = 82) a   k % 
 Several rating scales   24 29.27 
 0 (absent); 1 (present); 2 (strongly present)  16 19.51 
 Dichotomous   14 17.07 
 Other Likert scale   10 12.20 
 Frequency count  7 8.54 
 0 to 4   5 6.10 
 1 to 7   5 6.10 
 1 to 5   1 1.22 
      
Percentage of statements rated by two or more raters (k = 82) k % 
 100%   60 73.17 
 12.5% to 83.0%   22 26.83 
      
Number of accounts per study after 
adjustment (k = 82) 
M SD Mdn Mode 
54.00 42.84 42.52 40.01 
      
Inter-rater reliability indices reported as the single measure (k 
= 82) 
k % 
 Several   31 37.80 
 One   40 48.78 
    Pearson’s r   17 20.73 
    Percentage agreement (PCA)   7 8.54 
    ICC   7 8.54 
    Cohen’s kappa   6 7.32 
    Maxwell’s RE   2 2.44 
    Spearman’s rho   1 1.22 
    Weighted kappa   0 0.00 
 Range or average reported   11 13.41 
      
Notes. a = The sum of percentages do not add up exactly to 100.00% due to rounding issues.
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Table 3 
Meta-Analyses of Inter-Rater Reliability Measured with Pearson’s r 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Sum score 
k 31 30 35 34 30 32 27 31 29 15 19 33 31 31 31 22 14 13 7 6 
N 1768 1717 1843 1760 1660 1635 1514 1655 1481 926 1026 1677 1675 1319 1319 1007 406 509 176 277 
Min -.29 -.18 -.65 -.07 -.29 .46 -.13 .03 -.28 -.04 -.09 .35 .03 -.13 .02 -.06 -.22 -.06 -.15 .44 
Max 1.00 .92 .99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .98 
runweigh
ted 
.69 .46 .71 .69 .66 .86 .64 .62 .50 .80 .65 .79 .77 .58 .79 .73 .80 .71 .68 .90 
rweighte
d 
.69 .46 .73 .71 .65 .86 .64 .62 .52 .81 .67 .79 .76 .60 .78 .73 .79 .72 .71 .90 
Lowe
r CI 
.49 .37 .62 .59 .55 .79 .51 .49 .42 .60 .47 .72 .67 .50 .67 .56 .59 .15 -.55 .66 
Uppe
r CI 
.82 .55 .82 .80 .73 .90 .75 .73 .62 .92 .80 .85 .83 .69 .85 .84 .89 .93 .98 .97 
SE .16 .06 .10 .11 .08 .10 .10 .10 .07 .22 .15 .09 .10 .07 .11 .15 .19 .37 .64 .33 
Z 5.4 8.5 9.0 8.2 9.8 12.2 7.4 7.3 8.3 5.0 5.4 12.2 10.2 9.3 9.4 6.2 5.5 2.3a 1.2 4.3 
Q 1124 136 567 576 238 449 338 406 155 533 331 327 382 177 394 396 140 776 406 146 
I2 97.3 78.7 94.0 94.3 87.8 93.1 92.3 92.6 81.9 97.4 94.6 90.2 92.1 83.0 92.4 94.7 90.7 98.5 98.5 96.6 
Meta-analysis on the inter-rater reliability of CBCA 
 
213 
tau2 0.69 0.07 0.32 0.35 0.14 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.10 0.68 0.37 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.31 0.43 0.40 1.84 3.78 0.69 
1st 
Qu. 
.27 .23 .51 .34 .44 .69 .32 .29 .37 .04 .27 .58 .53 .32 .60 .14 .30 .15 -.05 .73 
Mdn .51 .35 .68 .56 .53 .83 .49 .48 .48 .46 .48 .72 .64 .58 .74 .61 .64 .33 .35 .91 
3rd 
Qu. 
.69 .61 .81 .84 .74 .89 .71 .75 .62 .87 .74 .84 .81 .75 .84 .74 .87 .70 .73 .97 
IQR .42 .37 .30 .50 .30 .20 .39 .46 .25 .84 .47 .26 .29 .43 .23 .60 .57 .55 .78 .24 
kBase 
rate 
20 19 19 16 18 17 13 17 16 6 10 16 14 15 12 9 5 3 3 4 
MBase 
rate 
.79 .31 .64 .37 .32 .33 .27 .23 .25 .02 .13 .37 .21 .30 .38 .21 .11 .16 .38 .41 
Notes. k = number of hypothesis tests; N = adjusted number of statements that were coded by at least two independent raters; Min = 
Minimum; Max = Maximum; r = Correlation Coefficient (Pearson’s r or Spearman’s r); CI = 95% confidence interval; SE = Standard Error; Z = 
z test; Q = homogeneity test statistic; I2 = measure of heterogeneity; Qu. = Quartile; IQR = Interquartile range; Mdn = Median; values in bold 
indicate significance at p < .001; a = p = .019. 
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Table 4 
Meta-Analyses of Inter-Rater Reliability Measured with Percentage Agreement (PCA) without PCA Values of ! .999 
 1 2* 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11* 12 13 14* 15 16 17 18 19 
Sum 
score
* 
k 25 29 28 23 26 24 24 24 24 16 22 24 21 26 22 14 13 10 6 8 
N 1466 1688 1605 1402 1563 1511 1477 1518 1507 1080 1325 1427 1439 1359 1043 602 595 623 252 574 
Min .33 .30 .24 .27 .18 .21 .25 .33 .20 .28 .37 .26 .27 .16 .11 .16 .34 .58 .39 .32 
Max .98 .94 .99 .94 .98 .95 .98 .96 .96 .99 .97 .95 .95 .92 .97 .98 .98 .95 .88 .90 
PCAunw
eighted 
.74 .67 .67 .65 .71 .72 .72 .68 .66 .85 .75 .70 .75 .68 .65 .78 .72 .75 .66 .75 
PCAweig
hted 
.79 .70 .70 .68 .77 .77 .79 .73 .71 .93 .83 .73 .81 .71 .70 .90 .86 .80 .75 .76 
Lower 
CI 
.68 .59 .57 .55 .66 .66 .68 .61 .59 .85 .73 .60 .70 .59 .57 .78 .74 .65 .50 .55 
Upper 
CI 
.90 .81 .83 .81 .88 .88 .89 .85 .84 1.00 .93 .85 .91 .84 .84 1.01 .99 .96 .99 .97 
SE .06 .06 .07 .07 .05 .06 .05 .06 .06 .04 .05 .06 .05 .06 .07 .06 .06 .08 .13 .11 
Z 14.1 12.5 10.7 10.1 14.0 13.6 14.8 12.1 11.2 21.4 16.2 11.70 15.0 11.5 10.0 15.5 13.4 10.0 6.0 7.1 
Q 390 305 752 354 374 325 212 312 448 71.5 104 309 175 323 395 84 73 70 25 158 
I2 93.8 90.8 96.4 94.0 93.3 92.9 89.2 92.6 94.9 79.0 79.9 92.6 88.6 92.3 94.7 84.4 83.5 87.2 79.6 95.6 
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tau2 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.04 
1st Qu. .63 .55 .50 .51 .56 .61 .61 .55 .57 .88 .61 .56 .67 .62 .53 .75 .48 .63 .50 .74 
Mdn .75 .68 .70 .67 .79 .80 .76 .73 .68 .94 .80 .78 .83 .74 .68 .90 .80 .75 .68 .79 
3rd Qu. .88 .79 .84 .81 .88 .89 .83 .85 .81 .95 .90 .82 .91 .83 .84 .95 .94 .86 .83 .88 
IQR .26 .24 .34 .30 .32 .27 .22 .30 .24 .07 .28 .26 .24 .21 .32 .20 .46 .23 .33 .17 
kBase rate 18 21 19 15 19 17 16 17 18 10 15 17 17 17 13 9 7 4 4 7 
MBase 
rate 
.76 .36 .64 .45 .33 .32 .22 .20 .26 .04 .20 .45 .12 .30 .35 .19 .11 .46 .73 .40 
Notes. k = number of hypothesis tests; N = adjusted number of statements that were coded by at least two independent raters; Min = 
Minimum; Max = Maximum; PCA = Percentage Agreement; CI = 95% confidence interval; SE =Standard Error; Z = Z-test; Q = homogeneity 
test statistic; I2 = measure of heterogeneity; Qu. = Quartile; IQR = Interquartile Range; Mdn = Median; values in bold indicate significance at 
p < .001; * = No values of .999 occurred for this criterion.  
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Table 5 
Unweighted Meta-Analyses of Inter-Rater Reliability Measured with Cohen’s Kappa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Sum 
score 
k 22 20 22 20 23 21 18 21 20 15 19 21 20 21 15 10 12 9 8 6 
N 1420 1410 1422 1386 1508 1450 1284 1417 1388 1048 1262 1334 1356 1188 778 461 612 492 357 445 
Min -.03 -.15 .00 -.07 -.08 .03 .00 -.16 .03 -.07 -.05 .07 .04 -.01 .16 -.03 -.02 -.09 -.03 .16 
Max 1.00 .95 .95 1.00 .97 .97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .70 .80 
kappaunw
eighted 
.35 .32 .45 .45 .45 .57 .45 .45 .44 .42 .41 .52 .51 .39 .54 .43 .57 .51 .30 .54 
1st Q. .01 .07 .24 .27 .17 .40 .27 .17 .15 .02 .10 .25 .25 .17 .36 .01 .33 .22 .08 .30 
Mdn .38 .32 .50 .43 .41 .61 .39 .52 .48 .47 .27 .58 .55 .47 .50 .32 .61 .56 .23 .65 
3rd Q. .50 .46 .61 .67 .73 .74 .74 .68 .63 .80 .71 .71 .72 .55 .75 .88 .90 .79 .53 .75 
IQR .49 .39 .37 .40 .56 .34 .47 .51 .48 .79 .61 .46 .47 .38 .39 .87 .57 .57 .44 .45 
kBase rate 19 16 18 16 18 16 13 16 15 10 14 17 15 15 10 7 6 4 6 4 
MBase rate .77 .47 .67 .50 .35 .28 .23 .19 .27 .04 .20 .40 .18 .30 .36 .22 .09 .45 .50 .35 
SDBase 
rate 
.19 .25 .18 .21 .21 .17 .16 .14 .19 .04 .17 .21 .23 .24 .20 .28 .06 .43 .38 .11 
Notes. k = number of hypothesis tests; N = adjusted number of statements that were coded by at least two independent raters; Min = 
Minimum; Max = Maximum; Mdn = Median; Qu. = Quartile; IQR = Interquartile Range; M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 6 
Unweighted Meta-Analyses of Inter-Rater Reliability Measured with Weighted Kappa and ICC 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Sum 
score 
ktotal 10 10 13 10 10 11 9 9 10 5 10 10 9 11 9 6 6 4 2 2 
kweighted kappa 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 3 1 0 
kICC 6 6 9 6 6 7 5 5 6 3 6 6 6 7 5 4 2 1 1 2 
N 573 573 880 758 573 811 533 533 573 397 573 573 533 651 373 210 240 185 24 123 
Min -.03 .17 .37 .04 .08 .32 .02 .20 .15 -.02 -.03 .40 .50 -.10 .26 -.02 .00 .03 -.01 .91 
Max .77 .91 .88 .92 1.00 1.00 .75 1.00 .90 1.00 .95 .96 .92 .89 .88 1.00 1.00 1.00 .66 .91 
1st Quartile .01 .29 .53 .32 .31 .46 .38 .32 .29 .11 .00 .54 .53 .33 .42 .06 .46 .22 a a 
Mdn .18 .55 .75 .49 .53 .68 .45 .67 .46 .67 .55 .62 .58 .59 .60 .48 .79 .46 a a 
3rd Quartile .36 .76 .77 .67 .77 .87 .65 .88 .73 .92 .75 .88 .64 .75 .82 .73 .92 .72 a a 
Interquartile 
Range 
.35 .47 .24 .36 .47 .41 .27 .56 .44 .81 .75 .34 .11 .42 .40 .67 .46 .51 a a 
kBase rate 6 6 8 7 5 6 4 4 4 3 5 5 4 6 4 3 3 1 1 2 
MBase rate .71 .30 .60 .28 .26 .29 .15 .13 .30 .02 .07 .32 .10 .39 .34 .10 .06 .09 .28 .25 
SDBase rate .17 .24 .09 .17 .18 .23 .18 .08 .14 .01 .06 .10 .05 .38 .28 .10 .05 a a .01 
Notes. k = number of hypothesis tests; N = adjusted number of statements that were coded by at least two independent raters; Min = 
Minimum; Max = Maximum; Mdn = Median; a  = Value is not meaningful due to small k. 
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Table 7 
Unweighted Meta-Analyses of Inter-Rater Reliability Measured with Maxwell’s Random Error 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Sum 
score 
k 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 12 12 13 13 11 7 7 6 6 6 5 
N 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 926 1022 942 942 1022 1022 742 335 335 295 295 295 381 
Min .57 .06 .14 .05 .07 .38 -.01 .35 .18 .03 .00 .12 .03 .24 .22 .57 .37 .67 -.22 .21 
Max .95 .84 .90 .93 .92 1.00 .92 .93 .94 1.00 .84 .90 .93 .83 .73 1.00 .88 1.00 1.00 .74 
1st 
Quartile 
.66 .30 .28 .48 .20 .52 .56 .40 .37 .80 .51 .46 .50 .39 .35 .72 .73 .83 .61 .49 
Mdn .77 .40 .40 .67 .62 .73 .67 .49 .52 .91 .59 .61 .64 .50 .53 .91 .81 .85 .73 .51 
3rd 
Quartile 
.82 .76 .58 .75 .69 .83 .79 .64 .75 .95 .76 .65 .83 .76 .54 .95 .88 .88 .81 .73 
IQR .16 .46 .30 .27 .49 .31 .23 .24 .38 .16 .25 .19 .33 .36 .19 .24 .15 .05 .21 .24 
kBase rate 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 9 9 10 10 11 4 4 3 3 3 4 
MBase rate .74 .43 .65 .58 .36 34 .27 .20 .28 .06 .25 .35 .12 .31 .45 .01 .08 .35 .68 .42 
SDBase rate .21 .30 .18 .29 .21 .19 .18 .16 .23 .09 .17 .18 .05 .23 .14 .01 .06 .51 .27 .16 
Notes. k = number of hypothesis tests; N = adjusted number of statements that were coded by at least two independent raters; Min = 
Minimum; Max = Maximum; IQR = Interquartile Range; M = Mean (Maxwell’s RE); Mdn = Median. 
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Table 8 
Results for Moderator-Analyses for Research Paradigm as a Predictor of Pearson's r 
Research 
Paradigm  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Laboratory 
Experiment 
k1 25 23 26 24 22 21 18 22 19 11 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .55 
[.51;.58] 
.40 
[.36;.45] 
.69 
[.66;.72] 
.58 
[.54;.61] 
.61 
[.57;.64] 
.76 
[.74;.78] 
.59 
[.55;.63] 
.49 
[.45;.53] 
.45 
[.40;.50] 
.34 
[.27;.40] 
Field- and 
Quasi-
Experiment 
k2 6 7 9 10 8 11 9 9 10 4 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .67 
[.59;.73] 
.44 
[.32;.55] 
.79 
[.74;.83] 
.84 
[.80;.87] 
.60 
[.51;.68] 
.93 
[.91;.94] 
.73 
[.66;.78] 
.68 
[.60;.75] 
.55 
[.46;.63] 
.93 
[.90;.95] 
Qb  7.47** 0.39 12.10*** 67.86*** 0.03 85.71*** 11.72*** 15.59*** 3.64* 173.96*** 
 (Table 8 continues) 
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 Table 8 continued 
Research 
Paradigm  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Laboratory 
Experiment 
k1 13 23 21 22 22 18 8 8 5 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .35 
[.29;.41] 
.66 
[.63;.69] 
.60 
[.57;.64] 
.55 
[.50;.59] 
.70 
[.67;.73] 
.56 
[.52;.61] 
.62 
[.54;.70] 
.79 
[.75;.83] 
.95 
[.93;.97] 
Field- and 
Quasi-
Experiment 
k2 6 10 10 9 9 4 6 5 2 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .78 
[.72;.82] 
.85 
[.82;.88] 
.77 
[.72;.82] 
.71 
[.64;.76] 
.80 
[.75;.84] 
.72 
[.58;.82] 
.82 
[.76;.87] 
.66 
[.56;.74] 
.48 
[.06;.75] 
Qb  75.01*** 48.24*** 22.28*** 13.79*** 10.12** 4.56* 16.67*** 8.62** # 
Notes. Moderator analyses were not computed with subgroup ks < 3. k = number of studies in each group; r = weighted 
average effect size (Pearson’s r); Qb= homogeneity test statistic: variability between group means explained by the  
categorical variable; # = moderator analysis not computed. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
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Table 9 
Results for Moderator-Analyses for Training Intensity as a Predictor of Pearson's r 
Number of 
Training 
Components 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2-4 
components 
k1 9 7 10 11 9 11 7 9 10 4 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .38 
[.29;.47] 
.41 
[.31;.50] 
.80 
[.76;.83] 
.45 
[.37;.53] 
.68 
[.61;.73] 
.80 
[.76;.83] 
.57 
[.48;.64] 
.43 
[.34;.52] 
.45 
[.36;.53] 
.28 
[.15;.40] 
5-6 
components 
k2 22 23 25 23 21 21 20 22 19 11 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .61 
[.57;.64] 
.41 
[.36;.45] 
.68 
[.65;.71] 
.68 
[.65;.71] 
.59 
[.55;.62] 
.81 
[.79;.83] 
.63 
[.59;.66] 
.55 
[.50;.58] 
.48 
[.43;.52] 
.54 
[.49;.59] 
Qb  25.13*** 0.01 20.32*** 33.03*** 6.04* 0.13 1.98 5.73* 0.35 16.29*** 
 (Table 9 continues) 
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 Table 9 continued 
Number of 
Training 
Components 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
2-4 
components 
k1 5 11 8 9 8 9 7 6 3 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .06               
[-.06;.19] 
.61 
[.54;.68] 
.54 
[.45;.61] 
.38 
[.29;.47] 
.83 
[.77;.88] 
.38 
[.29;.47] 
.79 
[.66;.87] 
.99 
[.98;.99] 
-.12        
[-
.67;.52] 
5-6 
components 
k2 14 22 23 22 23 22 7 7 4 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .58 
[.53;.63] 
.72 
[.70;.75] 
.66 
[.62;.69] 
.61 
[.57;.64] 
.71 
[.68;.74] 
.61 
[.57;.64] 
.71 
[.65;.76] 
.41 
[.32;.50] 
.95 
[.93;.96] 
Qb  66.50*** 10.74** 8.24*** 25.13*** 11.14*** 25.13*** 1.46 399.79*** 27.99*** 
Notes. Moderator analyses were not computed with subgroup ks < 3. k = number of studies in each group; r = weighted 
average effect size (Pearson’s r); Qb= homogeneity test statistic: variability between group means explained by the  
categorical variable. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. 
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Table 10 
Results for Moderator-Analyses for Rating Scale as a Predictor of Pearson's r 
Rating Scale  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Presence k1 12 12 11 8 10 8 4 7 7 3 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .66 
[.61;.70] 
.45 
[.38;.51] 
.55 
[.49;.61] 
.62 
[.56;.67] 
.71 
[.67;.75] 
.80 
[.77;.83] 
.63 
[.57;.69] 
.61 
[.55;.66] 
.47 
[.40;.53] 
.64 
[.56;.71] 
Likert or 
weighting 
k2 18 17 19 20 17 18 19 18 18 10 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .49 
[.44;.54] 
.37 
[.31;.43] 
.68 
[.65;.72] 
.56 
[.51;.61] 
.51 
[.46;.56] 
.73 
[.69;.76] 
.61 
[.56;.65] 
.45 
[.39;.50] 
.46 
[.40;.51] 
.23 
[.15;.31] 
Frequency 
counts 
k3   5 6  6 4 6 4 2 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh]   .90 
[.88;.92] 
.80 
[.76;.84] 
 .93 
[.91;.94] 
.63 
[.56;.71] 
.56 
[.47;.63] 
.53 
[.42;.62] 
.94 
[.91;.96] 
Qb  24.07*** 3.22 146.66*** 47.59*** 35.83*** 97.76*** 0.86 17.46** 1.25 # 
 (Table 10 continues) 
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Table 10 continued 
Rating Scale  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Presence k1 5 8 9 8 8 7 1 1 1 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .51 
[.43;.59] 
.68 
[.63;.73] 
.65 
[.60;.69] 
.63 
[.57;.70] 
.86 
[.83;.88] 
.81 
[.76;.84] 
.78 
[.61;.88] 
1.00 
[1.00;1.00
] 
.76 
[.45;.91] 
Likert or 
weighting 
k2 11 17 17 18 18 13 11 10 6 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh] .38 
[.29;.46] 
.68 
[.64;.72] 
.59 
[.54;.63] 
.53 
[.47;.58] 
.58 
[.52;.62] 
.37 
[.29;.44] 
.63 
[.54;.71] 
.31 
[20;.41] 
.94 
[.92;.96] 
Frequency 
counts 
k3  7 5 5 5  2 2 0 
 r [CIlow;CIhigh]  .78 
[.73;.82] 
.73 
[.67;.78] 
.65 
[.57;.71] 
.80 
[.76;.84] 
 .81 
[.74;.86] 
.67 
[.56;.75] 
 
Qb  5.17** 10.93** 12.29** 8.34* 99.71*** 100.16*** # # # 
Notes. Frequency counts were not included in moderator analyses. Moderator analyses were not computed with subgroup  
ks < 3. k = number of studies in each group; r = weighted average effect size (Pearson’s r); Qb= homogeneity test statistic: 
variability between group means explained by the categorical variable; # = moderator analysis not computed. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. 
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Table 11 
Results for Meta-Regressions with Base Rate and Squared Base Rates (as Indicators of Linear and Curvilinear 
Relationships) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
k 20 19 19 16 18 17 13 17 16 
QModel 1.38 16.59*** 28.04*** 14.79*** 2.78 2.49 10.33** 31.75*** 14.34*** 
QResidual 278.89*** 58.82*** 69.84*** 207.87*** 118.64*** 251.16*** 93.52*** 181.43*** 38.51*** 
BBase Rate  0.27 0.64*** 1.71*** 0.64*** 0.24 0.21 0.38* 1.07*** 0.19 
betaBase 
Rate 
.07 .50*** .52*** .24*** -.16 .06 .25* .43*** .10 
BBase Rate2 0.19 1.45* 0.73 1.85* 0.07 0.88 0.62 4.57*** 5.95*** 
betaBase 
Rate
2 
.01 .29* .04 .13* .01 .06 .09 .53*** .53*** 
R2 .00 .22 .29 .07 .02 .01 .10 .15 .27 
R295% CI [-.02; .02] [-.06; .50] [-.01; .58] [-.13; .27] [-.09; .13] [-.07; .09] [-.14; .34] [-.11; .41] [-.04; .58] 
 (Table 11 continues)
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Table 11 continued 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 
k 10 16 14 15 12 9 
QModel 80.45*** 51.03*** 6.39* 5.47 19.30*** 21.85*** 
QResidual 144.70*** 169.20*** 139.97*** 58.19*** 152.76*** 123.20*** 
BBase Rate  4.14*** 1.69*** 1.01* 0.54* 0.42* 1.66*** 
betaBase Rate .57*** .66*** .65* .42* .15* .36*** 
BBase Rate2 27.49*** 6.43*** 1.21 1.25 3.21*** 4.65* 
betaBase Rate2 .47*** .46*** .52 .31 .27*** .17* 
R2 .36 .23 .04 .09 .11 .15 
R295% CI [.01; .71] [-.07; .53] [-.12; .20] [-.13; .31] [-.15; .37] [-.16; .46] 
Notes. QM = homogeneity test statistic for the regression model: variability between  
group means explained by the regression model; QR = homogeneity test statistic for  
the residual: unexplained variability between group means expected by chance;  
B = unstandardized regression coefficient; beta = standardized regression weights;  
R2 = determination coefficient: amount of variability explained by predictor variable(s);  
meta-regression for Criteria 10, 17, 18, and 19 is not meaningful due to small k. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
Meta-analysis on the inter-rater reliability of CBCA 
 
227 
Table 12 
Results for Multiple Meta-Regression for Rating Scale, Research Paradigm, and Training Intensity as Predictors of Pearson's r 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
k 30 29 30 28 27 26 23 25 25 
QModel 54.71*** 4.11 59.16*** 80.15*** 50.68*** 65.73*** 2.48 40.55*** 1.44 
QResidual 1064.99*** 131.34*** 315.22*** 365.30*** 183.99*** 247.48*** 284.71*** 316.09*** 149.94*** 
BParadigm 
 
0.26*** 0.07 0.38*** 0.65*** -0.01 0.62*** 0.07 0.50*** 0.09 
betaParadigm 
(1=Laboratory; 
2=Field) 
.11*** .07 .29*** .36*** -.01 .40*** .05 .25*** .08 
BTraining 
 
0.26*** -0.04 -0.26*** 0.29*** -0.25*** -0.18** 0.09 0.11 0.04 
betaTraining 
(1=short; 2=long) 
.13*** -.05 -.20*** .22*** -.26*** -.16** .07 .09 .04 
BRating Scale  
 
-0.23*** -0.10 0.11 -0.05 -0.38*** -0.24*** -0.02 -0.28*** -0.01 
betaRating Scale  
(1=Presence; 2 = 
Likert) 
-.14*** -.16 .10 -.04 -.45*** -.24*** -.02 -.26*** -.02 
R2 0.49 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.11 0.01 
R295% CI [.27; .71] [-.08; .14] [-.05; .37] [-.04; .40] [-.02; .46] [-.03; .45] [-.06; .08] [-.09; .31] [-.06; .08] 
 (Table 12 continues)
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Table 12 continued 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 
k 16 26 26 26 26 20 
QModel 74.55*** 23.43*** 15.00** 10.68** 96.04*** 122.09*** 
QResidual 163.05*** 241.78*** 322.83*** 124.08*** 279.30*** 271.63*** 
BParadigm 
 
0.20* 0.36*** 0.25** .12 0.17 0.61*** 
betaParadigm 
(1=Laboratory; 
2=Field) 
.14* .25*** .16** .12 .10 .25*** 
BTraining 
 
0.75*** 0.15* 0.12 0.19* -0.16 0.03 
betaTraining 
(1=short; 2=long) 
.62*** .15* .10 .18* -.09 .01 
BRating Scale  
 
0.25** 0.00 -0.08 -0.19** -0.61*** -0.83*** 
betaRating Scale  
(1=Presence; 2 = 
Likert) 
.22** .00 -.08 -.24** -.47*** -.57*** 
R2 0.32 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.26 0.31 
R295% CI  [.03; .61] [-.09; .27] [-.09; .16] [-.09; .25] [.01; .51] [.04; .58] 
Notes. QM= homogeneity test statistic for the regression model: variability between group means  
explained by the regression model; QR = homogeneity test statistic for the residual: unexplained  
variability between group means expected by chance; B = unstandardized regression coefficient;  
beta = standardized regression weights; R2 = determination coefficient: amount of variability explained  
by predictor variable(s); meta-regression for Criteria 10, 17, 18, and 19 is not meaningful due to small k. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Base rates plotted against weighted average percentage agreement for 19 CBCA criteria. 
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Figure 2. Base rates plotted against weighted average Pearson r for 19 CBCA criteria. 
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Figure 3. Base rates plotted against weighted average kappa for 19 CBCA criteria. 
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Appendix A 
Coding Decisions for Study and Sender Characteristics 
Authors Source Paradigm Design 
Lang
uage Mode 
Nacc
. 
Nfe
male 
Nmal
e 
Ntota
l 
M 
Age 
Liars' 
Status 
Event 
Type 
Val-
ence 
Moti-
vation 
Intervie
w 
Akehurst, Köhnken, & 
Höfer (2001) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 na na 66 na actor part. neutral none 
semi-
struct. 
Akehurst, Manton, & 
Quandte (2011) journal field betw. E spoken 1 26 5 31 10.87 victim sex. abuse neg. high 
semi-
struct. 
Anson, Golding, & Gully 
(1993) journal field betw. E spoken 1 13 10 23 8.00 victim sex. abuse neg. high na 
Bensi, Gambetti, Nori, 
& Giusberti (2009) journal exp. betw. I spoken 1 19 21 40 26.52 witness 
watch 
video neg. low 
free 
report 
Blandón-Gitlin, Pezdek, 
Lindsay, & Hagen 
(2009; Exp. 2) 
journal quasi within E spoken 2 37 14 51 19.20 actor part. neutral none free report 
Blandón-Gitlin, Pezdek, 
Rogers, Brodie (2005) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 43 51 94 10.50 actor part. neutral none struct. 
Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij 
(2014) journal quasi within D written 2 36 28 64 21.09 
wit./act.
/vic./p. sign. LE neg. low 
free 
report 
Boychuk (1991) Diss. field betw. E spoken 1 60 15 75 na victim sex. abuse neg. high semi-struct. 
Bradford (2006) Diss. exp. betw. E spoken 1 16 4 20 19.90 actor trivial LE neg. none free report 
Buck, Warren, Betman, 
& Brigham (2002) journal field betw. E spoken 1 80 24 104 6.45 victim sex. abuse neg. high 
semi-
struct. 
Caso, Vrij, Mann, & De 
Leo (2006) journal exp. within I spoken 2 na na 64 na actor part. neutral none struct. 
Chang (2008) Diss. field betw. E written 1 31 38 69 na na crime neg. high free report 
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Connolly & Lavoie 
(2009) 
ms. 
subm. exp. betw. E spoken 1 22 18 40 7.43 actor part. neutral low 
semi-
struct. 
Craig, Scheibe, Raskin, 
Kircher, & Dodd (1999) journal field betw. E spoken 1 37 11 48 8.90 victim sex. abuse neg. high struct. 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 
1) Diss. exp. within E spoken 4 na na 81 na actor trivial LE 
neg./ 
pos. low struct. 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 
2) Diss. exp. within E spoken 2 na na 126 na actor trivial LE neutral low 
semi-
struct. 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 
3) Diss. field betw. E spoken 1 na na 22 na perpetr. crime neg. high na 
Dukala, Sporer & 
Polczyk (in prep.) 
unpubl. 
ms. exp. betw. P spoken 1 70 10 80 71.21 witness 
watch 
video neg. low 
struct. & 
CI 
Dunbar, Harvell, 
Jensen, Burgoon, & 
Kelley (2012; Exp.1) 
present
. exp. within E spoken 2 90 104 194 28.51 actor 
sex. ab./ 
sign. LE 
neg./ 
pos. med. struct. 
Dunbar, Harvell, 
Jensen, Burgoon, & 
Kelley (2012; Exp.2) 
present
. exp. betw. E spoken 1 52 32 84 22.76 perpetr. part. neg. med. struct. 
Eggers (2002) Thesis exp. betw. G spoken 1 34 26 60 na wit./ vic./p. crime neg. na 
semi-
struct. 
Gödert, Gamer, Rill, & 
Vossel (2005) journal exp. betw. G spoken 1 68 0 68 26.00 perpetr. 
mock 
crime neg. low 
semi-
struct. 
Granhag & Strömwall 
(2002) journal exp. betw. S spoken 1 14 10 24 na witness 
observe 
event neg. low 
free 
report 
Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Landström (2006) journal exp. betw. S spoken 1 na na 38 12.40 actor part. neutral na CI 
Hänert (2007) Diss. exp. betw. G spoken 1 31 43 74 5.40 witness observe event neutral none struct. 
Heinze (1996) & 
Horstmann (1996) Thesis exp. within G spoken 2 22 20 42 14.11 victim sign. LE neg. none 
semi-
struct. 
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Herrmann & Jena 
(1995; Sender 1) Thesis quasi within G spoken 30 0 1 1 13.00 
wit./act. 
/vic. sign. LE 
neg./ 
pos. none 
semi-
struct. 
Herrmann & Jena 
(1995; Sender 2) Thesis quasi within G spoken 30 1 0 1 28.00 
wit./act. 
/vic. sign. LE 
neg./ 
pos. none 
semi-
struct. 
Hettler (2005) & Maier 
(2007) Thesis quasi betw. G spoken 1 14 26 40 27.75 wit./act. sign. LE neg. none 
semi-
struct. 
Höfer (1995) Diss. exp. within G spoken 2 27 29 56 28.11 witness watch video neg. none 
free 
report 
Honts & Devitt (1993) report quasi within E spoken 2 13 13 26 na actor trivial LE neg. med. semi-struct. 
Horowitz, Lamb, Esplin, 
Boychuk, Krispin, & 
Reiter-Lavery (1997) 
journal field betw. E spoken 1 79 21 100 8.58 victim sex. abuse neg. high semi-struct. 
Janka (2003) Thesis quasi within G na 4 8 6 14 na wit./vic. sign. LE neg. low semi-struct. 
Joffe (1992; 2nd grade 
children) Diss. exp. betw. E spoken 1 23 20 43 na actor part. neutral none 
semi-
struct. 
Joffe (1992; 4th grade 
children) Diss. exp. betw. E spoken 1 27 23 50 na actor part. neutral none 
semi-
struct. 
Krahe & Kundrotas 
(1992) journal field betw. G spoken 1 30 0 30 na victim sex. abuse neg. high na 
Krahe, Reimer, & 
Scheinberger (1995) 
present
. field betw. G spoken 1 30 0 30 na victim sex. abuse neg. high na 
Lamb, Sternberg, 
Esplin, Hershkowitz, 
Orbach, & Hovav 
(1997b) 
journal field betw. H spoken 1 70 28 98 8.72 victim sex. abuse neg. high na 
Lamers-Winkelmann, 
Buffing, & van der 
Zanden (1992) 
present
. field betw. D spoken 1 75 28 103 5.90 victim sex. abuse neg. high na 
Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher 
(2013; Exp. 1) 
online 
first quasi betw. E spoken 1 14 26 40 35.61 victim trivial LE neg. none 
free 
report 
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Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham, & Fisher 
(2013; Exp. 2) 
online 
first quasi betw. E spoken 1 61 22 83 25.31 victim trivial LE neg. none 
free 
report 
Lee, Klaver, & Hart 
(2008) journal exp. within E spoken 2 0 45 45 32.91 perpetr. crime neg. none 
free 
report 
Manzanero, Recio, 
Alemany, Vallet, 
Aróztegui, & Sporer 
(2014) 
unpubl. 
ms. quasi betw. Sp. spoken 1 13 16 29 32.17 victim sign. LE neg. low struct. 
Mazzoni & Ambrosio 
(2002) na exp. within I spoken 2 na na 30 7.00 victim sign. LE neg. none 
semi-
struct. 
Merckelbach (2004; 
Exp.2) journal quasi within na written 2 38 0 38 19.50 victim sign. LE neg. none 
free 
report 
Metzger (1996) Thesis exp. betw. E spoken 1 na na 66 na actor part. neutral none struct. 
Naumann (2005) Thesis quasi betw. G spoken 1 10 0 10 26.30 actor sign. LE neg./ pos. low 
semi-
struct. 
Niehaus (2001) Diss. quasi betw. G spoken 1 41 39 80 8.75 victim sign. LE neg. low struct. 
Peace & Porter (2011) journal quasi within E written 2 233 58 291 19.64 victim sign. LE neg. low 
free 
report 
Petersen (1997; 
Seminar Group) Thesis exp. na G na na na na na na victim sign. LE neg. na 
free 
report 
Petersen (1997; 
Training Group) Thesis exp. na G na na na na na na victim sign. LE neg. na 
free 
report 
Porter, Peace, & 
Emmett (2007) journal exp. within E written 2 94 32 126 19.86 victim sign. LE neg. none 
free 
report 
Porter & Yuille (1996) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 44 16 60 na perpetr. mock crime neg. low 
semi-
struct. 
Porter, Yuille, & 
Lehman (1999) journal exp. within E spoken 2 na na 75 19.20 victim sign. LE neg. low struct. 
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Roma, Martini, 
Sabatello, Tatrelli, & 
Ferracuti (2011) 
journal field betw. I spoken 1 86 23 109 8.58 victim sex. abuse neg. high semi-struct. 
Ruby & Brigham (1998; 
Black speakers) journal quasi within E spoken 2 3 3 6 na 
wit./act.
/vic./p. sign. LE neg. none 
free 
report 
Ruby & Brigham (1998; 
White speakers) journal quasi within E spoken 2 3 3 6 na 
wit./act.
/vic./p. sign. LE neg. none 
free 
report 
Rutta (2001) Thesis exp. within G typed 2 na na 16 na wit./act. /vic./p. sign. LE neg. low 
semi-
struct. 
Saacke (1995) Thesis quasi within G spoken 1 47 41 88 8.50 wit./act. /vic. sign. LE neg. low 
semi-
struct. 
Sallmon & Volbert 
(2013) 
present
. quasi betw. G spoken 1 36 33 69 25.80 act./vic. sign. LE neg. low 
free 
report 
Santtila, Roppola, 
Runtti, & Niemi (2000) journal quasi within S spoken 2 35 33 68 10.50 victim sign. LE neg. none 
semi-
struct. 
Saykaly, Talwar, 
Lindsay, Bala, & Lee 
(2013) 
journal exp. within E spoken 2 38 40 78 7.58 actor part. pos. none struct. 
Scheinberger (1993) Thesis quasi betw. G spoken 1 30 0 30 30.00 actor sign. LE pos. low free report 
Schellemann-
Offermanns & 
Merckelbach (2010) 
journal quasi within D typed 2 30 30 60 na victim sign. LE neg. none free report 
Sporer (1997a) journal exp. betw. G spoken 1 40 40 80 25.00 actor sign. LE neutral none free report 
Sporer (1997b) chapter exp. betw. G written 1 100 100 200 21.00 actor sign. LE 
neg./ 
pos. none 
free 
report 
Sporer & Bursch (2003) unpubl. ms. exp. betw. G written 2 
10
0 100 200 21.00 actor sign. LE 
neg./ 
pos. none 
free 
report 
Steller, Wellershaus, & 
Wolf (1992) journal quasi within G spoken 2 47 41 88 8.50 
wit./act. 
/vic. sign. LE neg. low 
semi-
struct. 
Meta-analysis on the inter-rater reliability of CBCA 
 
237 
Strömwall, Bengtsson, 
Leander, & Granhag 
(2004) 
journal exp. betw. S spoken 1 na na 41 11.85 actor part. neutral none CI 
Volbert & Lau  (2013; 
Exp.2) journal quasi betw. G spoken 1 36 0 36 46.75 actor sign. LE 
neg./ 
pos. none struct. 
Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, 
& Bull (2002) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 na na 130 14.09 wit./act. part. neutral low struct. 
Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, 
& Bull (2004) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 na na 91 na wit./act. 
observe 
event 
/part. 
neutral low free report 
Vrij, Edward, & Bull 
(2001) journal exp. within E spoken 2 76 10 86 25.32 witness 
watch 
video neg. low struct. 
Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & 
Bull (2000) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 53 20 73 28.89 witness 
watch 
video neg. low struct. 
Vrij & Heaven (1999) journal exp. within E spoken 2 16 24 40 23.00 witness watch video neg. none struct. 
Vrij, Kneller, & Mann 
(2000) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 22 8 30 26.30 witness 
watch 
video neg. none 
free 
report 
Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, 
Milne, & Bull (2008) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 40 40 80 20.88 perpetr. 
mock 
crime neg. low 
free 
report 
Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & 
Fisher (2007) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 50 70 120 22.07 perpetr. 
mock 
crime neg. med. na 
Wehner (2006) chapter exp. betw. G spoken 1 30 26 56 24.60 act./p. mock crime neg. low CI 
Willén & Strömwall 
(2012) journal quasi within S spoken 2 9 21 30 34.20 perpetr. crime neg. none 
semi-
struct. 
Wrege (2004) Thesis quasi within G spoken 2 10 6 16 27.00 wit./act. /vic. sign. LE neg. low 
semi-
struct. 
Zaparniuk, Yuille, & 
Taylor (1995) journal exp. betw. E spoken 1 24 16 40 19.80 witness 
watch 
video neg. none 
semi-
struct. 
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Notes. Exp. = Experiment; journal = article published in journal; Diss. = Dissertation; ms. subm. = manuscript submitted for 
review; present. = paper or poster presented at conference, or summary of presented paper in edited conference proceedings; 
unpubl. ms. = unpublished manuscript; report = published research report; online first = online first version of to be printed 
journal article; chapter = book chapter; quasi = quasi-experiment; betw. = between-participants design (lie or truth); within = 
within-participants design (lie and truth); E = English, G = German, D = Dutch, H = Hebrew, I = Italian, P = Polish, S = Swedish; 
Sp = Spanish; na = not available; written = handwritten; Nacc. = number of accounts per person; M = Mean; wit. = witness; act. = 
actor; vic. = victim; p./perpetr. = perpetrator; sex. ab. = sexual abuse; sign. = significant; LE = life event; part. = participate; neg. 
= negative; pos. = positive; med. = medium; struct. = structured; free report = free report only; CI = Cognitive Interview. 
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Appendix B 
Coding Decisions for Rater, Rating Process, and Training Characteristics 
Authors Nrate
r 
Occupation Mode Scale Dura-
tion 
Litera-
ture 
Defini-
tions 
Exam
-ples 
Lec-
ture 
Practice Su
m 
% 
rated 
Nadj. 
Akehurst et al. (2001) 3 na transcript other Likert na no yes yes yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 66 
Akehurst et al. (2011) 2 psych. transcript 1 to 5 na no yes yes yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 31 
Anson et al. (1993) 4 na audiovisual 0/1 na no yes no yes 2 comp. 4 100.0 23 
Bensi et al. (2009) 2 Ph.D. transcript 0-1-2 6.00 yes yes no yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 40 
Blandón-Gitlin et al. 
(2009; Exp. 2) 
2 grad. students transcript 0-1-2 na yes yes no yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 51 
Blandón-Gitlin et al. 
(2005) 
2 psych. transcript 0/1 na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 48 
Bogaard et al. (2014) 2 na transcript 0-1-2 1.50 yes yes yes no 2 comp. 5 100.0 64 
Boychuk (1991) 3 psych./ 
grad. students 
transcript 0-1-2 to 0/1 201.33 yes yes no yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 75 
Bradford (2006) 2 students transcript 1 to 7 na no yes no no 2 comp. 3 100.0 20 
Buck et al. (2002) 2 grad. students transcript 0/1 na yes yes no no 2 comp. 4 100.0 104 
Caso et al. (2006) 2 na transcript frequencies na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 20.0 10 
Chang (2008) 4 grad. students transcript 0/1 35.00 no yes no yes 2 comp. 4 100.0 69 
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Connolly & Lavoie (2009) 2 grad. students transcript 0-1-2 16.00 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 40 
Craig et al. (1999) 4 students transcript 0/1 2.00 no yes no yes 2 comp. 4 100.0 48 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 
1) 
2 students audiovisual 0/1 1.00 no yes yes yes 1 comp. 4 100.0 150 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 
2) 
4 students audiovisual 0-1-2 1.00 no yes yes yes 1 comp. 4 100.0 126 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 
3) 
2 students transcript 0/1 na no yes yes yes 1 comp. 4 100.0 22 
Dukala et al. (in prep.) 4 grad. students transcript 0-1-2 10.00 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 50.0 40 
Dunbar et al. (2012; 
Exp.1) 
8 students audiovisual 1 to 7 1.50 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 194 
Dunbar et al. (2012; 
Exp.1) 
8 students audio-
visual 
1 to 7 1.50 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 84 
Eggers (2002) 6 grad. students transcript 0 to 4 na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 60 
Gödert et al. (2005) 3 students transcript other Likert 18.00 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 68 
Granhag & Strömwall 
(2002) 
2 na na frequencies na na yes yes na na 2 20.0 14 
Granhag et al. (2006) 2 na transcript 2 types 40.00 yes no no no 2 comp. 3 20.0 16 
Hänert (2007) 2 grad. students transcript other Likert na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 16.2 12 
Heinze (1996) & 
Horstmann (1996) 
3 psych./ 
grad. students 
transcript 2 types na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 42 
Herrmann & Jena (1995; 
Sender 1) 
3 na transcript 3 types na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 15 
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Herrmann & Jena (1995; 
Sender 2) 
2 na transcript 3 types na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 15 
Hettler (2005) & Maier 
(2007) 
3 grad. students transcript 2 types na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 28.3 80 
Höfer (1995) 3 students audiovisual 4 or  
more types 
80.00 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 56 
Honts & Devitt (1993) 2 Ph.D. transcript 0-1-2 na yes yes yes no no 3 100.0 26 
Horowitz et al. (1997) 3 grad. students transcript 0/1 na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 100 
Janka (2003) 2 grad. students transcript 3 types na yes yes yes no no 3 100.0 28 
Joffe (1992; 2nd grade 
children) 
4 students transcript other Likert 20.00 no yes yes yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 43 
Joffe (1992; 4th grade 
children) 
4 students transcript other Likert 20.00 no yes yes yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 50 
Krahe & Kundrotas 
(1992) 
31 police transcript 0-1-2 na no yes no no no 1 100.0 30 
Krahe et al. (1995) na psych./ 
(grad.) students 
transcript other Likert na yes no no yes no 2 100.0 30 
Lamb et al. (1997b) 3 na transcript 0/1 na yes yes no no 2 comp. 4 100.0 89 
Lamers-Winkelmann et 
al. (1992) 
2 na transcript 0/1 16.00 yes yes no yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 103 
Leal et al. (2013; Exp. 1) 2 na transcript 2 types na no yes no yes no 2 100.0 40 
Leal et al. (2013; Exp. 2) 2 na transcript 2 types na yes yes no yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 83 
Lee et al. (2008) 2 na transcript 0/1 na no yes no yes no 2 83.0 75 
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Manzanero et al. (2014) 2 psych. transcript frequencies na no yes no yes no 2 100.0 29 
Mazzoni & Ambrosio 
(2002) 
2 na transcript 0-1-2 na no no no no no 0 100.0 30 
Merckelbach (2004; 
Exp.2) 
2 psych. transcript other Likert na yes yes no no no 2 100.0 38 
Metzger (1996) 3 students transcript other Likert na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 93 
Naumann (2005) 2 psych. transcript 2 types 3.00 yes yes yes yes no 4 100.0 10 
Niehaus (2001) 9 grad. students transcript 2 types na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 80 
Peace & Porter (2011) 2 students transcript 2 types 20.00 no yes no yes no 2 20.0 58 
Petersen (1997; Seminar 
Group) 
6 grad. students transcript 0 to 4 7.50 no yes yes yes no 3 100.0 4 
Petersen (1997; Training 
Group) 
6 grad. students transcript 0 to 4 7.50 no yes yes yes no 3 100.0 4 
Porter et al. (2007) 2 na transcript 1 to 7 na no no no no no 0 20.0 48 
Porter & Yuille (1996) 2 na transcript 2 types 24.00 no yes no yes no 2 13.3 8 
Porter et al. (1999) 3 na transcript 2 types na no yes no yes no 2 15.0 25 
Roma (2011) 2 psych. transcript 0/1 7.50 yes yes no yes 1 comp. 4 100.0 109 
Ruby & Brigham (1998; 
Black speakers) 
119 students transcript 0-1-2 0.75 no yes yes no 1 comp. 3 100.0 6 
Ruby & Brigham (1998; 
White speakers) 
119 students transcript 0-1-2 0.75 no yes yes no 1 comp. 3 100.0 6 
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Rutta (2001) 2 psych. transcript 2 types na yes yes yes no 1 comp. 4 15.6 5 
Saacke (1995) 2 grad. students transcript 3 types na yes yes no yes 1 comp. 4 100.0 88 
Sallmon & Volbert (2013) 2 grad. students transcript frequencies na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 42.0 29 
Santtila et al. (2000) 2 na transcript 2 types na yes yes no no 2 comp. 4 29.4 20 
Saykaly et al. (2013) 2 grad. students transcript frequencies na no yes no yes 1 comp. 3 25.0 59 
Scheinberger (1993) 2 grad. students transcript 0-1-2 na no yes yes yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 30 
Schellemann-Offermanns 
& Merckelbach (2010) 
2 students transcript other Likert na yes yes no no no 2 100.0 60 
Sporer (1997a) 2 students transcript 0-1-2 5.00 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 80 
Sporer (1997b) 2 grad. students transcript 0-1-2 na yes yes yes no 2 comp. 5 100.0 200 
Sporer & Bursch (2003) 2 grad. students transcript 1 to 7 10.00 yes yes no no 2 comp. 4 100.0 200 
Steller et al. (1992) 3 grad. students transcript other Likert 90.00 no yes yes yes 1 comp. 4 100.0 88 
Strömwall et al. (2004) 2 na transcript 0-1-2 na yes yes no yes 2 comp. 5 20.0 18 
Volbert & Lau (2013; 
Exp. 2) 
2 psych. transcript 3 types na yes yes yes no 1 comp. 4 16.7 9 
Vrij et al. (2002) 2 na transcript 2 types na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 95 
Vrij et al. (2004) 2 na transcript 4 or  
more types 
na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 91 
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Vrij et al. (2001) 2 na transcript 2 types na yes yes no yes 2 comp. 5 100.0 86 
Vrij; Edward, et al. (2000) 2 na transcript 2 types na yes yes no no 2 comp. 4 100.0 73 
Vrij & Heaven (1999) 2 na transcript 2 types na no no no no no 0 100.0 40 
Vrij, Kneller, et al. (2000) 2 na transcript 0/1 na yes yes no no 2 comp. 4 100.0 30 
Vrij et al. (2008) 2 na transcript frequencies na no yes no yes no 2 50.0 40 
Vrij et al. (2007) 2 na transcript frequencies na yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 50.0 60 
Wehner (2006) 2 grad. students audiotape 0 to 4 40.00 yes yes yes yes 2 comp. 6 100.0 56 
Willén & Strömwall 
(2012) 
2 students transcript 0 to 4 6.00 yes yes yes no 2 comp. 5 25.0 15 
Wrege (2004) 2 grad. students transcript 3 types na no yes yes no 1 comp. 3 12.5 8 
Zaparniuk (1995) 3 na audiotape 0/1 na no yes no yes 1 comp. 3 50.0 20 
Notes. Exp. = Experiment; Nrater = number of raters; na = not available; Mode = Mode of presentation; other Likert = other Likert 
scale (e.g., 1 to 4); Duration = average training duration per rater  (in hours); comp. = number of the following components that 
are fulfilled: a) practice, b) feedback/discussion, c) homework tasks; Sum = sum of five training variables (literature (0/1), 
definitions (0/1), examples (0/1), lecture (0/1), and practice (0-1-2)): minimum = 0, maximum = 6; % rated = percentage of 
accounts that were independently coded by at least two raters; Nadj. = number of adjusted statements--adjustment: total number 
of statements multiplied by the percentage of statements that were coded by at least two raters. 
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Appendix C 
List of Studies Reporting on Different Reliability Indices for CBCA Criteria 
Authors Pearson's r / 
Spearman's rho / phi 
(Absolute) PCA Cohen's kappa Weighted kappa / 
ICC 
Maxwell's RE 
Akehurst et al. (2001) CBCA01-10, 12-16 CBCA01-10, 12-16 # # # 
Akehurst et al. (2011) CBCA01-19, sum 
score 
# # # # 
Anson et al. (1993) # CBCA01-19, sum 
score 
CBCA01-15, 17-19,  
sum score 
# CBCA01-15, 17-19, 
sum score 
Bensi et al. (2009) CBCA01, 02, 05, 08, 
09, 13, 14, 15, 16 
# # # # 
Blandón-Gitlin et al. (2009; 
Exp. 2) 
CBCA01-07, 09, 12-
16 
CBCA01-07, 09, 12-
16 
CBCA01-07, 09, 12-
16 
# # 
Blandón-Gitlin et al. (2005) # # CBCA01-15 # # 
Bogaard et al. (2014) # # CBCA01, 03-06, 08, 
09, sum score 
# # 
Boychuk (1991) # # range (CBCA01-19) # # 
Bradford (2006) CBCA01-09, 11, 12, 
14, 15, 17, 18, sum 
score 
# # # # 
Buck et al. (2002) # # # # CBCA01-19 
Caso et al. (2006) # CBCA03, 05, 06, 07, 
12, 14, 15 
# # # 
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Chang (2008) # # # ICC: range 
(CBCA06)h 
# 
Connolly & Lavoie (2009) CBCA01-07, 09, 11, 
12, 14, 15, 17 
CBCA01-07, 09-17 CBCA01-07, 09-17 w. kappa: CBCA01-
07, 09-17 
CBCA01-07, 09-17 
Craig et al. (1999) # range (CBCA01-15), 
sum score 
range (CBCA01-15) # # 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 1) # CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
# CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 2) # CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
# CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
Dana-Kirby (1997; Exp. 3) # CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
# CBCA01-14, sum 
score 
Dukala et al. (in prep.) CBCA01-05, 08-17; 
rho: CBCA01-05, 08-
17 
CBCA01-05, 08-17 CBCA01-05, 08-17 ICC: CBCA01-05, 08-
17e 
# 
Dunbar et al. (2012; Exp.1) # # # ICC: CBCA03, 04, 
06, 14f 
# 
Dunbar et al. (2012; Exp.1) # # # ICC: CBCA03, 04, 
06, 14f 
# 
Eggers (2002) CBCA01-09, 11-19 CBCA01-19 CBCA01-18 # CBCA01-19 
Gödert et al. (2005) CBCA01-10, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 18 
CBCA01-18a # w. kappa and ICC: 
CBCA01-18dg 
# 
Granhag & Strömwall (2002) CBCA03 CBCA03 # # # 
Granhag et al. (2006) CBCA01, 02, 03, 05, 
06, 08, 12, 14, 15, 16 
CBCA01, 02, 03, 05, 
06, 08, 12, 14, 15, 16 
CBCA01, 02, 03, 05, 
06, 08, 12, 14, 15, 16 
# # 
Hänert (2007) CBCA01-09, 11, 13-
16 
# # # # 
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Heinze (1996) & Horstmann 
(1996) 
CBCA04-18; phi: 
CBCA01, 02, 03 
# # # # 
Herrmann & Jena (1995; 
Sender 1) 
CBCA02, 03, 04, 06-
10, 12-15 
# # # # 
Herrmann & Jena (1995; 
Sender 2) 
CBCA02, 03, 04, 06, 
08, 12-15 
# # # # 
Hettler (2005) & Maier (2007) sum score (CBCA01-
09, 11-18) 
# # # # 
Höfer (1995) CBCA02, 03, 07, 12, 
13, 14; phi: CBCA01, 
10, 15, 16 
# # # # 
Honts & Devitt (1993) range (CBCA01-09, 
12-17, sum score) 
# # # # 
Horowitz et al. (1997) # CBCA01-19 CBCA01-19 # CBCA01-19 
Janka (2003) CBCA04-09, 11-18 CBCA01-15, 17, 18 # w. kappa: CBCA01-
18 
# 
Joffe (1992; 2nd grade 
children) 
# # # ICC: CBCA01-03, 05-
09, 11-15, sum 
scoreg 
# 
Joffe (1992; 4th grade 
children) 
# # # ICC: CBCA01-03, 05-
09, 11-16, sum 
scoreg 
# 
Krahe & Kundrotas (1992) # # CBCA01-19 # # 
Krahe et al. (1995) # # # # # 
Lamers-Winkelmann et al. 
(1992) 
# CBCA01-19 CBCA01-19 # # 
Lamb et al. (1997b) # sum score (CBCA01-
14) 
# # # 
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Leal et al. (2013; Exp. 1) # # # ICC: sum score 
(CBCA01-09, 11-12, 
14-17)h 
# 
Leal et al. (2013; Exp. 2) # # # ICC: sum score 
(CBCA01-09, 11-12, 
14-17)h 
# 
Lee et al. (2008) # # CBCA01-17, 19 # # 
Manzanero et al. (2014) # CBCA01, 02 (range: 
04-16, 19) 
# # # 
Mazzoni & Ambrosio (2002) rho: sum score 
(CBCA01-19) 
# # # # 
Merckelbach (2004; Exp.2) range (CBCA01, 03-
06, 08, 09, 12, 13) 
# # # # 
Metzger (1996) CBCA01-09, 11-16 # # # # 
Naumann (2005) # # sum score (CBCA01-
15) 
# # 
Niehaus (2001) CBCA01-15, 17, 18 CBCA01-15, 17, 18, 
sum score 
CBCA01-15, 17, 18, 
sum score 
w. kappa: CBCA01-
15, 17, 18, sum score 
# 
Peace & Porter (2011) CBCA01, 03 # # # # 
Petersen (1997; Seminar 
Group) 
CBCA01-19 CBCA01-19a CBCA01-19 # CBCA01-19 
Petersen (1997; Training 
Group) 
CBCA01-19 CBCA01-19a CBCA01-19 # CBCA01-19 
Porter et al. (2007) range (CBCA01, 12, 
13) 
# # # # 
Porter & Yuille (1996) CBCA12 (CBCA01, 
02, 03, 07, 08, 09, 
11, 14, 15: min. rel.) 
# # # # 
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Porter et al. (1999) CBCA04 (CBCA01, 
03, 15: min. rel.) 
# # # # 
Roma (2011) # # # # CBCA01-14 
Ruby & Brigham (1998; Black 
speakers) 
# CBCA01-09, 11, 12, 
14-17 
# # # 
Ruby & Brigham (1998; White 
speakers) 
# CBCA01-09, 11, 12, 
14-17 
# # # 
Rutta (2001) CBCA01, 03, 04, 06, 
09, 12, 14, 15, 17 
# # # # 
Saacke (1995) # CBCA01-18 CBCA02-18 # # 
Sallmon & Volbert (2013) # # # ICC: CBCA03i # 
Santtila et al. (2000) rho: CBCA06, 09 
(range: CBCA01-05, 
07, 08, 10-14) 
# # # # 
Saykaly et al. (2013) # # CBCA14 # # 
Scheinberger (1993) CBCA03-09, 11-15, 
18 
# # # # 
Schellemann-Offermanns & 
Merckelbach (2010) 
range (CBCA01, 03-
06, 08, 09, 12, 13) 
# # # # 
Sporer (1997a) Pearson's r and phi: 
CBCA01-09, 12, 13b 
CBCA01-09, 12, 13b CBCA01-09, 12, 13 # CBCA01-09,12,13 
Sporer (1997b) Pearson's r and phi: 
CBCA01-13 
CBCA01-13b CBCA01-13 # CBCA01-13 
Sporer & Bursch (2003) Pearson's r and rho: 
CBCA01-13 
# # ICC: CBCA01-13e # 
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Steller et al. (1992) # CBCA01-18 # # # 
Strömwall et al. (2004) CBCA01, 03-08, 10-
16, 19 
CBCA01-19 CBCA01, 03-08, 10-
16, 19 
# # 
Volbert & Lau (2013; Exp. 2) CBCA05-10, 12-19 # # w. kappa: CBCA01-
19 
# 
Vrij et al. (2002) CBCA01-08, 12-16 # # # # 
Vrij et al. (2004) CBCA01-09, 11-16 # # # # 
Vrij et al. (2001) CBCA01-06, 08, 13-
16 
CBCA01-06, 08, 13-
16c  
CBCA01-06, 08, 13-
16 
# # 
Vrij; Edward, et al. (2000) CBCA01-06, 08, 09, 
12-16, 18 
# # # # 
Vrij & Heaven (1999) # CBCA03, 16 # # # 
Vrij, Kneller, et al. (2000) # CBCA02 (range: 
CBCA01, 03, 04, 05, 
08, 13-16) 
# # # 
Vrij et al. (2008) CBCA04 # # # # 
Vrij et al. (2007) CBCA01-09, 11-18 # # # # 
Wehner (2006) Pearson's r and rho: 
CBCA01-04, 07, 08, 
09, 12, 14, 15, sum 
score 
CBCA01-04, 07, 08, 
09, 12, 14, 15, 
sumcores 
# # # 
Willén & Strömwall (2012) CBCA01-09, 11-17, 
19 
# # w. kappa: CBCA01-
09, 11-17, 19 
# 
Wrege (2004) CBCA06, 12, 13, 15; 
rho: CBCA01-08, 13, 
# # # # 
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14, 15, 17 
Zaparniuk (1995) # CBCA01-03, 05-18 # # # 
Notes. min. rel. = minimum reliability; # = no index reported; whenever several correlation coefficients (Pearson's r, Spearman's 
rho, phi) were reported, Pearson's r was chosen for analysis when possible; a = in addition to absolute PCA, extended PCA was 
reported; b = two values were reported for each index: Pearson's r and PCA for 0-1-2 rating, and phi and PCA for dichotomous 
rating (for analysis, PCA for 0-1-2 rating was chosen); c = two values were reported: before and after data transformation (for 
analysis, PCA after data transformation was chosen); w. kappa = weighted kappa; d = when weighted kappa and ICC were 
reported, ICC was chosen for analysis; e = when ICCaverage and ICCsingle were reported, ICCaverage was chosen for analysis; f = 
one-way random version of ICC; g = generalizability coefficient; h = type of ICC not specified; i = two values reported: 
consistency and absolute agreement (absolute agreement chosen for analysis). 
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DISCUSSION 
This dissertation reported two meta-analyses on the detection of deception 
with linguistic and verbal content cues. Aside from other approaches to detect 
deception (e.g., nonverbal, paraverbal, psychophysiological), former research (e.g., 
Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, 
Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2014) 
strongly suggested that the approach of analyzing the content of a statement is 
probably most promising to outperform the average 54% discrimination accuracy 
(Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Therefore, the aim of this 
dissertation was to further the knowledge on linguistic and verbal content cues to 
deception by means of meta-analyses. 
To this end, the first meta-analysis examined if and to what extent linguistic 
cues assessed by computer programs can distinguish deceptive from true 
statements. In other words, the focus of this enterprise was the validity of linguistic 
cues to deception. The second meta-analysis deals with Criteria-based Content 
Analysis criteria (CBCA, Steller & Köhnken, 1989), or credibility criteria as a special 
kind of verbal content cues rated by human raters. More specifically, the amount of 
agreement that can be reached by several independent evaluators--that is, their 
inter-rater reliability--was systematically investigated. In the following, main and most 
important findings of both meta-analyses are discussed. A more detailed discussion 
can be found in the corresponding discussion sections of each meta-analysis. 
Linguistic cues to deception assessed by computer programs 
In the first meta-analysis, after an exhaustive literature search in various 
interdisciplinary research areas, 44 hypothesis tests were included. Furthermore, 
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from a wealth of different linguistic cues (> 200), 40 were selected, operationally 
defined and allocated to six principal research questions. Under each question, a 
direction of effect was hypothesized for every single linguistic marker from different 
theoretical perspectives. Moreover, several theoretically or methodologically 
important independent variables were supposed to be associated with effect sizes 
(e.g., event type and personal involvement, emotional valence, intensity of 
interaction, motivation of the liar, production mode, program type, publication status, 
experimental design). 
The first research question “Do liars experience greater cognitive load?” was 
mainly supported in that compared to true statements, lies seem to be shorter and 
less elaborate than true statements. These findings provided support for the 
theoretical assumption of a working memory model to deception in that constructing 
a lie is cognitively more demanding for working memory capacity than telling the 
truth (Sporer, 2015; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007, based on Baddeley, 2000, 
2006). More specifically, differences between liars and truth-tellers in word quantity 
were largest when negative emotional events were told to an interaction partner, but 
seem to be reversed in computer-mediated communication, or when analyzed from 
specific programs designed to detect deception. 
The second research question was based on an impression management 
approach in that a liar’s profile or self-presentation is less convincing than a truthful 
one (DePaulo et. al, 2003). Thus, it was hypothesized that compared to truth-tellers, 
liars language is less certain and more vague as indexed with the use of more modal 
verbs or tentative constructions. In general, weak support was found for the 
opposite: Truth-tellers seem to slightly use more tentative words than liars. This 
effect occurred only in a within-experimental design, but is unrelated to other 
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independent variables. However, this finding could actually be seen as support for 
the self-presentational perspective, because truth-tellers do not require any special 
effort to appear credible or avoid insecurities (see Volbert & Steller, 2014), and 
therefore might express more words related to uncertainty. 
The third complex of research questions dealt with emotional processes: Due 
to Ekman’s emotional approach (1988, 2001) liars feel more negative emotions than 
truth-tellers, a transfer of these emotions on language was assumed. Indeed, liars 
expressed more negative emotional words, negations, and more emotional words 
overall than truth-tellers. Differences in negative emotions between liars and truth-
tellers were most pronounced in settings when storytellers were highly motivated in 
providing negative emotional, self-experienced events to an interaction partner, and 
only occurred in studies using a within-participants design. No differences were 
found in the use of positive emotional words although from an autobiographical 
“fading affect bias” it was assumed that liars use fewer positive emotional words 
(Walker & Skowronski, 2009). These results suggested that it is necessary to 
differentiate the type of emotional valence (i.e., negative, positive, neutral) expressed 
in language. 
The fourth research question focused on the psychological distance, or 
immediacy (e.g., Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968) expressed by manipulating the use of 
personal pronouns and active versus passive speech. The hypothesis that liars are 
less immediate and distance themselves more from events was partially supported. 
In general, liars used slightly fewer self-references and more other references than 
truth-tellers. This difference in self-references was most stressed in negative events 
told to an interacting person, and in published studies implementing a within-
participants design. On the other side, liars expressed more other references in 
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unpublished studies with a between-participants design, where senders were asked 
to provide statements on neutral events or attitudes without an interaction partner. 
These results impressively showed a varying association of independent variables 
with specific linguistic cues to deception. 
The fifth research question investigated the amount of details in statements. 
From a reality monitoring approach (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Sporer, 1997, 2004) it 
was assumed that liars would use less sensory and perceptual details than truth-
tellers because the critical event is internally generated and not based on memory of 
an actual experience. Some support for this assumption was found for words 
expressing sensory-perceptual processes, especially hearing and quantifiers, but not 
for other indicators. These effects were strongest when senders were highly 
motivated, handwrite their accounts, the study was published, and implemented a 
within-participants design. Contrary to the hypothesis, liars tended to use more 
motion verbs, especially when statements were spoken or handwritten, or when the 
study was published. This result could be explained from a working memory 
perspective, in that liars might use more simple and less complex words, like motion 
verbs due to greater cognitive demands (see also Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & 
Richards, 2003). 
The sixth research question, “Do liars refer less often to cognitive 
processes?”, was derived from autobiographical memory research. Indeed, liars 
expressed fewer words related to their cognitions. Put differently, truth-tellers 
provided more cognitive words--possibly to generate cues for memory retrieval (e.g., 
Conway, 1990). Again, this effect was only present in studies implementing a within-
participants design. 
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Besides these research questions, the results of miscellaneous linguistic cues 
to deception that could not be allocated to a specific research question or could not 
be predicted from a theory, were presented in the meta-analysis. However, the 
above findings altogether strongly suggested that a theoretical foundation and 
integration with derived hypotheses is of utmost relevance when investigating the 
outcome of linguistic cues to deception. 
Setting the fact aside that most theories received at least some support, it is 
important to discuss some factors that limit the generalizability of these findings. It 
should be mentioned first that a meta-analysis always constitutes a weighted mean 
of mean results and left a large amount of variance within and between studies in the 
dark (e.g., Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Therefore, moderator analyses could bring a 
more complex association between effect sizes and independent variables to light. 
Here, one or several moderator variables--such as the emotional valence of the 
event, the personal investment or motivation of the sender, or methodological factors 
(i.e., experimental design, publication status)--moderated almost all main effects. In 
other words, the specific context of a statement, or the research setup can already 
make a difference in the linguistic profile of liars and truth-tellers (see also Hancock 
and Woodworth, 2013). Another limitation is the general small effect size (according 
to Cohen, 1988), although it can be compared to effect sizes found in previous meta-
analyses (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007). Put 
differently, the difference between liars’ and truth-tellers’ linguistic profile on average-
-and even when considering context variables--is quite small. 
Furthermore, two probably important variables could not be investigated in 
this meta-analysis: Language and age of senders. As Newman et al. (2003) already 
pointed out, different languages and their specific grammatical rules (e.g., the use of 
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personal pronouns in Spanish vs. English) can lead to different linguistic profiles--
regardless of the truth status. Furthermore, the language proficiency also plays an 
important role in linguistic differences between liars and truth-tellers (for an example 
of credibility criteria rated by human evaluators, see Evans & Michael, 2014). 
Additionally, the cultural or ethnic background may also play a role in speech and the 
use of specific words (e.g., Matsumoto, Hwang, & Sandoval, 2014). Furthermore, the 
storyteller’s age matters in that children’s language is generally more simple and less 
complex because their cognitive ability, regulation of language and memory retrieval 
strategies develop throughout childhood (e.g., Volbert & Steller, 2014). For example, 
in a recent study, Williams, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala, and Lee (2014), directly compared 
children’s with adult’s linguistic profile. Results revealed that younger children (4-5 
years) and older children (6-7 years) differ from adults (18-25 years) in the use of 
personal pronouns, emotional and cognitive process words, and exclusive terms 
when lying or telling the truth. Together these issues suggest that by analyzing the 
language of truth-tellers and liars, it is imperative to take the age of the storyteller 
and different languages into account. 
The results and limitations of the first meta-analysis lead to the following 
practical and empirical implications: Computer programs may be useful to find some 
preliminary linguistic differences between truth-tellers and liars. Therefore, 
predictions regarding the outcome of linguistic cues should be based a priori on 
suitable theories. Also, the context of a statement, specific characteristics of the 
storyteller, and the research paradigm should always be taken into account when 
interpreting these effects. However, at this point, computer programs should not be 
used as a (single) tool to decide whether a person is lying or telling the truth, 
especially not in a criminal justice context. Therefore, future research on linguistic 
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analyses with computer programs should focus on its potential in further uncovering 
linguistic profiles between liars and truth-tellers. This could be implemented for 
example by refining word categories and linguistic cues, or by complementing words 
to dictionaries with the help of theoretical assumptions. Moreover, other relevant 
personal factors that could lead to different narrative styles, like age (e.g., Williams et 
al., 2014), language (e.g., Masip, Bethencourt, Lucas, Sánchez-San Segundo, & 
Herrero, 2012), or fantasy proneness (e.g., Schelleman-Offermans & Merckelbach, 
2010), should be investigated more closely. These and further situational variables 
should be subject to future research before applying a computer-based linguistic lie 
detection assessment to individual forensic cases (if at all). 
Inter-rater reliability of CBCA criteria 
The second meta-analysis investigated the inter-rater reliability of CBCA 
criteria. CBCA is an important component of Statement Validity Assessment (SVA, 
Köhnken, 2004; Steller & Köhnken, 1989), a clinical credibility assessment 
procedure used by psychological forensic expert witnesses in court in many 
countries, especially when no external and explicit evidence is at hand (Köhnken, 
2004; Sporer, 1983; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). Aside from its forensic application, 
CBCA criteria have been object of many research investigations as a means to 
detect deception (e.g., Vrij, 2008). Within this procedure, the critical statement is 
analyzed in view of 19 criteria, which are subsumed under five broader categories: 
general characteristics of the statement (i.e., 01-logical structure, 02-unstructured 
production, 03-quantity of details), specific contents (i.e., 04-contextual embedding, 
05-descriptions of interactions, 06-reproduction of conversation, 07-unexpected 
complications), peculiarities of the content (i.e., 08-unusual details, 09-superfluous 
details, 10-accurately reported details misunderstood, 11-related external 
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associations, 12-acounts of subjective mental state, 13-attribution of perpetrator’s 
mental state), motivation-related contents (i.e., 14-spontaneous correction, 15-
admitting lack of memory, 16-raising doubts about ones own memory, 17-self-
deprecation, 18-pardoning the perpetrator), and offense-specific elements (i.e., 19-
details characteristic of the offense). All criteria are assumed to appear more often in 
truthful than in deceptive statements (e.g., Undeutsch, 1967; Steller & Köhnken, 
1989). Aside from Undeutsch’ working hypothesis (Köhnken, 1990), several authors 
attempted to develop a more comprehensive theoretical background from cognitive 
and motivational perspectives (Köhnken, 2004; Niehaus, 2001; Sporer, 1997; Volbert 
& Steller, 2014). Empirical support for this assumption for most criteria came from 
two recent meta-analyses on the validity of CBCA criteria (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 
2015; Sporer, Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, & Masip, 2015). As an important prerequisite of 
its validity, the inter-rater reliability is of utmost importance (e.g., Köhnken, 2004; 
Küpper & Sporer, 1995; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). 
Therefore, the first meta-analysis on the inter-rater reliability of CBCA criteria 
was conducted. To this end, after an exhaustive literature search, 82 hypothesis 
tests that fulfilled eligibility criteria were included. Besides six reliability indices that 
constitute the dependent variables, four independent variables were investigated: 
Research paradigm, amount of rater’s training, rating scale, and base rate, or 
frequency of occurrence of the individual CBCA criteria. 
As expected, inter-rater reliabilities as measured with Pearson’s r were good 
to excellent for almost all criteria. Lowest but still good reliability values (according to 
Fleiss, 1981) were found for unstructured production (02) and superfluous details 
(09). For percentage agreement, all criteria except contextual embedding (04) 
resulted in good agreement rates. Unweighted analyses of Cohen’s kappa displayed 
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moderate to fair agreement (according to Landis & Koch, 1977) for all criteria with 
lowest values for two criteria (unstructured production (02), details characteristic of 
the offense (19)). Combined analyses of weighted kappa and ICC showed good 
reliabilities except for logical structure (01). Unweighted analyses on Maxwell’s RE 
resulted in good reliabilities except for two criteria with marginal reliability 
(unstructured production (02), quantity of details (03)). Moreover, further analyses 
revealed that independent variables significantly moderate inter-rater reliabilities in 
the expected direction (at least for the first of the following three variables). First, the 
base rate was highly associated with reliability in that low and high base rates 
accompany lower Pearson’s r and lower kappa, but higher percentage agreement. 
Second, Pearson’s r was found to be higher in field studies and quasi-experiments 
than in laboratory experiments for most CBCA criteria. Third, less fine-grained rating 
scales were associated with higher Pearson’s r for some CBCA criteria. Fourth, the 
amount of training was positively, negatively or not associated with Pearson’s r--
depending on the specific CBCA criterion.  
Taken together, these meta-analytic findings suggest that on average, the 
inter-rater reliability is sufficient to good for most CBCA criteria. Compared to inter-
rater reliabilities of psychiatric diagnoses in initial DSM-5 field trials (Freedman, 
Lewis, Michels, Pine, Schultz, Tamminga, Gabbard, Shur-Fen Gau, Javitt, Oquendo, 
Shrout, Vieta, & Yager, 2013, Figure 1), the inter-rater reliability of CBCA raters lies 
in the middle of this range. However, a few criteria with less straightforward 
definitions like unstructured production (02; see also Anson, Golding, & Gully, 1993) 
resulted in a somewhat lower inter-rater reliability. In interpreting the amount of 
agreement, it is important to take moderator variables--especially its base rate and 
research paradigm--into account. 
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Despite these findings, some limiting aspects of this meta-analysis and 
implications for future research need to be discussed. Almost all meta-analyses 
resulted in highly heterogeneous and/or skewed distribution of effect sizes. Although 
relevant moderator variables were detected, a large amount of variance still left 
unexplained for most criteria. Therefore, future research should attempt to more 
precisely quantify the link between variations of specific context variables with its 
inter-rater reliability. To this attempt, it would also be desirable to maintain the power 
of future meta-analyses by including more studies overall, and by reducing the 
number of excluded studies due to missing data (e.g., Cohn & Becker, 2003). Thus, 
it would be helpful if future studies could report all data on independent and 
dependent variables--regardless of their significance--to avoid publication bias (e.g., 
Sporer & Cohn, 2011; Sutton, 2009). As more and more scientific journals provide 
the opportunity to upload supplemental material online, this would probably not be an 
unrealistic suggestion. Also, a (much) higher percentage of multiple rated statements 
(i.e., 100%), would also lead to a higher number of included rated statements for 
future syntheses. Furthermore, as only a few CBCA field studies with high-stake, real 
life forensic cases meeting high quality research standards were conducted (e.g., 
Akehurst, Manton, & Quante, 2011; Roma, Martini, Sabatello, Tatarelli, & Ferracuti, 
2011), future research should try to focus on these type of investigations. By doing 
so, conclusions with higher ecological validity and generalizability can be made. 
Finally, future studies should refrain from using percentage agreement as the only 
measure due to its shortcomings (e.g., Cohen, 1960). Instead, the following reliability 
indices should be employed: ICCs or Pearson’s r for continuous data, and kappa or 
weighted kappa for categorical data. As a more sophisticated and unbiased 
estimator of kappa, the prevalence-adjusted, bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK, Birt, 
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Bishop, & Carlin, 1993) might also be used to control for its base rate (i.e., 
prevalence) dependence. 
Moreover, three research directions that would probably further our 
knowledge in using CBCA to detect deception are the following: (a) to examine the 
relationship between inter-rater reliability and validity (as is planned in Sporer et al., 
2015), (b) to more deeply investigate the application of the entire credibility 
assessment procedure SVA in terms of its validity and reliability (see also Volbert & 
Steller, 2014, for this suggestion), and (c) to establish a link between human CBCA 
ratings and linguistic computer analyses, for example by editing dictionaries from a 
theoretical view or adding specific words or sentences expected to be found as a 
CBCA criterion (e.g., Sim & Lamb, 2013). 
Setting research implications aside, how do these meta-analytic findings 
support the practical application of CBCA? As mentioned earlier, the inter-rater 
reliability is the most important prerequisite of its validity. In other words, although 
CBCA ratings have subjective or clinical components, this meta-analysis showed 
that reliability is maintained. In other words, the fact that two independent 
psychological expert witnesses come to the same rating of CBCA criteria is above 
chance level. However, the inter-rater reliability of the entire SVA procedure and its 
final credibility assessment in court are in need of more empirical investigations 
(Volbert & Steller, 2014). This issue is impressively demonstrated in the introducing 
example, the “Kachelmann-trial”: Here, two psychological expert witnesses came to 
the same evaluation that critical statements of the alleged victim Claudia D. are 
probably not based on real experience (Friedrichsen, 2011, May). Although the 
overall conclusion coincided, it may be the case that they were at least partially 
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derived from different ratings of CBCA criteria--besides considering and weighting 
other important factors from SVA. 
Conclusion 
These meta-analyses integrated previous research on the detection of 
deception from linguistic and verbal content cues. The first meta-analysis 
demonstrated that theoretically based linguistic cues to deception might exist. 
However, their validity is limited to small effect sizes and to their association with a 
number of situational variables and research settings. Although some linguistic cues 
were detected, in 2015, computer programs should not be used for forensic or any 
other application to judge whether a person is lying or telling the truth. The second 
meta-analysis revealed that the inter-rater reliability of CBCA criteria was generally 
sufficient to good for most criteria. However, results were also highly associated with 
situational and methodological variables. Finally, with these meta-analyses, this 
dissertation added empirical knowledge on deception detection research from a 
verbal perspective, and provided practical implications and orientations for future 
research.
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DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In verschiedenen sozialen Situationen des alltäglichen Lebens ist ein jeder 
gelegentlich mit dem Verdacht konfrontiert, dass ein Gesprächspartner oder eine 
Gesprächspartnerin nicht die Wahrheit erzählt. Die Erkenntnis, dass Menschen im 
Durchschnitt mindestens zweimal pro Tag lügen (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, 
& Epstein, 1996), stützt diesen Verdacht. Ebenso kommt es in anderen 
Lebensbereichen, wie zum Beispiel im Arbeitskontext in Bewerbungsgesprächen, 
oder im forensischen Kontext zu Lügen, also absichtlichen Falschaussagen (Vrij, 
2008). Besonders bei letztgenanntem können die negativen Konsequenzen von 
nicht erkannten Falschaussagen oder für unwahr gehaltene wahre Aussagen sowohl 
für die einzelne Person, als auch für das Allgemeinwohl, erheblich sein. Daher ist die 
Frage, wie Lügen von wahren Aussagen unterschieden werden können, von großer 
Relevanz. 
Da Menschen bei dieser Entscheidung im Durchschnitt mit einer Urteilsgüte 
von 54% nur leicht oberhalb des Zufallsniveaus liegen (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; 
Bond & DePaulo, 2006), versuchen Forscher und Praktiker seit jeher diese Fähigkeit 
zu verbessern, indem sie nach Indikatoren (als Synonyme werden Merkmale, 
Kriterien oder Hinweise verwendet) suchen, die zur validen Unterscheidung von 
Lüge und Wahrheit herangezogen werden können. Diese Indikatoren können sich 
auf psychophysiologische Reaktionen (z. B. Hautleitfähigkeit, Atemfrequenz), 
nonverbales Verhalten (Gestik, Mimik, Körperbewegungen) oder paraverbales 
Verhalten (Stimmhöhe, Antwortlatenz), oder auf den Inhalt einer Aussage beziehen 
(siehe Überblick in Sporer & Köhnken, 2008). 
Forschungsergebnisse der letzten Dekade zeigen, dass inhaltliche Merkmale 
dabei im Vergleich zu anderen Methoden die vielversprechendste Validität 
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aufweisen (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo, Lindsay, 
Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & 
Meissner, 2014). Daher beschäftigt sich die Dissertation mit der Frage, ob bestimmte 
inhaltliche Merkmale, die zur Unterscheidung von Lüge und Wahrheit herangezogen 
werden, wissenschaftlichen Gütekriterien der Validität und Reliabilität genügen. 
Hierfür wurde die Methodik der Metaanalyse angewendet, welche sich dadurch 
auszeichnet empirische Primärstudien, die dieselbe Forschungsfrage untersuchen, 
zu integrieren (z. B. Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Im Vergleich zu einer qualitativen 
Literaturzusammenfassung (Review), werden Studienergebnisse mithilfe von 
methodologischen Standards, insbesondere Effektstärken, selektiert, quantifiziert 
und analysiert (APA 2008; Cooper, Hedges, & Valentine, 2009; Sporer & Cohn, 
2011). Während die erste Metaanalyse die Validität linguistischer Kriterien, die 
mithilfe von Computerprogrammen analysiert wurden, untersucht, ergründet die 
zweite Metaanalyse die Beurteilerübereinstimmung (Interrater-Reliabilität) von 
Glaubhaftigkeitsmerkmalen (Steller & Köhnken, 1989). Das Ziel der Dissertation ist 
es somit, einen empirisch-systematischen Überblick über zwei bedeutsame Zweige 
der Forschung zur Entdeckung von Täuschung mit inhaltlichen Merkmalen zu liefern. 
Metaanalyse I: Validität linguistischer Lügenkriterien 
Als eine Möglichkeit inhaltliche Lügenmerkmale zu erforschen, untersuchten 
Wissenschaftler und Wissenschaftlerinnen aus verschieden Forschungsbereichen 
wie Psychologie, Kommunikationswissenschaften, Computerlinguistik oder 
Computerwissenschaften, mithilfe von verschiedenen Computerprogrammen Texte 
wahrer und falscher Aussagen. Hierbei wurden meist a priori grammatikalische 
Kategorien (z. B. Wortanzahl, Personalpronomen, Verben), oder inhaltliche 
Kategorien (z. B. emotional-getönte Wörter, oder Wörter, die 
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wahrnehmungsgebundene oder kognitive Prozesse abbilden), definiert, die 
linguistische Kriterien darstellen (als Beispiel siehe Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count, LIWC, Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001). Die Anzahl der zu einer 
Kategorie zugehörigen auftretenden Wörter wird dann zwischen wahren und 
erfundenen (transkribierten) Aussagen verglichen. Erstaunlicherweise wurde bereits 
1974 die erste empirische Untersuchung mit einer linguistischen Computeranalyse 
von Knapp, Hart und Dennis durchgeführt. 
Die in der vorliegenden Metaanalyse durchgeführte umfassende 
Literatursuche in renommierten wissenschaftlichen Datenbaken ergab, dass fast 40 
Jahre später circa 400 Studien durchgeführt worden waren. Nach Abgleich mit den 
Ein- und Ausschlusskriterien (wie zum Beispiel die Angabe unabhängiger 
statistischer Daten über die Häufigkeit linguistischer Merkmale in wahren und 
erfundenen Aussagen), wurden 44 Hypothesentests in die Metaanalyse 
eingeschlossen. Aus über 200 linguistischen Kriterien wurden 40 relevante Kriterien 
sechs Forschungsfragen zugeordnet und deren Richtung im Rahmen theoretischer 
Einbettung vorhergesagt. Ebenso wurden neben Studiencharakteristika 
(Publikationsjahr, Anzahl der Stichprobe, Alter, Anzahl der Aussagen, etc.) weitere 
relevante unabhängige Variablen, wie die Art (selbsterlebte Erfahrung, Einstellung, 
Verschiedenes) und die emotionale Valenz (neutral, negativ, positiv) des 
Ereignisses, die Art der Interaktion zwischen Aussagendem und Zuhörer (keine 
Interaktion, computervermittelt, Interview, Gespräch), die Motivation des 
Aussagenden (keine, wenig bis mittel, viel), die Art der Berichterstattung (hand- oder 
maschinenschriftlich, mündlich), der Programmtyp (LIWC, allgemein, spezifisch), das 
experimentelle Design (Zwischensubjekt- und Innersubjektfaktoren) und der 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
273 
Publikationsstatus (publiziert, unpubliziert), von zwei trainierten, unabhängigen 
Beurteilern und Beurteilerinnen kodiert. 
Mithilfe der beschriebenen Methodik sollten folgende Ziele der Metaanalyse 
erreicht werden: Systematische Integration interdisziplinärer Forschungsergebnisse 
zur Abbildung linguistischer Unterschiede zwischen wahren und erfundenen 
Aussagen, operationalisierende Definitionen linguistischer Kriterien, Vorhersage der 
Richtung des Effektes mithilfe theoretischer Einbettung und Quantifizierung des 
Zusammenhangs zwischen Kontextvariablen und Effektstärken. Im Folgenden 
werden die Hauptergebnisse der Forschungsfragen und der linguistischen Kriterien, 
welche jeweils in Richtung der Lüge im Vergleich zur Wahrheit formuliert sind, 
dargestellt. Dabei bedeuten negative Effektstärken, dass Lügner ein Merkmal 
häufiger und positive Effektstärken, dass Wahrheitssagende ein Merkmal häufiger 
(im Vergleich zu dem jeweiligen Pendant) benutzten. Zudem werden die Ergebnisse 
der Kontextvariablen und Implikationen für Forschung und Praxis diskutiert. Da bis 
zur Durchführung der Metaanalyse keine deutschsprachige Studie vorlag, werden im 
folgenden die Übersetzungen des LIWC-Wörterbuches von Wolf, Horn, Mehl, Haug, 
Pennebaker und Kordy (2008) teilweise übernommen. 
Die erste Forschungsfrage, ob Lügner kognitiv stärker belastet sind, wurde 
anhand des Arbeitsgedächtnismodell des Lügens (Sporer, 2015; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006, 2007, basierend auf Baddeley, 2000, 2006; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, 
& Tcholakian, 2013) gestellt. Es wurde angenommen, dass das Arbeitsgedächtnis 
beim Lügen aufgrund mehrerer paralleler Aufgaben insgesamt stärker beansprucht 
wird, wodurch weniger Kapazität für die Sprachproduktion verbleibt. Die Vorhersage, 
dass Lügen im Durchschnitt kürzer sind, also weniger Wörter insgesamt beinhalten, 
wurde bestätigt. Zudem benutzten Lügner hypothesenkonform weniger 
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unterschiedliche Wörter und sich ausschließende Konjunktionen (z. B. außer, ohne, 
jedoch), wodurch sich eine falsche Aussage eher einfacher und weniger komplex als 
eine wahre Aussage gestaltet. Der positive Haupteffekt der Wortanzahl war am 
größten, wenn negativ-emotionale Ereignisse einem direkten Interaktionspartner 
gegenüber geschildert wurden. Dahingegen zeigte sich ein invertierter Effekt bei 
computerbasierter Kommunikation oder bei der Auswertung mit speziellen 
Computerprogrammen. Demnach waren unter diesen Umständen Lügen im 
Durchschnitt länger als wahre Aussagen. Weitere linguistische Merkmale, wie zum 
Beispiel Wort- oder Satzlänge, Verbanzahl, Schreibfehler, oder weitere kausale 
Konjunktionen (z. B. weil, daher, aufgrund) zeigten keine signifikanten Unterschiede. 
Als hypothesenkonträre Ausnahme zeigte sich bei Lügnern eine erhöhte Satzanzahl. 
Der Selbstpräsentationsansatz von DePaulo und Kollegen (DePaulo et al., 
2003) stellte den theoretischen Hintergrund für die zweite Forschungsfrage, ob 
Lügner unsicherer sind als Wahrheitssagende, dar. Es wurde angenommen, dass 
eine täuschende Selbstpräsentation weniger überzeugend ist und dass Lügner sich 
durch moralische Bedenken und negative Gefühle mehr von ihrer Aussage 
distanzieren. Wenn sich diese Distanz in der Sprache niederschlägt (Wiener & 
Mehrabian, 1968), könnten Lügen eher vage und unsicher formuliert sein (Kuiken, 
1981). Die Metaanalysen zeigten keine Unterschiede in Modalverben (z. B. sollten, 
könnten) und bei Wörtern, die Gewissheit ausdrücken (z. B. finite 
Temporaladverbien, wie nie, immer, alle). Im scheinbaren Widerspruch zur 
Hypothese wurde in wahren Aussagen eine erhöhte Anzahl von Wörtern gefunden, 
die eine Vorläufigkeit ausdrücken (z. B. vielleicht, beinahe), allerdings nur in Studien 
mit einem Innersubjektfaktoren-Design. Aus einer anderen Perspektive des 
Selbstpräsentationsansatzes konnte dieser Effekt damit erklärt werden, dass sich 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
275 
Personen, die die Wahrheit sagen, nicht zusätzlich anstrengen, glaubhaft zu 
erscheinen oder Unsicherheiten zu vermeiden - im Gegensatz zu Lügnern, die damit 
vermehrt beschäftigt sind (DePaulo et al., 2003; Volbert & Steller, 2014). 
Der dritte Fragenkomplex beschäftigte sich mit emotionalen Prozessen. 
Aufgrund Ekman’s emotionalen Ansatzes (1988, 2001) wurde angenommen, dass 
Lügner negative Emotionen, wie Schuld, Scham, Angst oder Ärger empfinden. 
Daher wurde erwartet, dass sich diese Emotionen in der Sprache wiederfinden. In 
der Tat benutzten Lügner im Durchschnitt mehr Verneinungen (z. B. nein, nicht) und 
negativ-emotionale Wörter, insbesondere Wörter, die Ärger ausdrücken. Die 
Unterschiede in negativ-emotionalen Wörtern zeigten sich nur im 
Innersubjektfaktoren-Design und wenn der Aussagende hoch motiviert war einem 
direkten Interaktionspartner ein negativ-emotionales, selbsterlebtes Ereignis 
mitzuteilen. Dahingegen fanden sich keine Unterschiede für Traurigkeits- oder 
Angstwörter. Der aus der autobiographischen Gedächtnisforschung stammende 
„fading affect bias“ (Walker & Skowronski, 2009), dass negative Ereignisse schneller 
verblassen als positive, wurde nicht bestätigt, da sich im Durchschnitt keine 
Unterschiede in positiv-emotionalen Wörtern darstellten.  
Die vierte Forschungsfrage „Distanzieren sich Lügner stärker von ihrer 
Aussage?“ basierte auf dem Konstrukt der Unmittelbarkeit (Immediacy) von Wiener 
und Mehrabian (1968), welcher den Grad der Direktheit und Intensität der Interaktion 
zwischen Aussagendem und Aussage beschreibt. Es wurde angenommen, dass 
sich Lügner mehr von ihrer Aussage distanzieren, indem sie weniger Selbstbezüge, 
mehr Fremdbezüge und passive Verben oder Generalisierungen benutzen. 
Tatsächlich verwendeten Lügner im Durchschnitt etwas weniger Personalpronomina 
der 1. Person (z. B. ich, wir) und mehr Personalpronomina der 2. und 3. Person (z. 
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B. du, er, ihr, sie). Es ergaben sich keine signifikanten Effekte für Generalisierungen 
(z. B. jeder, alle) oder passive Verben. Der Effekt der Selbstbezüge war besonders 
deutlich, wenn in einer publizierten Studie mit Innersubjektfaktoren-Design negative 
Ereignisse einem Interaktionspartner geschildert werden sollten. Demgegenüber 
zeigte sich ein moderierender Zusammenhang bei Fremdbezügen in die Richtung, 
dass die erwarteten Effektstärken vor allem in unpublizierten Studien mit 
Zwischensubjektfaktoren-Design, in dem neutrale Ereignisse oder Einstellungen 
ohne Anwesenheit eines Interaktionspartners berichtet wurden, auftraten. 
Ob Lügner insgesamt weniger Details berichten, untersuchte die fünfte 
Forschungsfrage. Vor dem theoretischen Hintergrund des Realitätsüberwachungs-
ansatzes (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Sporer, 1997, 2004) wurde angenommen, dass 
Lügner weniger sensorische und kontextbezogene Details berichten (können), da sie 
nicht zurückgreifen können auf durch Wahrnehmung eines tatsächlichen Ereignisses 
extern-generierte Erinnerungen, sondern auf intern-generierte Erinnerungen 
basierend auf Phantasien, Gedanken oder Träume,. Es zeigten sich 
hypothesenkonforme, kleine Effekte für sensorisch-wahrnehmungsbezogene 
Prozesse, insbesondere Wörter, die das Hören (z. B. zuhören, sprechen) betreffen, 
und für Numerale (z. B. wenig, alles, viel). Diese Effekte wurden besonders bei 
hochmotivierten Personen, die ihre Aussage handschriftlich verfassten, und in 
publizierten Studien mit einem Innersubjektfaktoren-Design deutlich. Für andere 
linguistische Kriterien, wie Sehen, Fühlen, Zeit, Ort, Präpositionen, Zahlen oder 
Modifizierer (Summe aus Adverbien und Adjektiven) zeigten sich keine Effekte. 
Entgegen der Hypothese traten Bewegungsverben (z. B. laufen, gehen) häufiger bei 
Lügnern auf, insbesondere wenn diese ihre Aussage mündlich oder handschriftlich 
darboten, und wenn die Studie publiziert war. Dieses Ergebnis konnte mithilfe des 
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Arbeitsgedächtnismodells erklärt werden, da Lügner aufgrund eingeschränkter 
kognitiver Kapazität weniger komplexe Wörter, wie zum Beispiel Bewegungsverben 
benutzen (siehe Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003). 
Die sechste Forschungsfrage „Beziehen sich Lügner weniger häufig auf 
kognitive Prozesse?“ fand theoretische Einbettung in der autobiographischen 
Gedächtnisforschung (Conway, 1990). Da Erinnerungen an tatsächlich Erlebtes 
Hinweise zur Wiederherstellung, unterstützende Erinnerungen oder weitere kognitive 
Operationen bedürfen, wurde angenommen, dass Lügen weniger kognitive Wörter 
beinhalten, da die zugrunde liegenden Prozesse andere sind (z. B. Sporer, 2015; 
Walczyk et al., 2013). Für die Kriterien kognitive Prozesse (z. B. weil, denken, 
wissen) und Einsicht (z. B. bemerken, bewusst, entscheiden) ergaben sich 
hypothesenkonforme kleine Effektstärken, was bedeutet, dass Personen, die die 
Wahrheit sagen, durch die Wortwahl mehr Bezüge zu kognitiven Prozessen 
herstellten. Diese Effekte wurden im Durchschnitt nur in Studien mit einem 
Innersubjektfaktoren-Design gefunden. 
Neben den sechs Forschungsfragen zugeordneten linguistischen Merkmalen 
wurden weitere 29 Kriterien einer Restkategorie zugeordnet, da diese theoretisch 
nicht hergeleitet werden konnten. Diese Analysen ergaben, dass wahre Aussagen 
mehr Wörter bezüglich Hemmung (z. B. abstreiten, unterdrücken), Menschen (z. B. 
Baby, Junge), Biologie, physische Zustände und Essen, beinhalteten. Lügen 
enthielten mehr einschließende Wörter (z. B. auch, insgesamt), soziale Prozesse, 
Freizeitwörter und Zukunftsverben. 
Insgesamt zeigten die Ergebnisse, dass mithilfe von Theorien bestimmte 
linguistische Merkmale zwischen wahren und erfundenen Aussagen vorhergesagt 
werden können und sich im Durchschnitt unterscheiden. Ebenso demonstrierten die 
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Moderatoranalysen, dass die Haupteffekte der allermeisten Kriterien innerhalb 
verschiedener Kategorien der Moderatorvariablen zu unterschiedlichen Effektstärken 
führen. Daher kann zusammenfassend festgehalten werden, dass die Validität 
einzelner, hypothesengeleiteter linguistischer Lügenkriterien unter bestimmten 
Bedingungen gegeben zu sein scheint. Diese Interpretation unterliegt allerdings 
folgenden limitierenden Faktoren: Erstens mussten aufgrund von nicht vorhandenen 
oder beschaffbaren Daten mindestens 50 relevante Studien ausgeschlossen 
werden. Da Hinweise aus den Moderatoranalysen für einen Publikationsbias (Sutton, 
2009) vorlagen, kann eine Verzerrung der Effektstärken durch den Ausschluss 
dieser Studien nicht quantifiziert werden. Zweitens waren durchschnittliche 
Effektstärken nach Cohen’s (1988) Einteilung (klein: d = 0.20, mittel: d = 0.50, groß: 
d = 0.80) eher klein ausgeprägt. Der Median aller untersuchten gerichteten 
Effektstärken ergab einen Wert von |d = 0.19|, welcher allerdings im Vergleich zum 
Median von |d = 0.10| in DePaulo et al.’s Metaanalyse (2003) mit 158 Lügenkriterien 
sogar leicht höher liegt. Drittens zeigte sich eine erhebliche Heterogenität der 
individuellen Effektstärken innerhalb einzelner Kriterien, welche nur teilweise durch 
den Ausschluss von Ausreißern oder Moderatorvariablen erklärt werden konnte. 
Oftmals verbleibt ein erheblicher Anteil unaufgeklärter Varianz zwischen den 
Studieneffekten. Viertens konnte der Zusammenhang der Validität linguistischer 
Merkmale mit zwei wesentlichen Kontextvariablen - Sprache und Alter - mangels 
ausreichender Studienanzahl nicht quantifiziert werden. Insgesamt führen diese vier 
Limitationen dazu, dass die Aussagekraft der einzelnen Haupteffekte linguistischer 
Lügenmerkmale als eingeschränkt zu beurteilen ist. 
Schlussendlich führen die Befunde und Limitationen der Metaanalyse zu 
folgenden Implikationen für zukünftige Forschung: Aufgrund der interdisziplinären 
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Vielfalt der Kriterien, die in dieser Arbeit definiert, kategorisiert und einer Theorie 
zugeordnet wurden, könnten zukünftige Untersuchungen auf diese Definitionen 
zurückgreifen. Ebenso empfiehlt es sich, die untersuchten Lügenkriterien anhand 
von spezifischen Theorien a priori vorherzusagen. Des Weiteren wäre es 
erstrebenswert für zukünftige Projekte, relevante Kontextvariablen zu untersuchen 
und in die Interpretation der Ergebnisse miteinzubeziehen (siehe Hancock & 
Woodworth, 2013). Des Weiteren wäre die Entwicklung von Computerprogrammen, 
welche über ein Wort-Auszählen hinausgehen und den situativen Kontext einer 
Aussage als auch Personencharakteristika berücksichtigen, wünschenswert. 
Abschließend wäre ein direkter Vergleich von menschlichen und computerbasierten 
Urteilen relevant, um Stärken und Schwächen jeder Seite nutzbar zu machen. 
Insgesamt zeigte diese Metaanalyse, dass linguistische Lügenmerkmale unter 
bestimmten Bedingungen existieren. Allerdings darf daraus nicht geschlussfolgert 
werden, dass Computerprogramme als Basis für eine Einzelfallentscheidung über 
Lüge oder Wahrheit herangezogen werden können. 
Metaanalyse 2: Interrater-Reliabilität der Glaubhaftigkeitskriterien 
Vor Strafgerichten kommt es häufig zu Verhandlungen, in denen Aussage 
gegen Aussage steht und keine zuverlässigen und unabhängigen Beweismittel, wie 
zum Beispiel DNA-Spuren oder Videobandaufzeichnungen, zur Verifizierung einer 
Aussage herangezogen werden können (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Undeutsch, 1982; 
Vrij, 2008). Daher werden in Deutschland in speziellen Fällen aufgrund eines 
Bundesgerichtshofurteils (BGH, 1999) und auch in einigen anderen Ländern, wie 
zum Beispiel der Schweiz, Niederlande oder Spanien, psychologische Gutachter und 
Gutachterinnen - so genannte Rechts- oder Aussagepsychologen und -
psychologinnen - zu Rate gezogen. Diese untersuchen anhand eines 
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systematischen klinisch-psychologischen Beurteilungsprozesses, der so genannten 
Glaubhaftigkeitsbegutachtung (Köhnken, 1990; Steller & Volbert, 1999; Volbert, 
1995), die aussagende Person, welche in den allermeisten Fällen ein Opferzeuge 
oder eine Opferzeugin (z. B. eines Missbrauchs oder Vergewaltigung) ist. Bei 
diesem umfangreichen und hypothesengeleiteten Prozedere müssen verschiedenste 
Faktoren, wie die Entstehung der Aussage, die Interviewtechnik, 
Personencharakteristika, die Aussagekonstanz und nicht zuletzt die kritische 
Aussage selbst untersucht werden (z. B. Steller & Volbert, 1999; Volbert, 2010). 
Diese letztgenannte merkmalsorientierte Aussagen- oder Inhaltsanalyse wird 
mit der von Steller und Köhnken (1989) aus der bisherigen Literatur 
zusammengestellten Liste von 19 Glaubhaftigkeitskriterien oder Realkennzeichen 
durchgeführt (Criteria-based Content Analysis, CBCA). Diese werden fünf 
übergeordneten Kategorien zugeordnet: Allgemeine Merkmale (01-Logische 
Konsistenz, 02-Ungeordnet sprunghafte Darstellung, 03-Quantitativer 
Detaillreichtum), spezielle Inhalte (04-Raum-zeitliche Verknüpfungen, 05-
Interaktionsschilderung, 06-Wiedergabe von Gesprächen, 07-Schilderungen von 
Komplikationen im Handlungsverlauf), inhaltliche Besonderheiten (08-Schilderung 
ausgefallener Einzelheiten, 09-Schilderung nebensächlicher Einzelheiten, 10-
Phänomengemäße Schilderung unverstandener Handlungselemente, 11-Indirekt 
handlungsbezogene Schilderungen, 12-Schilderung eigener psychischer Vorgänge, 
13-Schilderung psychischer Vorgänge des Angeschuldigten), motivationsbezogene 
Inhalte (14-Spontane Verbesserungen der eigenen Aussage, 15-Eingeständnis von 
Erinnerungslücken, 16-Einwände der Richtigkeit gegen die eigene Aussage, 17-
Selbstbelastungen, 18-Entlastung des Angeschuldigten), und deliktspezifische 
Inhalte (19-Deliktspezifische Aussagenelemente). Die von Steller (1989) als 
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Undeutsch-Hypothese bezeichnete Grundannahme von Udo Undeutsch (1967), 
dass sich wahre von erfundenen Aussagen in ihrer Qualität unterscheiden, führt zu 
der Hypothese, dass das Vorliegen eines jeden Realkennzeichens in einer Aussage 
für den Erlebnisbezug, bzw. für die Wahrheit der Aussage, spricht. Im Gegenzug 
bedeutet die Abwesenheit eines Realkennzeichens jedoch nicht, dass eine Lüge 
vorliegt. Eine umfangreichere theoretische Untermauerung (im Vergleich zur 
Arbeitshypothese von Undeutsch; siehe Köhnken, 1990) im Hinblick auf kognitive 
Faktoren als auch motivationale Aspekte der Selbstpräsentation wurde von 
verschiedenen Autoren unternommen (Köhnken, 2004; Niehaus, 2001; Sporer, 
1997; Volbert & Steller, 2014). 
Als wichtige Voraussetzung für die forensisch-praktische Anwendbarkeit 
müssen psychometrische Gütekriterien, wie die Validität und Reliabilität erfüllt sein 
(Köhnken, 2004; Steller, 1989; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Wells & Loftus, 1991). 
Inwieweit die Glaubhaftigkeitskriterien tatsächlich zwischen wahren und erfundenen 
Aussagen unterscheiden - das heißt die Frage nach der Validität - wurde in vielen 
experimentellen Studien und einigen Feldstudien untersucht (Vrij, 2008). In einer 
aktuellen Metaanalyse über 18 dieser publizierten Studien, in denen Kinderaussagen 
analysiert wurden, zeigten sich mehrheitlich mittlere Effektstärken in die erwartete 
Richtung (Amado et al., 2015). Mit anderen Worten: Die Realkennzeichen treten wie 
erwartet durchschnittlich häufiger in wahren als in erfundenen Kinderaussagen auf. 
Ebenfalls zeigen vorläufige Teilergebnisse einer weiteren aktuellen Metaanalyse 
über 58 Studien, dass für die meisten Kriterien im Durchschnitt signifikante positive 
Effektstärken zu finden sind (Sporer, Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, & Masip, 2015). Diese 
Effekte werden von mindestens drei unabhängigen Variablen moderiert: Dem 
Studienparadigma (Experiment vs. Quasi-Experiment und Feldstudie), dem 
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Studiendesign (Zwischensubjekt- und Innersubjektfaktoren) und dem Alter der 
Aussagenden (Kinder bis 12 Jahre vs. Erwachsene ab 18 Jahre). 
Als unabdingbare Voraussetzung für die Validität eines psychologischen 
Messinstrumentes ist eine hohe Beurteilerübereinstimmung, die so genannte 
Interrater-Reliabilität, anzusehen (Anastasi, 1990; Cronbach, 1990; Küpper & 
Sporer, 1995). Hierbei stellt sich die Frage, ob und inwiefern zwei Beurteiler oder 
Beurteilerinnen zu demselben Rating eines einzelnen Realkennzeichens gelangen. 
Da zu dieser Fragestellung eine Vielzahl empirischer Studien durchgeführt wurden 
und bisher noch keine quantitative Zusammenfassung vorlag, wurde diese 
Metaanalyse als notwendiges Unterfangen angesehen. Die Ziele der Metaanalyse 
bestanden demnach darin, sämtliche Studien über die Beurteilerübereinstimmung 
quantitativ zu integrieren und verschiedene Reliabilitätsindizes zu schätzen. Des 
Weiteren sollte der Zusammenhang zwischen Reliabilität und unabhängigen 
Variablen eruiert werden. 
Nach einer umfangreichen Literaturrecherche in wissenschaftlich relevanten 
digitalen Datenbanken und analogen Bibliotheken wurden 52 englischsprachige und 
22 deutschsprachige unveröffentlichte und veröffentlichte Studien nach Abgleich mit 
Ein- und Ausschlusskriterien inkludiert. Hierbei wurden zum Beispiel nur Studien 
eingeschlossen, welche die Einschätzung der Glaubhaftigkeitskriterien von 
mindestens zwei unabhängigen und blinden Beurteilern oder Beurteilerinnen 
miteinander verglichen und einen entsprechenden Reliabilitätsindex berichteten. Die 
abhängigen Variablen (bzw. Effektstärken) stellten gängige Reliabilitätsindizes 
(Pearson’s r, Prozentuale Übereinstimmung, Cohen’s kappa, weighted (gewichtetes) 
kappa, Intraklassenkorrelationskoeffizient (ICC, intra-class correlation coefficient) 
und Maxwell’s random error, RE) dar. Neben wichtigen Studiencharakteristika 
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wurden die vom Wahrheitsstatus unabhängige Basisrate (Auftretenshäufigkeit) der 
Realkennzeichen, das Forschungsparadigma (Experimente, Quasi-Experimente und 
Feldstudien), die Trainingsintensität der Beurteiler und Beurteilerinnen und die 
Beurteilungsskalierung (dichotom, Präsenzrating (0-1-2), Likert-Skalierung, 
Häufigkeitszählung) als unabhängige Variablen von zwei unabhängigen Experten 
oder Expertinnen mit zufriedenstellenden Interrater-Reliabilitäten kodiert. 
Für den Reliabilitätsindex Pearson’s r ergaben sich in den gewichteten 
Metaanalysen weitestgehend gute bis exzellente Reliabilitäten für die meisten 
Realkennzeichen. Die geringsten Werte, obwohl diese nach Fleiss’ (1981) 
Kategorisierung noch als gut zu bewerten sind, zeigten sich für 02-Ungeordnet 
sprunghafte Darstellung und 09-Schilderung nebensächlicher Einzelheiten. Die 
gewichteten Metaanalysen zur Prozentualen Übereinstimmung zeigten durchgehend 
zufriedenstellende Werte. Ungewichtete Metaanalysen des Reliabilitätsindex kappa 
lieferten für alle bis auf zwei Kriterien (02-Ungeordnet sprunghafte Darstellung und 
19-Deliktspezifische Aussagenelemente) eine moderate bis faire Übereinstimmung 
(nach der Kategorisierung von Landis & Koch, 1977). Aufgrund ähnlicher 
psychometrischer Kennwerte wurde das gewichtete kappa und ICC gemeinsam 
untersucht. Die ungewichtete Metaanalysen ergaben gute Reliabilitäten für alle 
Realkennzeichen mit Ausnahme der 01-Logischen Konsistenz. Ebenso zeigte der 
Index Maxwell’s RE in einer ungewichteten Metanalyse gute Reliabilitäten mit 
Ausnahme zweier Kriterien (02-Ungeordnet sprunghafte Darstellung und 03-
Quantitativer Detailreichtum). Neben diesen Hauptbefunden deuteten weitere 
Analysen (Moderatoranalyse und Metaregression) auf Zusammenhänge zwischen 
unabhängigen Variablen und Reliabilität hin. Wie erwartet zeigte sich, dass eine 
besonders niedrige oder hohe Basisrate mit niedrigen Reliabilitäten (gemessen mit 
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Pearson’s r und kappa), jedoch mit erhöhter Prozentualer Übereinstimmung 
einhergeht. Des Weiteren ergaben sich hypothesenkonform für die meisten 
Realkennzeichen höhere Reliabilitäten (Pearson’s r) in Quasi-Experimenten und 
Feldstudien als in Experimenten. Bezüglich der Beurteilungsskalen wurden höhere 
Werte (Pearson’s r) für weniger differenzierte Skalen (wie z. B. Präsenzratings oder 
dichotome Urteile) im Vergleich zu Likert-Skalen oder Häufigkeitszählungen für 
einige Glaubhaftigkeitskriterien gefunden. Die Annahme, dass ein intensiveres 
Training mit einer höheren Reliabilität (Pearson’s r) einhergeht, wurde für fünf 
Realkennzeichen bestätigt, es zeigten sich jedoch ebenso Befunde in die konträre 
Richtung für drei weitere Kriterien. 
Zusammengefasst zeigte die Metaanalyse, dass die Beurteiler-
übereinstimmung für die meisten Realkennzeichen und innerhalb der meisten 
Reliabilitätsindizes als hinreichend bis gut zu beurteilen ist. Dabei ergaben sich wie 
angenommen besonders für Kriterien mit einer klaren Operationalisierung (wie zum 
Beispiel 06-Wiedergabe von Gesprächen, 10-Unverstandene Handlungselemente, 
oder 16-Einwände der Richtigkeit der eigenen Aussage) konsistent überzeugende 
Reliabilitäten. Besonders zwei Kriterien (02-Ungeordnet sprunghafte Darstellung, 09-
Schilderung nebensächlicher Einzelheiten) mit eher uneindeutigen Definitionen 
wiesen vergleichsweise niedrigere Reliabilitäten auf. Als weitere wesentliche 
Befunde zeigten sich Zusammenhänge der Reliabilität mit der Basisrate einzelner 
Kriterien, der Wahl des Forschungsparadigmas, der Beurteilungsskala und der 
Trainingsintensität. 
Neben den Hauptaussagen sind folgende Limitationen zu nennen und im 
Hinblick auf zukünftige Forschung kritisch zu diskutieren. Zunächst waren die 
Ergebnisse mehrheitlich von großer Heterogenität. Obwohl die Varianz durch die 
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erwähnten Variablen teilweise erklärt wurde, verblieb ein erheblicher Anteil 
ungeklärter Varianz. Daher wird es wichtig sein in weiterer Forschung, ungeklärte 
Varianz durch systematische Untersuchungen weiterer unabhängiger Variablen zu 
quantifizieren. Dies könnte in zukünftigen Metaanalysen ebenfalls möglich sein, 
wenn die Autoren der Studien alle Informationen zu unabhängigen als auch 
abhängigen Variablen offen darlegten (z. B. indem zusätzliche Daten auf 
entsprechenden Internetseiten der Zeitschriften hochgeladen würden). Da es in 
manchen Studien sehr schwierig oder nicht möglich gewesen ist, einige Daten zu 
erfassen, litten viele Ergebnisse unter dem Ausschluss relevanter Studien, womit die 
Power der Metaanalyse reduziert wurde (Cohn & Becker, 2003). Ebenso wurde die 
Aussagekraft der metaanalytischen Ergebnisse dadurch vermindert, dass häufig nur 
ein Anteil der gesamten Aussagen einer Studie mehrfach kodiert wurde. Es wäre 
daher für zukünftige Forschung wünschenswert, dass nach Möglichkeit alle 
unabhängigen Beurteiler und Beurteilerinnen alle Aussagen - und nicht nur einen 
Anteil - evaluieren könnten. Für die Auswahl des Reliabilitätsindexes wäre es 
erstrebenswert, wenn nicht nur auf die Prozentuale Übereinstimmung (aufgrund der 
Überschätzung durch die Zufallsübereinstimmung, siehe Cohen, 1960), sondern 
vielmehr auf psychometrisch höherwertige Indizes, wie Pearson’s r, ICC oder kappa 
abgestellt würde. Ebenfalls sollte, wie bereits erwähnt, immer die Basisrate der 
einzelnen Kriterien bei der Interpretation mitberücksichtigt werden. Abschließend 
bleibt zu erwähnen, dass die einzelnen Realkennzeichen nur einen Teil der 
forensisch-praktischen Arbeit der Glaubhaftigkeitsbegutachtung ausmachen und sich 
zukünftige Forschung mit den Gütekriterien des gesamten Prozesses der 
Glaubhaftigkeitsbegutachtung beschäftigen sollte (siehe Volbert & Steller, 2014). 
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Trotz dieser Limitationen und Anregungen zeigte diese Metaanalyse 
insgesamt, dass die Beurteilerübereinstimmung der allermeisten Realkennzeichen 
als zufriedenstellend zu beurteilen ist. Daher ist eine wesentliche Bedingung für die 
Validität der Realkennzeichen und für die Anwendung in der forensischen 
Aussagepsychologie gegeben. 
Schlussfolgerung 
Das Ziel der Dissertation war es, den Forschungsbereich der Entdeckung von 
Täuschung aus inhaltlicher Perspektive zu ergänzen. Die erste Metaanalyse zeigte, 
dass einige hypothesengeleitete linguistische Lügenmerkmale existieren, wobei die 
Validität aufgrund kleiner Effektstärken und Zusammenhänge zu Kontextvariablen 
als eingeschränkt zu beurteilen ist. Daher wurde empfohlen, Computerprogramme 
im Jahr 2015 als Entscheidungsgrundlage über Wahrheit oder Lüge nicht 
anzuwenden. Die zweite Metaanalyse ergab, dass die Beurteilerübereinstimmung für 
die meisten der 19 Glaubhaftigkeitsmerkmale anhand verschiedener 
Reliabilitätsindizes als hinreichend bis gut zu bewerten ist, wobei unabhängige 
Variablen bei der Interpretation berücksichtigt werden müssen. Insgesamt kann 
geschlussfolgert werden, dass inhaltliche Kriterien zur Differenzierung von Lüge und 
Wahrheit - unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen - psychometrische Gütekriterien 
erfüllen.
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